INVESTIGATION OF
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS
Before the President's Commission
on the Assassination
of President Kennedy

Pursuant to Executive Order 11130, an Executive order creating a Commission to ascertain, evaluate, and report upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination and S.J. Res. 137, 88th Congress, a concurrent resolution conferring upon the Commission the power to administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, receive evidence, and issue subpenas

Volume
V

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON: 1964

For sale in complete sets by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C., 20402

iii

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman

Biographical information on the Commissioners and the staff can be found in the Commission's Report.

v

Preface

The testimony of the following witnesses is contained in volume V: Alan H. Belmont, assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Jack Revill and V. J. Brian of the Dallas police, who testified concerning conversations Revill had with James Patrick Hosty, Jr., a special agent of the FBI; Robert A. Frazier, a firearms expert with the FBI; Drs. Alfred Olivier, Arthur Dziemian, and Frederick W. Light, Jr., wound ballistics experts with the U.S. Army laboratories at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; John A. McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Richard M. Helms, Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency; Thomas J. Kelley, Leo J. Gauthier, and Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, who testified concerning efforts to reconstruct the facts of the assassination; Mrs. John F. Kennedy; Jack Ruby; Henry Wade, district attorney of Dallas; Sgt. Patrick T. Dean, of the Dallas police, who testified concerning a conversation with Ruby; Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas; Richard Edward Snyder, John A. McVickar, Abram Chayes, Bernice Waterman, and Frances G. Knight, of the U.S. Department of State; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald; Harris Coulter, an interpreter with the Department of State; Robert Alan Surrey, a Dallas citizen who testified regarding his relationship with General Walker; James J. Rowley, Chief of the U.S. Secret Service; Robert Carswell, special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury; Bernard William Weissman, who testified concerning an advertisement signed by him which appeared in the Dallas Morning News on November 22, 1963; Robert G. Klause, a Dallas citizen who testified regarding a "Wanted For Treason" handbill; Mark Lane, a New York attorney; President Lyndon B. Johnson and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson; Llewellyn E. Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon.

vii

Contents

COMMISSION EXHIBITS INTRODUCED

1

Hearings Before the President's Commission
on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

Wednesday, May 6, 1964
TESTIMONY OF ALAN H. BELMONT

The President's Commission met at 9:25 a.m. on May 6, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald R. Ford, John J. McCloy, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; David W. Belin, assistant counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Samuel A. Stern, assistant counsel; and Charles Murray, observer.

The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, the Commission will come to order.

Mr. Belin, you had something you wanted the record to show in connection with our testimony yesterday.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Would you present it to the Commission now, please.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir. We have a report from an FBI document that states that Roy Truly when interviewed on November 22, advised that "it is possible Oswald did see him with a rifle in his hands within the past few days," that is as of November 22, "as a Mr. Warren Caster, employed by Southwestern Publishing Co., which company has an office in the same building, had come to his office with two rifles, one was a .22 caliber rifle which Caster said he had purchased for his son, and the other a larger more high-powered rifle which Caster said he had purchased with which to go deer hunting if he got a chance," and Truly said that he examined the high-powered rifle and raised it to his shoulder and sighted over it and then returned it to Caster and Caster left with both rifles.

Then Truly went on to state that he does not own a rifle and has had no other rifle in his hands or in his possession for a long period of time. Now because of the problem that did arise, I believe the staff will promptly go down to Dallas to take the deposition of both Mr. Truly and Mr. Caster to fully get this in deposition form and find out where these rifles were as of November 22.

The Chairman. And their caliber, and so forth.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yes, sir; I think that is desirable. You ought to do that.

Mr. Belmont, the purpose of today's hearing is to take your testimony concerning the general procedures of the FBI and explain their relationship to the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Would you please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Belmont. I do.

The Chairman. Will you be seated, please.

Mr. Stern, will you conduct the examination, please?

Mr. Stern. Thank you, sir. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. Belmont. Alan H. Belmont.

2 Mr. Stern. And your address, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. Belmont. 2711 North Yucatan Street, Arlington, Va.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, what was your education at the college level?

Mr. Belmont. Graduate of Stanford University in California, with an A.B. degree, majoring in accounting.

Mr. Stern. What year?

Mr. Belmont. 1931.

Mr. Stern. What was your employment briefly before joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. Belmont. I joined the Bureau, the FBI, in 1936, and in the interim I worked for public accountants and as a public accountant myself in California.

Mr. Stern. Would you describe, please, for the Commission briefly your experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1936?

Mr. Belmont. I entered the FBI November 30, 1936, and after the period of training, was assigned to Birmingham, Ala., as my first office. I transferred to Chicago in about August 1937, and remained there until the summer of 1938 when I was transferred to Washington, D.C., headquarters.

In January of 1941 I was transferred to New York as supervisor of applicant and criminal investigative matters, remained there until the fall of 1942, when I was made assistant agent in charge of our Chicago office. In January of 1943 I was made agent in charge of our Cincinnati office and remained there until the summer of 1944 when I was transferred to New York as assistant agent in charge of criminal matters in New York.

Subsequently, I was placed in charge of all security work in New York for a number of years and was transferred to Washington in charge of the domestic intelligence division in February 1950. I headed that division until about June of 1961 when I was made assistant to the director in charge of all investigative work of the FBI and that is my present position.

Mr. Stern. Could you describe the organization of the FBI with two purposes in mind: First, to fix your position in the organization. Second, to provide a framework for describing the investigation of the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Belmont. The headquarters of the FBI is, of course, or the FBI is headed by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as Director. Directly under him is Mr. Clyde Tolson, Associate Director. There are 10 divisions broken down in particular types of administration.

Mr. Dulles. May I say if any of this is classified, highly classified, you had better let us know because then we could go off the record.

Mr. Belmont. There is nothing classified here.

Mr. Dulles. Right. I know that you would have that in mind.

Mr. Belmont. Thank you.

Basically, the division of the 10 divisions at headquarters is between administrative and investigative. The 10th division is the inspection division and reports directly to Mr. Hoover. I am in charge of the investigative divisions which are comprised of the general investigative divisions handling general criminal work, the special investigative division handling special inquiries of applicant nature, and our aggressive approach to organized crime.

The laboratory division handles all examinations of a scientific nature, and the domestic intelligence division handles all types of security work. I am in charge of those four divisions, and thus am in charge and responsible for our investigative work.

Our field offices, numbering 55, are geographically located in accordance with the amount of work in a particular area. Each division in the field is headed by a special agent in charge, assisted by an assistant special agent in charge. They are responsible for the proper conduct of the work within their divisions. They are answerable to Mr. Hoover. They are also supervised, of course, in the particular area of the work concerned by the division at headquarters.

Depending on——

Mr. Dulles. May I ask is that 55 in the United States?

Mr. Belmont. United States and its possessions.

Mr. Dulles. And Puerto Rico?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. It doesn't include your legal——

3 Mr. Belmont. Legal attachés abroad?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. No; they are under the direct supervision of our headquarters.

Depending on the size of the division in the field, we will have a supervisory staff in order to properly supervise the work of the agents in the field.

Mr. Stern. Can you describe the establishment of a typical case, indicating the meaning of the terms office of origin and auxiliary office?

Mr. Belmont. A case is opened by the FBI upon the receipt of information indicating a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI. We restrict our investigations to those matters which are within our jurisdiction.

The office of origin is the office where the major part of the work is to be done. Thus it should be the controlling office of the investigation.

Normally, if an individual is under investigation, it will be the office where he resides. There will be in many cases investigation to be conducted by other offices. Those offices that have investigations in that case are considered auxiliary offices, and will cover the investigation sent to it, sent to them, by the office of origin or by another auxiliary office if a lead develops within that area that requires attention elsewhere.

I may say that the office of origin can be changed and is changed if during the investigation it becomes apparent that the focus of the investigation has shifted to another area.

It is logical, therefore, that that office which bears the brunt of the investigation should be in possession of all the material pertinent to the investigation and should be charged with the supervision and running of the investigation and the direction of it.

In the event the office of origin is changed at any given time, the previous office of origin will forward to the new office of origin all material pertaining to the case so that it will have a complete file and the necessary knowledge to run the case.

Mr. Stern. Can you tell us a bit more about how information is maintained and how it flows through the system from headquarters to office of origin, to the auxiliary office or in the other directions that are possible?

Mr. Belmont. Since the information is maintained in a standard and uniform filing system in both our field offices and our headquarters so that there is complete uniformity in the handling of information, our main filing system is at headquarters. Consequently, we need here all pertinent information in any case. Consequently, the reports and information developed during a case are sent to our headquarters for filing.

It is pertinent to observe that we conduct close to 2 million name checks a year for other agencies and departments of the Federal Government. Consequently, we must have here all pertinent information so that a name check will reflect the information in possession of the Bureau.

When a report is prepared in our field office—an investigation, and there are leads or investigation to be performed in another office, copies of this report are designated for that office, together with the lead or the investigation to be covered. Upon receipt of that the office gathers the background information from the report and proceeds with the investigation.

Mr. Stern. This is the auxiliary office?

Mr. Belmont. The auxiliary office.

If there is a matter of urgency rather than wait for an investigative report, the information will be transmitted by more rapid means, such as teletype. All of our offices have teletypes; radio, our offices have a radio system; telephone.

Mr. Dulles. Is that teletype from the office to Washington only, or is there some interoffice teletypes?

Mr. Belmont. Each office is connected with each other office by teletype.

Mr. Dulles. It is; all over the country?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; permitting rapid communication.

Mr. Dulles. That is, New Orleans and Dallas would have teletype between these two offices?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

The Chairman. What kind of radio communication, Mr. Belmont, did you say?

4 Mr. Belmont. We have an emergency radio communication so that both for normal use, in the matter of expense, to reduce expenses, and for an emergency, our offices can communicate with headquarters and with each other.

The Chairman. On your own transmission system?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; that is correct. We feel that in any type of an emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities——

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with the mainland was our radio system.

The Chairman. Is that so?

Mr. Belmont. And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska.

We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a matter of urgency and requires special handling.

So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of communication.

By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling, the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL.

Mr. Stern. I think we might turn now to a description of your role in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. As the individual in charge of all investigative operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility, the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau.

Mr. Stern. Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall in the investigation of his case before November 22—personally?

Mr. Belmont. No; this case was not of the importance or urgency that it was considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters. Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis.

Mr. Stern. Have you been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. I have indeed.

Mr. McCloy. Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year?

Mr. Belmont. I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our system to investigate any individual where there is information or evidence that indicates a necessity for investigation within our jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other areas of the world.

Mr. McCloy. They also would not come per se to your attention, your personal attention?

Mr. Belmont. Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover.

I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure. That is inherent in our system of close supervision.

Mr. McCloy. What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of defection just out of its own character of such significance that it becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when you learn of it.

Mr. Belmont. Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to which those particular cases would be called to my attention.

As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these. Immediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication of possible damage5 to the country through the leak of information, classified or in some other instance where there is a question of policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only say in general I do see many such cases.

Mr. McCloy. Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a preassassination investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a defector, they had interviews with him, and then they marked the case closed.

At one stage it was reopened and then it was closed again because, as I gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense.

I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in the field office, in the office that had charge, the man who was in charge of the office that was dealing with that case locally, is that right?

Mr. Belmont. That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment would be passed on by our headquarters staff.

Mr. McCloy. Passed on by Washington?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence division.

Mr. McCloy. In this case then the decision to close that case, I am talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or tacitly approved by the Washington staff.

Mr. Belmont. Not tacitly approved. Approved.

Mr. McCloy. Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just accept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing."

Mr. Belmont. When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is reviewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation. That is a decision of substance.

Mr. McCloy. Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved?

Mr. Belmont. No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that would be an unnecessary move.

Mr. McCloy. I can understand that.

Mr. Belmont. It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service, through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and it is reviewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to the handling of the closing of the case or any other matter pertaining to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with instructions to the field.

Mr. McCloy. All right.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question further on that point?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Dulles. As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday, with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets, and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started.

Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful.

Mr. Belmont. The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion that the purpose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had been served. He closed the case, as he felt there was no further action to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed.

In March 1963 Agent Hosty received information in Dallas to the effect that6 Oswald had been in communication with The Worker, the east coast Communist newspaper. He therefore reinstituted the case, and sent out a lead to check Oswald's employment. He also received information, as I recall it, that Oswald had been in communication with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, so there were two incidents that aroused his interest.

In June 1963 our New Orleans office likewise received information that Oswald had communicated with The Worker or was on a subscription list for The Worker. So that the case was revived in Dallas by Hosty.

Mr. Dulles. That was even before what we call the New Orleans incident?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. And he learned that Oswald had left Dallas, the residence was then picked up in New Orleans, and the case was revived. So that actually there was a joint revival of the case.

Then on August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested by the New Orleans police in connection with a disturbance of the peace in passing out these pamphlets, which further aroused our interest. So that the reopening of the case after the closing was due to these incidents that I have mentioned.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you. So that at the time of the assassination, this was an open and not a closed case as regards the Dallas office.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct. At the time that Oswald was found to be living in New Orleans, and this was definitely established that he was actually residing there, the Dallas office in accordance with the procedure that I mentioned, transferred the case to New Orleans as office of origin.

Subsequently, the case was again transferred back to Dallas when it was determined that Oswald was again residing in the Dallas area.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern. We were getting, Mr. Belmont, to the question of whether you had been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. I said I have indeed.

Mr. Stern. Yes. As a part of that you have reviewed in detail the investigation made prior to the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Have you participated in or supervised the preparation of reports and other correspondence to the Commission in response to questions from the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. I show you a letter with attached memorandum which has been marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 833. Can you identify this document, Mr. Belmont?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter transmitted on April 6, 1964, to Mr. Rankin by the FBI with enclosure answering a number of questions which the Commission posed to the FBI.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this letter?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. And you have reviewed it and are familiar with it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. We have covered in your answers to Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCloy a good deal of the material in here.

I would like briefly to touch upon several of the questions, the more important questions, regarding the nature of the FBI's interest in Lee Harvey Oswald at various times, and I would like you to refer to each question that I indicate but not read your answer. Paraphrase it. I think we have had a good deal of the specific detail but what I am interested in is a description from your examination of the investigation as it was carried on, of the nature of the FBI interest in Oswald.

I would like to turn to the first question in which we asked——

The Chairman. You mean by that that you could get, we could get, a better idea from paraphrasing the answer than we could get from the exact answer itself?

7 Mr. Stern. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might——

The Chairman. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.

Mr. Stern. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions?

Mr. Belmont. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.

We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.

That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.

Mr. Stern. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to?

Mr. Belmont. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.

Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.

So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college.

Mr. Stern. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question.

Mr. Dulles. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833—the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file."

The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known about it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

8 We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.

Mr. Dulles. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Stern. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York?

Mr. Belmont. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.

Mr. Stern. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?

Mr. Belmont. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not?

The Chairman. Yes; 1962.

Mr. Belmont. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.

Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.

Mr. Stern. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual?

Mr. Belmont. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.

Mr. Stern. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?

Mr. Belmont. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.

When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes.

Mr. Stern. Turning to——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. Belmont. No evidence whatsoever.

9 Mr. Stern. Question 8, Mr. Belmont, on page 5, sets out the information from a report by Agent Hosty regarding alleged Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity by Oswald while he was still residing in Dallas. Have you found that an investigation was conducted to determine whether that was accurate and do you think it should have been investigated?

Mr. Belmont. As to whether he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas? We did check. We have rather excellent coverage of such activities. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas. And, as a matter of fact, I can go a step further and say that following his dissemination of pamphlets and his activities in New Orleans, our inquiry of our sources who are competent to tell us what is going on in the organizations such as Fair Play for Cuba Committee, advised that he was not known to them in New Orleans. So that his activities in New Orleans were of his own making, and not as a part of the organized activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. McCloy. On that point, Mr. Belmont, where did he get his material, the printed material that he was distributing? Must he not have gotten that from some headquarters?

Mr. Belmont. It is my recollection that he had that printed up himself.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. McCloy. All of it, so far as you know, was self-induced, so to speak?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Stern. Does your answer imply, Mr. Belmont, that there were Fair Play for Cuba activities in Dallas and New Orleans that you knew about?

Mr. Belmont. No; we do not have information of Fair Play for Cuba activities in Dallas nor any organized activity in New Orleans. So that this letter that you refer to, which was undated, was, as in so many things that Oswald wrote, not based on fact.

Mr. Stern. On page 7 in the answer to question 12, you refer to the inconsistencies and contradictions between the information Oswald gave to Agent Quigley when he interviewed him in the New Orleans jail and the facts as they were known to the FBI before that, and say that "in the event the investigation of Oswald warranted a further interview, these discrepancies would have been discussed with him."

Can you explain why the fact of these inconsistencies and contradictions and perhaps outright lies to Agent Quigley was not itself reason for a further interview?

Mr. Belmont. Let me turn this just a little bit and say why should we re-interview him?

Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether his activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving statement to Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files as a part of the case, and if we determined that the course of the investigation required us to clarify or face him down with this information, we would do it at the appropriate time.

In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling us something that wasn't true, and unless this required further investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course, in accord with the whole context of the investigation.

Mr. Stern. Do you know whether the fact of these contradictions was called to the attention of the Dallas office at the time of Oswald's return to Dallas?

Mr. Belmont. The entire file, of course, or the pertinent serials were sent to Dallas at the time that the case was transferred back to Dallas so they would have that information.

Mr. Stern. I gather what you are saying is they would note the contradictions from the reports?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. In the answer to question 14 on page 8, again in connection with these inconsistencies, the letter reads "These inconsistencies were considered in subsequent investigation."

Can you expand on that and tell us how they were considered?

Mr. Belmont. That is right along the line of my previous explanation to you,10 namely, that they were recorded in the file. In the event it was desired to talk to him further at a future date, they would be considered as to whether we desired to have him further explain.

Mr. Stern. On page 12, in response to question 22, which asked for an explanation of the reason for the investigation to ascertain his whereabouts, the letter reads, "In view of Oswald's background and activities the FBI had a continuing interest in him."

What was the nature of that continuing interest at that time?

Mr. Belmont. On August 21, 1963, because of his activities in distributing these pamphlets, and his arrest in New Orleans, headquarters here in Washington sent a letter to the New Orleans and Dallas offices instructing them to pursue the investigation. In other words, in evaluating this information we felt it desirable that we further explore his activities to determine whether they were inimical to the internal security of the country. So that we had this continuing interest based on our evaluation, and so instructed our field offices.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, I believe the answers to the other questions give us a complete enough record.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Stern. May this exhibit which has been marked 833 for identification be admitted?

The Chairman. It may be admitted in evidence under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. McCloy. Is there anything else, Mr. Belmont, that you may want to add? You have already been asked this question as you went through all these questions and answers, but is there anything else you would like to add in view of your answers this morning in further elaboration of the answers that have been given?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; unless the Commission has further questions at this point, I believe that the questions are answered properly and sufficiently.

Mr. McCloy. You think that if you are interviewing a defector which is something that provokes your interest, and I guess the mere fact of defection and return to the United States would do so, and if you found that defector was lying to you, you think that without something in addition to that there would be no further necessity of examining him. Is that a fair question? Let me put it another way.

Mr. Belmont. I have just a little difficulty following you.

Mr. McCloy. Here is my point. Here was a defector who comes within the category of interesting cases naturally.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. And you question him and you find he is lying to you. At that stage, as I understand your testimony, you say without something more you don't necessarily go any further, is that right?

Mr. Belmont. No; that is not correct. We had talked to this man twice in detail concerning the question of possible recruitment by Soviet intelligence. We had checked his activities. He was settling down. He had a wife and a child. He had, according to what he had told us, in our interview with him, he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. The State Department evaluation of him in Moscow was that he had learned his lesson and, as a matter of fact, he had made some statement to the effect that he now recognized the value of the American way of life, along those lines.

So that we had pretty well settled that issue. At the time that we interviewed him in the jail in New Orleans, we had again been following his activities because of his communications, his contacts with The Worker and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and our interest there was to determine whether he was a dangerous subversive. The interview in the jail was very apparently a self-serving interview in an attempt to explain his activities in the New Orleans area, and if I recall correctly, he took the position that the policy as directed against Cuba was not correct, and that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was merely addressing itself to the complaints of Cuba, and was not in effect a subversive organization.

11 If, Mr. McCloy, during those first two interviews where we were pursuing this matter of him being a defector and his recruitment, he had lied to us, and the agent was not satisfied we would have pursued it to the bitter end. Or if during any other time information came to our attention which indicated a necessity to pursue that further we would have pursued it to the bitter end.

Mr. McCloy. You speak of this as a self-serving interview. Do you think that he sought the interview with you, with Mr. Quigley eventually, because he had known of the prior contacts that he had had with the FBI, and he simply wanted to keep out of trouble?

Mr. Belmont. I don't know why he asked to see an agent. I simply do not know why.

Mr. McCloy. I think that is all.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 834. Can you identify that for the Commission, please?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated May 4, 1964, addressed to the Commission which sets forth in summary the contents of the headquarters file on Oswald prior to the assassination.

Mr. Stern. Do you have that file with you?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. Would you explain generally to the Commission what materials there are in that file that for security reasons you would prefer not to disclose?

Mr. Belmont. The file contains the identity of some of our informants in subversive movements. It contains information as to some of the investigative techniques whereby we were able to receive some of the information which has been made available to the Commission.

Mr. Stern. I think that is enough, Mr. Belmont, on that.

Mr. McCloy. You didn't have anything further to add to that, did you?

Mr. Belmont. No.

The Chairman. I think as to those things if it is agreeable to the other members of the Commission, we will not pursue any questioning that will call for an answer that would divulge those matters that you have just spoken of.

Mr. Belmont. I would like to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that—I think that is very kind of you—I would like to make it clear that Mr. Hoover has expressed a desire to be of the utmost help to the Commission, and to make any information available that will be helpful to the Commission. I think your observation is very much worthwhile.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, have you reviewed the actual file and this letter of May 4 which summarizes each document in the file?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, is this an accurate summary of each piece of information in the file?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. The file is available to the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. If they want to look at any item in it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The file does not include that security matter that you mentioned, or does it?

Mr. Belmont. This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau with all information in it.

The Chairman. With all information in it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; this is the actual file.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Belmont, are you willing to leave the file a reasonable time in case any of the Commissioners desire to examine it personally?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. We will return it.

The Chairman. I wonder if we do want it on those conditions. If we want to get anything from it don't you think, Mr. Rankin, that we ought to make12 it known here while the witness is here. I personally don't care to have this information that involves our security unless it is necessary, and I don't want to have documents in my possession where it could be assumed that I had gotten that information and used it, so I would rather, I would rather myself confine our questions to this file to the testimony of Mr. Belmont. Then if we want it, if we want any of those things, it then becomes a matter to discuss here in the open, and not just in privacy.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I felt it made a better record if the file is available only to the Commissioners in case they do want to examine it, and then it will be taken back and the staff will not examine it.

The Chairman. I think he has stated that the file will be made available to us whenever we want it.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

The Chairman. If we do want it to read it that is one thing. For myself, I think we can get what we want from examining the witness, and then if there is any portion of it that comes into play why we can determine the question here, but I really would prefer not to have a secret file, I mean a file that contains matters of that kind in our possession.

Mr. Rankin. There is one factor that I wanted to get before the Commission and in the record, and that is that you had all the information that the FBI had in regard to this matter, and I thought that was important to your proceedings, so that we would not retain such a file, and we had an accurate summary but that it is available so that the Commission can be satisfied that nothing was withheld from it in regard to this particular question. That was the purpose of the inquiry.

Mr. Dulles. I assume, Mr. Belmont, if later other testimony arises that would make us desire to refer to this file we could consult it in your offices or you would make it available to us?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I think I would personally rather have it done on that basis. What do you think, Mr. McCloy?

Mr. McCloy. I was just glancing at the file, and it seems to have the regular, the usual type of reports that we have seen. But there is a good bit of elaboration in those, in that file of the summary which is here. This summary I don't think can purport to be a complete description of the documents that are in here, as I glance through them here.

I just happened to see a good bit of detail in here which doesn't have anything to do with the security problem we talked about, but I would think that probably it would be wise for some member of the Commission or members of the Commission as a whole, to run through that file in order to be sure that we have seen the material elements of the file that we would not perhaps, might not, be able to get from this letter of May 4.

The Chairman. Well, there are so many of these questions in here that are obviously matters that we would have no more concern with than just to know about them.

Start from the very beginning, a news clipping from the Corpus Christi Times, dated October 2, 1959. Now if that excites any interest on the part of any member, why we could say, "Well, could you show us that?" Then the next is the United Press release, dated October 31 at Moscow, and a great many of these.

Now, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for us to look over all of these various things, items that are in the file, and then if there are any that happen to excite our interest, we can ask Mr. Belmont about it. If it is a matter that involves security, we could then discuss it and make our determination as to whether we wanted to see it. I would think that when we are dealing with things that are as sensitive as the FBI has to deal with in that respect, that that would be adequate; that is my opinion of it.

But if the rest of the Commission feel that they want to see it notwithstanding the security measure, I would, of course, have no objection.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, what I was trying to deal with was a claim by someone that the Commission never saw all there was in the hands of the13 FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, and we recognize that some of these items should not be considered important by anyone, as we look at the matter, but we wanted you to be able to satisfy the public and the country that whatever there was that the FBI had, the Commission had it, and we didn't think that in light of the security problems the whole file should be a part of the files of the Commission. And we tried to present here a summary, even of items that did not seem important, but we did want the record in such condition that the Commission could say in its report, "We have seen everything that they have." I think it is important to the case.

Mr. McCloy. I notice, Mr. Belmont, in running through this file, a note here that symbols are used in instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir.

Mr. McCloy. If that is so——

Mr. Belmont. In some instances.

Mr. McCloy. Only in some instances. There are other cases where that is not the case.

Mr. Belmont. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McCloy. There is a great deal of narrative in here about Oswald and his relations with the Embassy. Maybe it is elsewhere in the record.

Mr. Belmont. I would presume that you have received that from the other agencies. Those are copies of communications that the other agencies sent to us.

The Chairman. Well, why couldn't we go over this list and see what items we would be interested in and then we can determine, can we not, whether we want——

Mr. McCloy. I am not so sure, you can look through this yourself, I am not so sure if from reading just that short summary you get the full impact of all the narrative that is in the various reports. There is a good bit here. For example, one page I have here about this business of beating his wife and the drinking. There is a good bit of detail.

Mr. Belmont. Mr. McCloy, you have that record.

The Chairman. We have the record, I have read the records myself.

Mr. McCloy. Maybe we have that one.

Mr. Belmont. Any investigative report you have.

Mr. McCloy. Is there any investigative report in here that we have not got?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. We are trying to develop, Mr. Chief Justice and Commissioners, that you have everything that the FBI had, this is their total file in regard to this matter of Lee Harvey Oswald so that there is nothing withheld from you as far as the FBI is concerned. That is part of what we are trying to develop this morning, in addition to the items themselves.

Mr. Dulles. I wonder if the staff, Mr. Rankin, could not go over this and check over those items we have from other sources and what the FBI has already furnished us so what we deal with with respect to this file are only items that are not in the Commission's records, already. That would cut this down by half, I would imagine or more.

Mr. Rankin. Yes; we could do that for you.

Mr. Dulles. Then we could have this available possibly at a later date just to check over the other items against your files to see if there is any information there that we really need.

The Chairman. You could come back, couldn't you, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. Belmont. I am at your disposal.

The Chairman. I think that would be better. I think, Mr. Rankin, your purpose is entirely laudable here, but I think we do have to use some discretion in the matter, and you say that you want it so we can say we have seen everything. Well, the same people who would demand that we see everything of this kind would also demand that they be entitled to see it, and if it is security matters we can't let them see it. It has to go back to the FBI without their scrutiny.

So unless, I would say, unless there is something that we think here is vital to this situation, that it isn't necessary for us to see the whole file, particularly14 in view of the fact that we have practically—we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go over it and over it again.

Mr. McCloy. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from the Embassy?

Mr. Belmont. You are looking at——

Mr. McCloy. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We don't have these in our files, for example.

Mr. Belmont. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see.

Mr. McCloy. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative processes as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have somebody go through it.

Mr. Dulles. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file probably.

Mr. McCloy. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it.

The Chairman. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file then until we can give you the information.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. Stern. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?

The Chairman. Yes. There are no security matters in this?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

The Chairman. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 835?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Stern. What is the subject?

Mr. Belmont. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI.

Mr. Dulles. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this sense?

Mr. Belmont. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or without payment.

Mr. Stern. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out information at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal15 matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants.

Mr. Stern. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an informant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other agents have told us about?

Mr. Belmont. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in no way.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information contained here?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. And you are familiar with it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; I am.

Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?

Mr. Belmont. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.

Mr. Stern. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. No; we do not.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his handling of the Oswald case?

Mr. Belmont. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and decided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is concerned.

The Chairman. And a year before the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. Frankly, I don't recall.

The Chairman. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.

Mr. Stern. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.

Mr. Stern. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testimony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subsequently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testimony before the Commission.

Mr. Stern. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an informant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. The Commission's letter so advised us.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?

The Chairman. It may be admitted under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yesterday, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us?

Mr. Belmont. In order to be sure—I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?

Mr. Belmont. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves.16 I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent over with this letter.

Mr. Stern. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. To your knowledge, are they accurate?

Mr. Belmont. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.

Mr. Stern. Are they complete?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Stern. In connection with the material they cover?

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Stern. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest we admit this document.

The Chairman. It may be admitted as No. 825.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service.

Mr. Stern. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?

Mr. Belmont. I did.

Mr. Stern. Have you reviewed it recently?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; it is.

Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. Belmont. Well——

Mr. Dulles. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Service and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions.

Mr. Dulles. Subsequent to the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Stern. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to employ before the assassination in determining what information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President?

Mr. Belmont. These are contained in detail in the attachments which represent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. These instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Washington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been furnished to Secret Service.

17 Mr. Stern. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that is before the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes. Specifically the kind?

Mr. Stern. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against the President and Vice President and members of the family.

Mr. Stern. Have you broadened——

Mr. Belmont. I may say, sir——

Mr. Stern. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our responsibility and duty to furnish this information.

Mr. Stern. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information they were interested in?

Mr. Belmont. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should be furnished.

Mr. Stern. That is, established by the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of——

Mr. Belmont. No; I did not.

Mr. Stern. This liaison function.

Mr. Belmont. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.

Mr. Stern. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your instructions to special agents in this respect?

Mr. Belmont. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President.

The Chairman. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. Belmont. They appear as an attachment—working from the back, I think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of Instructions Section 83."

The Chairman. Yes; I have it.

Mr. Belmont. The first page is the same information that we previously furnished to Secret Service involving threats.

The Chairman. The first page is intact, as it was before.

Mr. Belmont. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the present date?

Mr. Belmont. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do it with the staff, or can I help you here?

Mr. Dulles. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.

Mr. Belmont. Very good.

18 Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.

Mr. Stern. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?

Mr. Belmont. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.

Mr. Dulles. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly changing in section (d) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government has.

Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change that.

Mr. Dulles. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it.

Mr. Belmont. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Stern. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont, should that "and" before (d) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these——

Mr. Belmont. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together if that is your thought.

Mr. Stern. That is right.

Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or".

Mr. Stern. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.

The Chairman. In what period of time?

Mr. Belmont. Since we put them out.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Belmont. Which was December 26.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. Have you included defectors in this list?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.

Mr. Stern. You mean as of December 26, 1963?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Stern. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under the expanded criteria?

Mr. Belmont. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.19 Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of security—I am not boring you with this, am I?

The Chairman. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.

Mr. Belmont. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.

We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing room.)

We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.

For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a danger.

That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field.20 We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.

Mr. McCloy. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been used to having.

Mr. Belmont. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.

Mr. McCloy. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that you feel——

Mr. Belmont. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.

Mr. McCloy. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures to cope with this, won't they?

Mr. Belmont. I do not know.

Mr. McCloy. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this Commission—I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that—all those under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.

You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.

Mr. McCloy. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are not saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right in that?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, "If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the information.

Mr. McCloy. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an occasion, when the President travels?

Mr. Belmont. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been referred to them.

Mr. McCloy. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made.21 This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders.

Mr. Belmont. I think you are correct.

Mr. McCloy. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.

Mr. Dulles. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been extended?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. If you——

Mr. Dulles. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instructions.

Mr. Belmont. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.

Mr. Dulles. That is paragraph 1?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2 of this exhibit which have been added?

Mr. Belmont. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.

Representative Ford. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone to the Secret Service automatically?

Mr. Belmont. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors automatically.

Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all defectors.

Representative Ford. Defectors are for the time being at least a special category other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would fall into one of these categories.

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. All Communists, yes.

Mr. Dulles. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative cases?

The Chairman. Yes; we can put it into the record.

Mr. Dulles. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set forth in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 83; is that correct?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. McCloy. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?

Mr. Stern. That is right number of the exhibit.

Mr. McCloy. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.

Mr. Dulles. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included that we add the dates and the page numbers.

Mr. Stern. I think the witness can do this immediately.

The Chairman. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it and incorporate it later in the record.

(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)

"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials22 or employees of Federal, State, or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government."

Mr. Dulles. Do I understand you, Mr. Belmont, to say, as drafted you would not consider that defectors automatically fell under this paragraph 2, but it is your practice to notify the Secret Service about defectors?

Mr. Belmont. We do notify Secret Service of any defectors coming to our attention.

Mr. Dulles. And by defectors, I guess we mean here maybe a redefector, meaning those who have gone to Russia and have come back or maybe those who have gone and not come back.

Mr. Belmont. If they haven't come back——

Mr. Dulles. They are not a danger.

Mr. Belmont. They are not within our cognizance and we don't notify Secret Service.

Mr. Dulles. These would be defectors who have gone to the Soviet Union and who then come back to the United States and tried to defect while they were over there.

Mr. McCloy. Not necessarily, not exclusively the Soviet Union, of course.

Mr. Dulles. Communist countries, I would say.

Representative Ford. Just to get an order of magnitude, how many are there? Is this a sizable number?

Mr. Belmont. I don't have a figure, Mr. Ford. You have had defectors in Korea from the military. You have had defectors——

Mr. McCloy. Germany.

Mr. Belmont. Berlin. When these are military personnel they are within the cognizance of the military, so that it is very difficult for me to give you a figure.

When we become interested is when they return to this country and warrant action by us from an internal security standpoint.

As in the Oswald case, we started our action based on newspaper publicity that he had attempted to or indicated his intention to, renounce his citizenship in Moscow. But I do not have a figure because many of these people are members of the armed services and I would hesitate to give you an estimate.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, do these terms "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists" have a particular meaning of art in FBI parlance? Can you tell us how you use these terms in this regulation or what these mean to you and to your agents.

Mr. Belmont. I will have to refer you to the dictionary, I think, Mr. Stern. A subversive is an individual who is active in the Communist Party or front groups associated with it or one of the other groups that we term subversive, such as the Socialist Workers Party.

The ultrarightists——

Mr. Dulles. Socialist Workers Party is a Trotskyite Party, is it not?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The ultrarightists, I believe here we attempt to spell out those people who are so far to the right that they do not consider themselves subject to the law and the proper procedures, and take things into their own hands.

The racists, I think, are—that speaks for itself, individuals who will go beyond the bounds of propriety in seeking their goals, and who adopt violence.

The Fascists——

Mr. McCloy. I was wondering how you were going to define that one.

Mr. Belmont. Is to give you the opposite end of the spectrum of subversives.

Mr. Dulles. Do we have anarchists in this country at the present time? There used to be an old anarchist society in the old days.

Mr. Belmont. That used to be, but it is dissolved. There is no organization. I venture to say we have individual anarchists at this time.

Mr. Dulles. No organized anarchist organization.

Mr. Belmont. No.

23 Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, in view of the quite important considerations you mentioned before, the danger of interfering with individual liberty, would it be possible within your organization to have the agents recommend to headquarters here and have someone at a higher level examine the recommendation before it is made to the Secret Service? This is, as I understand it, a continuing program and not one that comes into effect only when the President schedules a trip. This would operate without respect to scheduled trips by the President. Would that be possible? Would it fit your operation? Do you think it might help any?

Mr. Belmont. Well, what is your thought behind that, Mr. Stern? In other words, so that names of persons won't indiscriminately be sent on a local level?

Mr. Stern. Precisely. These categories are, after all, fairly gross. They use large terms which can mean different things to different people. The considerations you mention, I think, are quite real and important. Would it help any to do something of the sort?

Mr. Belmont. I think we will find that our agents are using good judgment in this matter. The danger involved in referring these matters to headquarters for a decision as to dissemination is the delay in time and, you will note, we stress the time element that when such information comes into the possession of our agents, immediate steps must be taken to transmit this information to Secret Service by the most expeditious means possible.

This might be of assistance to you. This information which we send to Secret Service in the field is placed in a control file, a separate file in the field, and is subject, under instructions, to inspection by our inspectors as they visit our field offices to insure that this requirement is being carried out properly; and they will examine the type of material that is being sent over.

Each field office is thoroughly inspected about once a year, and that is one of the requirements that they go through this to make sure this instruction is being properly carried out.

Mr. McCloy. I have no further questions. I have some general questions I would like to get to at the end, but I have to leave early this afternoon.

Mr. Rankin. I have one question I wanted to interject, Mr. Chairman, and that is as to statements, Mr. Belmont, about subversives, including persons who are members of Communist front groups. You mean to say that that includes any person who is a member of a Communist front group because, as you know, many leading citizens have been members of such groups.

Mr. Belmont. Now, Mr. Rankin, I wouldn't carry it by any means that far. It would be dependent upon the front group, the extent of activity in it, and the activities of the individual. By no means would we classify someone as a subversive who was connected with a front group by name or——

Mr. Dulles. By front groups you mean those on the Attorney General's list; you are taking that as a criterion of a front group?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; not necessarily that, sir. There are other groups that we consider front groups.

Mr. Dulles. I see.

Mr. Belmont. I am glad you raised that because each case would have to be considered on its own individual merits as to what is the extent of the activity and the purpose and intent of the activity.

Mr. Rankin. You recognize in the work in this field that there are many Americans who are interested in certain causes and purposes and front groups in connection with them who are loyal Americans, don't you?

Mr. Belmont. I have no doubt of that whatsoever.

Mr. Rankin. I just wanted to get that in the record.

Mr. Belmont. I also know many loyal Americans, unfortunately, who don't look behind some of these groups to determine their intents and purposes, and allow their names to be used where they would not otherwise do so if they took the time and trouble to check into what the organization was.

Mr. Rankin. So you don't lump them all under the term "subversive," that is what I was trying to get at.

Mr. Belmont. Right.

The Chairman. I suppose some join before an organization is infiltrated, too.

24 Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir; that is right.

Mr. McCloy. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents are capable of applying the judgment.

Representative Ford. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to this greater flow of information that they have received?

Mr. Belmont. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to my knowledge.

Representative Ford. Have they objected to the greater burden?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you are going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are excellent. We work closely together.

As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the President, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions made agents available at the request of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs to something like 139 agents—yes, 139 agents that we have made available.

We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for Secret Service and for the FBI; to see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad, particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose.

In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our offices to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the President when he makes this trip.

This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation and request of Secret Service.

Representative Ford. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in these instances?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was offered to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit a city and Secret Service does not have sufficient personnel in that particular city to cover what they consider is necessary, they need specialized help from us, they will make the request to us and we will authorize our local agent in charge to make those men, the designated number, available to the Secret Service representative, who then uses their services while the President is there.

Representative Ford. I gather that prior to the assassination such requests, specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the Bureau.

Mr. Belmont. No. There were never any such requests before.

Mr. Stern. At the level at which the requests have been made so far, have they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of something like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have, and our agents are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the country, ranging from matters of immediate urgency to matters which can be handled in due time, and whenever25 our agents are putting in an average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, the loan of 139 men will be felt.

Representative Ford. 169.

Mr. Belmont. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139.

Mr. Stern. 139 on 16 separate occasions.

Mr. Belmont. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not complaining.

We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase its personnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is properly their problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure and we are not complaining.

Mr. Dulles. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr. Belmont was here, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going back to the assassination day, a clear definition of the respective functions of the FBI and the Secret Service prior to and immediately after the assassination. There seemed to have been at one time a little confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this kind it always happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to——

Mr. Belmont. At the time of the assassination?

Mr. Dulles. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were just before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the functions of the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is a basic responsibility.

Mr. Dulles. And you have no auxiliary function to that——

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a primary responsibility and function of Secret Service.

Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish to Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that we have done religiously.

After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation of the assassination which changed the picture as far as this particular case was concerned.

Mr. Dulles. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. And there was a period there, there was a period though, after the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of office—did this order come to you during that period or after he had taken the oath of office?

Mr. Belmont. It was very rapid, probably within a day.

Mr. Dulles. I see. It wasn't immediately after.

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Dulles. It wasn't this period I am speaking of.

Mr. Belmont. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no jurisdiction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder and was within the province of the local police who immediately took hold of it and started the investigation.

Mr. Dulles. I realize that.

Mr. Belmont. And started the investigation and it was theirs.

Mr. Dulles. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by courtesy of the local authorities.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and immediately went into action because of what had happened, and there was no time for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be of the utmost assistance, and we sent men to the police department to assist in the interview and do anything else we could. This wasn't a time, of course, to sit back and say, "This isn't our job."

Mr. Dulles. I understand.

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

The Chairman. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any legislation26 in recent years that might have been introduced in the Congress to make an attack upon the President a Federal offense?

Mr. Belmont. I do know that there is legislation presently pending.

The Chairman. Since the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Since the assassination.

The Chairman. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know it had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were there any recent legislation to that effect?

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done research on it, and I just don't know.

The Chairman. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.

Representative Ford. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of Representatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right to take certain action when a chief of state from a foreign country was within the United States; a broadening of their authority when they had a suspicion or they had some reason to believe that an attack was being made on a foreign dignitary.

At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question you just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific legislative matters pending before any committee on this particular point.

Mr. Belmont. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection is that it was called to our attention—I cannot pinpoint it for you—but I think there is pending legislation now in this matter.

Mr. McCloy. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to the fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the wastebasket.

The Chairman. That is true.

Mr. McCloy. In respect of other incidents.

The Chairman. When the emotion died down.

Mr. McCloy. When the emotion died down, that is true.

I have some further questions.

The Chairman. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?

Mr. Stern. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday. Mr. Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if possible, when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on October 29, November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that he thought it had been done after the assassination. Have you caused a check to be made on that?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not have a specific record of when that information was recorded.

Mr. Stern. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some contemporaneous communication?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I recall correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of Mrs. Paine and had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.

Mr. Stern. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64 and 67, just so the record is straight.

Mr. Belmont. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the headquarters dated October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview that he had had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.

On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his contact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his interviews were incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4, but the actual insert for the report was not prepared until some time later. To the best of Hosty's recollection it was after the 22d and prior to December 2, but he was already on record by these AIRTELS.

Mr. Stern. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.

I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Mr. McCloy.

Mr. McCloy. I have one or two questions.

Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an agent or an informant of the FBI?

27 Mr. Belmont. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr. McCloy, and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never was, an agent or an informant of the FBI.

Mr. McCloy. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason to make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent of any other country.

Mr. McCloy. Or any other agency of the United States?

Mr. Belmont. Or any other agency of the United States.

Mr. McCloy. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr. Hosty said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in connection with it are still of constant concern to the FBI.

Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at the present time require or justify further investigation other than routine checkups that have not already been undertaken?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; frankly, I don't. I will say that from the requests we have received from the Commission, you have explored this most thoroughly. We do not have any unexplored areas in this investigation that should be explored. There are some pending requests that you have made, and we are running them out as rapidly as we can.

Mr. McCloy. Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after all, you have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have had a long exposure to investigation in this case.

As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any credible evidence thus far which would support a conclusion or an opinion that the death of the President was the result of a conspiracy or anything other than the act of a single individual?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no conclusion that this was other than an act of Oswald.

Mr. McCloy. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that he was the President's assassin?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever—you or the agency—have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker, case?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the incident, we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered——

Mr. McCloy. Bullets.

Mr. Belmont. And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that we did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to the assassination itself.

Mr. McCloy. Until recently.

Mr. Belmont. No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.

Mr. McCloy. In your investigation of the President's assassination, did you have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's background or Ruby's relationship to Oswald?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.

Mr. McCloy. Have we got all your reports on that?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?

Mr. Belmont. The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in summation, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is anything that would stand up to indicate that there was any association between Ruby and Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out extensively and carefully, but there is nothing, no information, that would stand up to show there was an association between them.

Mr. McCloy. Maybe this is in the record, but do you—by reason of your very close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this question—do you, from your knowledge of the investigation find—was there any evidence in28 regard to Ruby's propensity for violence before this shooting took place in the police headquarters in Dallas?

Mr. Belmont. Did we have any information of that character and of that nature?

Mr. McCloy. Yes; I am not talking before it happened, but as a result of your investigation did you turn up any other indications of any violence on the part of Ruby?

Mr. Belmont. I hesitate to attempt to evaluate the information that we gathered from hundreds and hundreds of people that we talked to during the investigation of Ruby after the assassination. I just don't feel that I am in a position to render a judgment as to his character or his impulsiveness, the degree of impulsiveness, whether he was capable——

Mr. McCloy. Whether he was prone to violent action.

Mr. Belmont. I just don't feel really competent. I have no doubt that a conclusion can be drawn from reports; of course, that was one of the basic issues at the trial.

Representative Ford. Was there any evidence that the FBI found to the effect that Ruby was a Communist?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

Representative Ford. None whatsoever?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

Representative Ford. Was there any evidence found by the FBI to the effect that Ruby was connected with in any way whatsoever so-called rightist groups?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I do not recall anything of that nature.

Mr. McCloy. No association that you know of as a result of the investigation of Ruby with any foreign government or agency of a foreign government?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; you understand, you are asking me questions, and I am replying on the basis of my best recollection, but I am giving you an answer from my knowledge of the case.

Mr. McCloy. That is what we were seeking, no more than that, because your impressions would be valuable.

Mr. Belmont. The reason I say that there may be someone we interviewed who made a statement about Ruby and it was run out, and it was found to be false. Congressman Ford, you asked me if he was a Communist. I would say we have no evidence of that.

Mr. McCloy. Do you feel that in view of the evidence that Oswald was a defector, that he engaged in this Fair Play for Cuba business, that he lied in his communications with the FBI, that Mr. Hosty should have been alerted by locating Oswald in the School Book Depository early in November, that he should have been alerted to informing the Secret Service of that?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I do not. You must take this matter in its proper context. I pointed out to you previously that this man came back from Russia; he indicated that he had learned his lesson, was disenchanted with Russia, and had a renewed concept—I am paraphrasing, a renewed concept—of the American free society.

We talked to him twice. He likewise indicated he was disenchanted with Russia. We satisfied ourselves that we had met our requirement, namely to find out whether he had been recruited by Soviet intelligence. The case was closed.

We again exhibited interest on the basis of these contacts with The Worker, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which are relatively inconsequential.

His activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, we knew, were not of real consequence as he was not connected with any organized activity there.

The interview with him in jail is not significant from the standpoint of whether he had a propensity for violence.

Mr. McCloy. That is the Quigley interview you are talking about?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; it was a self-serving interview.

The visits with the Soviet Embassy were evidently for the purpose of securing a visa, and he had told us during one of the interviews that he would probably take his wife back to Soviet Russia some time in the future. He had come back29 to Dallas. Hosty had established that he had a job, he was working, and had told Mrs. Paine that when he got the money he was going to take an apartment when the baby was old enough, he was going to take an apartment, and the family would live together.

He gave evidence of settling down. Nowhere during the course of this investigation or the information that came to us from other agencies was there any indication of a potential for violence on his part.

Consequently, there was no basis for Hosty to go to Secret Service and advise them of Oswald's presence. Hosty was alert, as was the Dallas office, to furnish information to Secret Service on the occasion of the President's visit.

It is my recollection that Hosty actually participated in delivering some material to Secret Service himself, and helped prepare a memorandum on another matter that was sent over there. So that most certainly the office was alert. The agent in charge had alerted his agents, even on the morning of the visit, as he had previously done a week or 10 days before the visit.

So that, in answer to your question, I cannot even through the process of going back and seeking to apply this against what happened, justifiably say that Hosty should have given this information under the existing conditions and with the history of this matter, that he was in a position to give it to the Secret Service. Now, most certainly——

Mr. McCloy. We wish he had.

Mr. Belmont. Of course.

Representative Ford. Mr. Chairman, I have a call from the floor of the House. I wonder if I could ask Mr. Belmont a question.

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

Representative Ford. In response to a question by Mr. McCloy, you categorically said that Federal Bureau of Investigation under no circumstances had employed Oswald as an informant, as an agent or in any other way whatsoever.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. You would be in a position to know specifically that information?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. You also said, as I recall, that you had found no credible information or evidence thus far that Oswald was connected in any way whatsoever with another country as an agent. Is that about what you said or do you wish to reaffirm it in another way?

Mr. Belmont. I will affirm what you said.

Representative Ford. There is a difference, however, between your knowledge as to whether the FBI had hired Oswald, you can be very categorical about that.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Representative Ford. You can only——

Mr. Belmont. Say based on the evidence that we have or which developed or all information that we received, there was no indication that Oswald was in any way connected or within the service of a foreign government.

Representative Ford. But there is a difference in the way you can answer those two questions.

Mr. Belmont. There is a difference, yes; there is a difference because in the one case we know, in the other case we rely on all the information and evidence available.

Representative Ford. But as far as a foreign government is concerned, you only know what you have been able to find out?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir.

Representative Ford. There is always the possibility in the second case, involving a foreign government, that something might come up at some other time.

Mr. Belmont. There is always the possibility. We have no indication of it. There is always the possibility; yes, sir.

Representative Ford. But you cannot be as categorical about the future in the second case as you were in the first case.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; you are right.

The Chairman. Are there any other questions?

30 Mr. Dulles. Do you have some more?

Mr. McCloy. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the hearing room.)

Mr. Dulles. I have two or three questions.

As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors that have been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the assassination.

I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published in England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed Kennedy," by Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and Warburg. I have not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have read a good deal of the background material on which it is based.

I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we will make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly, whether you would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in the Bureau familiar with the case or yourself, and possibly give us your views with regard to certain of the allegations here within your particular competence.

Mr. Belmont. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a compilation of the articles that he wrote in the French press.

Mr. Dulles. Express; yes.

Mr. Belmont. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we received them.

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Mr. Belmont. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they are filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions, misinformation, and certainly what I would term false journalism. In other words, he has stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many things which the Commission's investigation has disproved completely.

We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general comment on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it would probably result in a critique of 500 pages.

Mr. Dulles. We do not want that. I don't think we need that.

Mr. Belmont. Where actually many of these allegations have already been resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and give you a——

Mr. Dulles. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have, Mr. Chairman. Do you agree?

The Chairman. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there that contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our attention.

Mr. Belmont. Most certainly, sir.

The Chairman. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book. That is your idea, is it?

Mr. Dulles. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations there, any evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to have it.

Mr. McCloy. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything about Buchanan's background?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. Dulles. I wish you would check.

Mr. Belmont. We can send you a letter.

The Chairman. We have the record.

Mr. McCloy. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School and Yale.

Mr. Dulles. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a Communist at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington Star, I am advised, and I believe, according to the information I have, that he was terminated by the Star some years ago.

Mr. Belmont. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.

The Chairman. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement which we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in off the street.

Mr. Dulles. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.

31 I believe, Mr. Belmont, that you probably have furnished us already with information with regard to any contacts that Oswald might have had, individuals whom he knew, persons who might have been accused of being accomplices of his, but if there is anybody there or any persons in your file whom Oswald knew who have not been communicated to us, we would certainly like to have them to be sure we have looked into that field exhaustively, anybody who, according to your records, Oswald knew.

Mr. Belmont. I am sure we have explored that fully, and we have reported it to the Commission fully.

Mr. Dulles. All right; good.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. In view of your deep study of the case, have you reached any views of your own or are there any views of the Bureau, as to Oswald's motivation in the act that he committed?

Mr. Belmont. Again I don't feel competent to give you an answer. There is an indication from the exploration of his background that he wanted to be somebody. He wanted to be known as someone. Whether this caused him to do this terrible thing I don't know. I think if it were possible to peer into Oswald's mind, that would really be the only way you could get your question answered.

Mr. Dulles. Have you and the Bureau made any comparative study of the various assassination attempts and assassinations of other Presidents and people in high authority in this Government to see whether any pattern at all runs through these various attempts other than attempts where there is clearly a plot, as in the case of the attack on President Truman, and probably also in the case of President Lincoln? I am thinking chiefly of the assassination of President McKinley and the attempted assassination of President-elect Roosevelt in 1933.

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; we have not made a study of that nature. I would imagine that Secret Service has made a study.

Mr. Dulles. They have made a study. I didn't know whether you had made one also.

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; we have not.

Mr. Dulles. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Belmont, I have here in my hand a sheet that appeared on the newsstands over the weekend. It is supposed to be the National Enquirer. I believe it is out of New York, and it contains a page and a third about the assassination of the President and certain actions of the FBI, and so forth, and for the record I should like to read a portion of it and merely ask you if, in your opinion——

Mr. Belmont. All right, sir.

The Chairman. And with your knowledge there is any truth to any part of it. You, of course, are acquainted with that paper.

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I am not. In fact, someone told me it was, it came from, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and I was shocked that something like that would be in that paper. I found it was not the Philadelphia Inquirer.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. I think, in view of the relationship you have had in this whole matter, I would like to have your testimony in the record on it.

Mr. Belmont. Very good, sir.

The Chairman. There is no date on this paper, and I am told it appeared in three different days in three different formats with different headlines, but the same item. It is said to be by John Henshaw, Enquirer Washington Bureau Chief.

"Washington—The hottest story making the rounds here is that the U.S. Justice Department prevented the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby BEFORE the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Oswald and the man who killed him, Ruby, were suspected of being partners in crime 7 months before the President's death.

32 "The incredible details of the story are so explosive that officials won't even answer 'no comment' when queried about it. But the story being discussed by top-level Government officials reveals:

"1. That the Justice Department deliberately kept Oswald and Ruby out of jail before the assassination.

"2. That Dallas cops suspected Oswald of being the gunman and Ruby the paymaster in a plot to murder former Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker—7 months before the President was assassinated.

"3. That the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was using Ruby to recruit commandoes for raids against Castro's Cuba. To prevent this explosive information from being disclosed, the CIA asked the Justice Department to step in and stop the Dallas police from arresting Jack Ruby, as well as Oswald.

"A top-secret document—a letter signed by a high official of the Justice Department—was sent in April 1963 from the Dallas Police Department to Dallas Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry requesting the Dallas police NOT to arrest Oswald and Ruby in connection with the attempted slaying of General Walker.

"After a sniper shot at, but missed, General Walker in Dallas, April 10, 1963, Dallas police suspected that Oswald was the sniper and Ruby the payoff man.

"The cops were set to arrest the pair. But they never got the chance because of the heavy pressure brought to bear by the Justice Department. And so Oswald and Ruby were allowed to remain free. And 7 months later, on last November 22 in Dallas, Oswald was able to kill the President of the United States.

"The top-secret document—a copy of it is reportedly in the hands of the Presidential Commission investigating the assassination—bares a web of intrigue that involves the Federal Bureau of Investigation, along with the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

"It is so politically explosive that the Presidential Commission, headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, has even withheld it from one of its own members, Senator Richard Russell (D., Ga.).

"It is feared that Senator Russell, who leads the South in the fight against the civil rights bill, might use the document as a weapon against the Justice Department and its chief, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, a leader in the fight for civil rights.

"The document—requesting the cops not to arrest Ruby and Oswald—contradicts the FBI report on the assassination and the subsequent murder of Oswald."

My question is, do you have any information that would lead you to believe that any of those allegations are true?

Mr. Belmont. My answer, sir, is that that is utter fantastic nonsense, and I have no information to indicate that any of the allegations are true.

The Chairman. I think we had better mark this and introduce it in evidence. There is much more to the article, but it is explanatory of this, but I thought that was sufficiently a direct allegation that we ought to note it in the testimony. So will you give that a number, Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern. It will be numbered 837.

The Chairman. 837. It is introduced in evidence as No. 837.

Mr. Stern. May we also have admitted, Mr. Chief Justice, Exhibit No. 836, the letter of March 31, 1964, which Mr. Belmont has identified.

The Chairman. It may be admitted under that number.

(The documents referred to were marked for identification as Commission Exhibits Nos. 836 and 837 and were received in evidence.)

The Chairman. Is there anything further, gentlemen?

Mr. McCloy. May I suggest that we get a copy of the paper which does have the date on it. I forget what date it was.

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Rankin, I understand you have sent it over to us, so we will be glad to answer your letter.

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Belmont, we appreciate your cooperation, and we thank you for your courtesy.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

33

Wednesday, May 13, 1964
TESTIMONY OF LT. JACK REVILL

The President's Commission met at 10 a.m. on May 13, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald R. Ford; and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; and Charles Murray, observer.

The Chairman. Lieutenant Revill, the purpose of today's hearing is to hear your testimony and that of Detective V. J. Brian with particular regard to alleged conversation with Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr., of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, claimed to have occurred on November 22, 1963, in the afternoon, and also concerning the facts surrounding the discussion of Commission Exhibits 710 and 711.

What are those—those are the affidavits?

Mr. Rankin. That is his affidavit and Detective Brian's.

The Chairman. Those are the affidavits that you made in that regard.

Would you please rise and raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Lieutenant Revill. I do, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. Rankin. Lieutenant Revill, will you state your name and place of residence for the record, please?

Mr. Revill. My name is Jack Revill. I reside at 5617 Madowics, Dallas, Tex.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have an official connection with the police department of Dallas?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. Rankin. What is that?

Mr. Revill. I am presently a lieutenant of police of the Dallas Police Department.

Mr. Rankin. How long have you occupied that position?

Mr. Revill. I was promoted to lieutenant June 26, 1958.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have any particular area of responsibility?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I am presently in charge of the criminal intelligence section.

Mr. Rankin. Have you been in charge of that section since November 22 of 1963?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. Rankin. What are the functions of your work in that job?

Mr. Revill. My unit—our primary responsibility is to investigate crimes of an organized nature, subversive activities, racial matters, labor racketeering, and to do anything that the chief might desire. We work for the chief of police. I report to a captain who is in charge of the special service bureau.

Mr. Rankin. Who is that?

Mr. Revill. Capt. Pat Gannaway.

Mr. Rankin. How long have you reported to him?

Mr. Revill. In my present capacity?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Revill. Since I have been assigned to the criminal intelligence section.

Mr. Rankin. So that was for all times since and on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; this is true.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know James P. Hosty, Jr.?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. Rankin. How long have you known him?

Mr. Revill. I have known Jim, Mr. Hosty, since 1959, when I took over the intelligence section.

Mr. Rankin. Did you see him on November 22?

34 Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Rankin. Where.

Mr. Revill. In the basement of the city hall.

Mr. Rankin. Just before you saw Special Agent Hosty, where had you been?

Mr. Revill. I had been at the Texas School Book Depository.

Mr. Rankin. What did you do there?

Mr. Revill. We conducted a systematic search of the building, evacuated the people working in the building, and took names, addresses, and phone numbers of all of these people before they were permitted to leave.

Mr. Rankin. Was anyone working with you there?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Who?

Mr. Revill. Numerous people.

Mr. Rankin. I see. Was Detective Brian with you there?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. I had taken Detective Brian with me from the Trade Mart, Dallas Trade Mart, upon hearing of the shots being fired at Mr. Kennedy. I took Detective Brian and two other officers assigned to my unit, Detective R. W. Westphal and Detective Tarver, O. J. Tarver.

Mr. Rankin. How did you come back to the police department?

Mr. Revill. By automobile.

Mr. Rankin. By car?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Was anyone with you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir, I had Detectives Brian, Tarver, and Westphal.

Mr. Rankin. They were all in the car with you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And which way did you enter the building?

Mr. Revill. The Main Street ramp into the basement of the city hall.

Mr. Rankin. About what time of the day?

Mr. Revill. It must have been about 2:45, 2:50.

Mr. Rankin. All of these officers were with you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Where did you see Special Agent Hosty?

Mr. Revill. If I might explain that, I followed Mr. Hosty into the basement of the city hall. He drove into the basement, parked his car, I did the same, and Mr. Hosty departed from his car, ran over to where I was standing, Detective Brian and I.

The other two officers, Westphal and Tarver, as well as I recall, had remained in the rear talking to some other officers. I don't know who they were. At that time everything was mass confusion, and we were all upset.

Mr. Rankin. Will you explain to the Commission where you parked the car with reference to the point where you saw Agent Hosty?

Mr. Revill. I got out of my car, and we have two attendants assigned to the basement, two Negro attendants, and one of these individuals parked my vehicle for me, I don't know where he parked it. But as I got out of the car, Mr. Hosty ran toward me——

Mr. Rankin. Now, about the parking, excuse me.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Is that a part of the basement area of the police department?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. Rankin. All right; proceed.

Mr. Revill. And Mr. Hosty ran over to me and he says, "Jack"—now as I recall these words—"a Communist killed President Kennedy."

I said, "What?"

He said, "Lee Oswald killed President Kennedy."

I said, "Who is Lee Oswald?"

He said, "He is in our Communist file. We knew he was here in Dallas." At that time Hosty and I started walking off, and Brian, as well as I recall, sort of stayed back, and as we got onto the elevator or just prior to getting on the elevator Mr. Hosty related that they had information that this man was capable of this, and at this I blew up at him, and I said, "Jim"——

Mr. Rankin. What did he say in regard to his being capable?

35 Mr. Revill. This was it. They had—"We had information that this man was capable"——

Mr. Rankin. Of what?

Mr. Revill. Of committing this assassination. This is what I understood him to say.

Mr. Rankin. Are those his exact words?

Mr. Revill. As well as I recall. Give him the benefit of the doubt; I might have misunderstood him. But I don't believe I did, because the part about him being in Dallas, and the fact that he was a suspected Communist, I understand by the rules of the Attorney General they cannot tell us this, but the information about him being capable, I felt that we had taken a part in the security measures for Mr. Kennedy, and if such, if such information was available to another law enforcement agency, I felt they should have made it known to all of us, and I asked Hosty where he was going at that time. By this time we were on the elevator and he said he was going up to homicide and robbery to tell Captain Fritz the same thing. I said, "Do you know Captain Fritz?" and he said he had never met him. I said, "All right, I will take you up and introduce you to Captain Fritz." So Detective Brian and I and Hosty went to the third floor of the city hall and went to Captain Fritz' office, the homicide and robbery bureau. We didn't see Captain Fritz, he may or may not have been there. His office door was closed.

Mr. Dulles. What time of the day, could you give me the approximate time?

Mr. Revill. Between 2:30 and 3 o'clock, and I have the reason for saying this because of the typing of this report here. Our secretary got off at 4 o'clock.

Mr. Dulles. And Chief Curry had not yet returned, had he?

Mr. Revill. I don't know where he was.

Mr. Dulles. You didn't know about that?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you say anything about this to Captain Fritz?

Mr. Revill. I did not talk to Captain Fritz, as I said, I didn't see him. I introduced Mr. Hosty to Lieutenant Ted Wells, who is one of the lieutenants assigned to the homicide and robbery bureau and also present at that time was another special agent, Mr. Bookhout, and Hosty, there was confusion within this office, so Brian and I, after introducing Mr. Hosty to Wells, left and went back to the special service bureau office.

Mr. Rankin. And you didn't say anything to the inspector about it?

Mr. Revill. The inspector?

Mr. Rankin. Lieutenant Wells.

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Rankin. You didn't tell him this important information?

Mr. Revill. Hosty was going up to tell him the same thing.

Mr. Rankin. Did he tell you that?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he told me that.

Mr. Rankin. And Hosty told you then that he was going up to tell him that they knew he was capable of being the assassin?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; being at that time I was out of touch with everything, being in the building, I had put no connection between the shooting of Tippit and the President.

Mr. Rankin. Did you know that Oswald had been arrested?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; at that time I did not.

Mr. Rankin. You just knew about the someone by the name of Lee, didn't you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; Lee. And this was told to me by a colored employee of the School Book Depository. Myself and Lieutenant Frank Dyson took charge of the search of the building and we must have had 75 or 80 men in the building assisting in this search. I talked to a Negro——

Mr. Dulles. Were you in charge of that?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I was in charge of that phase of the search. I talked to a Negro by the name of Givens, and we had handled this person in the past for marijuana violations and I recognized him and in talking to him I asked him if he had been on the sixth floor, and as well as I recall, and Detective Brian was present at this same time he said, yes, that he had observed Mr. Lee, over36 by this window. Well, I asked him who Mr. Lee was, he said, "It is a white boy." He didn't know his full name. So, I turned this Givens individual over to one of our Negro detectives and told him to take him to Captain Fritz for interrogation, and while going to the city hall, or the police station I passed this detective and Givens, and they came into the homicide and robbery bureau shortly after Hosty and I did, so I am sure Captain Fritz did talk to Mr. Givens.

Mr. Rankin. When did you learn that Oswald had been arrested?

Mr. Revill. I really don't know, sir. Because time, we were all shocked that this thing had happened in our city and I personally felt that maybe a sense of responsibility, maybe we could have done more to prevent this thing. I just don't know when I heard that he had been arrested.

Mr. Rankin. Did you know it by the time you went to Lieutenant Wells' office?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not. He may have been in the office at that time.

Mr. Rankin. You didn't know that Oswald was already in the police department?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not. I had been in this building since word came of the shots being fired until about 2:30, 2:35, and at that time I decided that my unit could possibly do more at our office where we kept all of our files, cataloging these people, the suspects that were running through my mind at that time. So, I was, I put out a call for all of the intelligence unit personnel to meet me at the office and I got no reply to this because they were all up in the special service bureau. We had been assigned to the Trade Mart, and two or three of my officers had taken into custody four or five of these picket carriers, and we did this more for protection than anything else because after the word came of the assassination, well, I am afraid they would have been mobbed, and they were all up in the special service bureau booking these prisoners at the time, and I decided we would stop by the special service bureau office, to report back to my captain and see if there was something we could do there. And as I pulled into the basement this conversation took place with Mr. Hosty.

Mr. Rankin. And the particular words about Oswald being capable of being an assassin those were told you by Agent Hosty in the elevator?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; either just outside the elevator and as we got on. He never mentioned this again because I guess I lost my temper at him for withholding this type of information.

Mr. Rankin. I see. Did you do anything about losing your temper, did you say anything?

Mr. Revill. No; Jim Hosty and I are friends, and this has hurt me that I have involved Hosty into this thing, because he is a good agent, he is one of the agents there that we can work with; that has been most cooperative in the past, and I worked with him just like he is one of us.

Mr. Rankin. You went to the third floor on the elevator?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Who else went with you?

Mr. Revill. Detective Brian and Hosty, the elevator was—had several people on it. I don't recall who they were.

Mr. Rankin. Was Detective Brian on that elevator?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he was.

Mr. Rankin. At that same time?

Mr. Revill. He went to the third floor with me.

Mr. Rankin. And you are sure Agent Hosty was on the elevator with you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he was.

Mr. Rankin. And you are sure you were on the elevator?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Now, will you tell us exactly what you said to Hosty and also what he said to you?

Mr. Revill. After hearing about the information that they were purported to have had——

Mr. Rankin. Have you told us all the information that Hosty told you?

Mr. Revill. As well as I recall; yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Now, did you say anything to him about it?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

37 Mr. Rankin. What?

Mr. Revill. I asked him why he had not told us this, and the best, my recollection is that he said he couldn't. Now, what he meant by that I don't know. Because in the past our relations had been such that this type of information, it surprised me they had not, if they had such information he had not brought it or hadn't made it available to us.

Mr. Rankin. And you are certain you went up there on the elevator together?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; took him to the third floor and introduced him to Lieutenant Wells.

Mr. Rankin. Are you sure you didn't go up the stairs together.

Mr. Revill. No, sir; we went to the third floor on the elevator.

Mr. Rankin. You are positive?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; because we caught the elevator in the basement, and there would have been no reason to walk up the stairs.

Mr. Rankin. If Agent Hosty said you went up the stairs rapidly together, that would be untrue?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; this would be untrue.

Mr. Dulles. Did you go in that same driveway that the car went in that was to take Oswald out?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. That driveway; and you took that elevator right to the left as you went in there?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; we go straight into the doors into the elevator that goes up to the third floor.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Revill. Third and fourth floor.

Representative Ford. May I ask a question to reconstruct this a bit? Both Detective Brian and yourself came in one car?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. And you had two other officers with you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. More or less the same time Mr. Hosty came in?

Mr. Revill. We followed Mr. Hosty into the basement.

Mr. Dulles. Each in a car?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he was in a car and we were in mine.

Representative Ford. Your first contact with Mr. Hosty was in the basement there?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. What did he say there?

Mr. Revill. He come running up to me, and he said, "Jack, a Communist killed President Kennedy." I said, "What? What are you talking about?" He said, "Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy," and at that I said "Who is Lee Harvey Oswald?" And then he told me about him having him in their security files, and then that, "We had information that he was capable of this." By "we" I assumed he meant the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Representative Ford. Then Brian, Hosty, and yourself walked to the elevator?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. And the three of you took the elevator up to the third floor?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. It is about 10 feet as I remember it.

Mr. Revill. No, sir; it is more than that.

Mr. Dulles. It is a different elevator. It is not the one that take prisoners down?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; it is the swinging doors, you go through the swinging doors.

Mr. Dulles. It is another elevator?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. At what point in the sequence did you blow up, as you say?

Mr. Revill. When he told me about the capability. By blowing up——

38 Representative Ford. Was that standing in the basement near the car or was it over toward the elevator?

Mr. Revill. We were walking over toward the elevator during this conversation and as far as blowing up, this is semantics. I wanted to know why they had not given us this information.

Representative Ford. What is his reaction to that?

Mr. Revill. "We couldn't." I do not know what he meant by that.

Representative Ford. When you use words like "We couldn't" that "Oswald was a Communist" this is what I am trying to find out. You mean these are the precise words he said or are these your interpretations of what he said?

Mr. Revill. The time involved it could be my interpretation, to give him the benefit of the doubt, because as I said Hosty is a friend of mine, and the last thing I wanted to do was to cause this man any trouble, because of our relations in the past.

Representative Ford. Have you ever had any doubt in the interval between that time and now that what your recollection is is accurate or inaccurate, fair or unfair?

Mr. Revill. As far as I am concerned I have; this report is honest, and it was made within an hour after he made the thing. And since this assassination I have gone over in my mind could I have misunderstood him. I sometimes wish or hoped that I have. But this is in essence what he said to me. It might not be exactly the "we's" the "I's" but in essence it is what Mr. Hosty said.

Representative Ford. At one point as I recall your testimony, you said Hosty said that Oswald was a Communist. A few minutes after that testimony I think you said that Hosty suspected he was a Communist. Now, did you say that deliberately or did you just——

Mr. Revill. No, sir; if I said that I was wrong.

Representative Ford. Was that just confusion?

Mr. Revill. As I mentioned earlier he come hurrying up to me and he said, "Jack, a Communist killed the President." I said, "What?" He said, "Lee Harvey Oswald, a Communist killed the President," and then he went into the fact that they had known he was there, and then at the conclusion of our, not the conclusion because we continued to discuss this thing going up on the elevator, he made the statement that they had information that he was capable of this. He might have said probably or possibly capable of it, I don't recall, because in Dallas that day, the town died, and I know I was sick that this thing happened in my city, and I felt that maybe we could have done something else to prevent it.

Mr. Dulles. You stress the word "capable", that sticks in your mind, does it?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. He didn't say might have done it?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; capable.

Mr. Dulles. Normally would information of this kind have passed to you directly from the FBI or through the Secret Service in the event—of course, there hadn't been other Presidential visits, I guess, so there was no precedent but I was wondering in the case of a Presidential visit would it normally have come to you directly from the Secret Service rather than directly from the FBI?

Mr. Revill. Well, in the past Mr. Kennedy had visited Mr. Rayburn there and this information had never been made known to us and usually the information we got from the FBI and you have got to realize the relations are good, was on a personal basis, working with Mr. Hosty and the other agent assigned to their security section and men assigned to their criminal section, it was a share and share alike thing because I have 11 men, and we just augmented their force really with the information we gathered.

Mr. Dulles. Had you had a meeting with the FBI, a general meeting, to go over security problems prior to this time, prior to the President's visit?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I personally had taken part in no meetings.

Mr. Dulles. With the FBI?

Mr. Revill. With the FBI.

Mr. Dulles. Or Secret Service?

Mr. Revill. Or Secret Service.

Mr. Dulles. Why was this?

Mr. Revill. This I do not know. This was handled at a higher level. It is39 my understanding meetings were held and my captain who is my immediate supervisor was involved in these meetings but——

Mr. Dulles. You were not present at these meetings?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. Dulles. But the meetings you think were held?

Mr. Revill. This is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Lieutenant Revill, have you seen the original of that Exhibit 709?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. Rankin. Is that the report that you referred to when you were answering questions?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I brought a copy.

Mr. Rankin. And Congressman Ford?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; there was just one copy made of this and this is the copy I retained. The original went to Chief Curry. And on this, Chief Curry called me and he would like me to swear that this was a true and correct statement, and this I did.

Mr. Rankin. By that you are referring to the statement sworn to and subscribed before me this 7th day of April 1964?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Now, will you tell us how you happened to make this report, Exhibit 709?

Mr. Revill. Why I made the report?

Mr. Rankin. How did it happen that you made it?

Mr. Revill. After Mr. Hosty had related these circumstances to me, and after taking him to the third floor, I reported this incident to my captain, Captain Gannaway.

Mr. Rankin. When was this?

Mr. Revill. Within minutes after I left Mr. Hosty at the homicide and robbery bureau.

Mr. Rankin. What did you say to him?

Mr. Revill. I told him what had happened, what had transpired.

Mr. Rankin. Just describe what you said to him.

Mr. Revill. About meeting Mr. Hosty in the basement?

Mr. Rankin. Just tell us what you said.

Mr. Revill. About Mr. Hosty, following Mr. Hosty in the basement, that he came up to me, and stated that a Communist had killed the President, and that a Lee Harvey Oswald, they had him in their security files, and that they knew he was in Dallas, and that he was capable, that they had information he was capable of this. To this——

Mr. Rankin. Did you say anything about what you have said?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I don't recall. I might have.

Mr. Rankin. You don't recall that at all?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. Rankin. Did your captain ask you whether you said anything about that?

Mr. Revill. I don't recall him asking me that; no, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did he say anything to you about it?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he did. He told me to put this on paper.

Mr. Rankin. That is all he said?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; and to which I told him that I hated to do that because of Mr. Hosty, that he might have been stating a personal opinion. He said, "You put it on paper and give it to me and I will take it to Chief Curry," and this I did.

Within 30 minutes to an hour after the thing happened.

Mr. Rankin. Neither one of you said anything about this being strange that Agent Hosty would say anything like this?

Mr. Revill. I do not recall, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You didn't say anything like that?

Mr. Revill. I don't recall making such a statement.

Mr. Rankin. And he didn't say anything like that to you that you recalled?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Representative Ford. Did you write this out in longhand?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; and then I dictated it to one of the stenos in the office.40 And she was to, this is what I mentioned earlier the time element, she was to, she got off at 4 o'clock and this was before she went home for the day.

Mr. Dulles. This is on November 22 you are talking about?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Did you sign it on November 22 or at a later date?

Mr. Revill. The same time.

Mr. Dulles. But you swore to it on the 7th day of April 1964?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. You swore that was your signature?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; at the time I was hoping it would never come up.

Mr. Rankin. Why?

Mr. Revill. Because of the relations that we had with the Bureau.

Mr. Rankin. You thought this was a bad thing for the Bureau?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Rankin. For them to admit to you that they knew——

Mr. Revill. Not the admitting but to withhold it.

Mr. Rankin. To withhold the information?

Mr. Revill. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. They thought this man was capable of being an assassin?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And yet you say that Agent Hosty just blurted that out?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. Rankin. Have you told us all that you remember about it?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; all that I remember.

Mr. Rankin. Did you make this——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question that comes right along with that? Did he say anything to you about his having been in Russia and redefected?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Mr. Dulles. That did not come up in this conversation?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you ask him how he knew he was a Communist?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Dulles. Why not?

Mr. Revill. I don't know.

Representative Ford. In the statement that you gave on November 22 which you have signed, you say?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. "The subject was arrested for the murder of J. D. Tippit and is a prime suspect in the assassination of President Kennedy."

Mr. Revill. This I found out after reporting to my office, I didn't know what time this happened.

Representative Ford. In other words, you learned this subsequent to going with Hosty?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. And then coming back to your own office?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; some of the officers assigned to the Special Service Bureau on—were involved in the arrest, Detectives Carroll and I talked to Agent Bob Barrett, I ran into him in the hall and he had told me about the arrest of Oswald. I think he was present at the time.

Representative Ford. That is how you learned about this?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. At what time of day did you make this actual statement and sign it approximately?

Mr. Revill. Approximately 3:30, 3:35.

Mr. Dulles. 3:35 on the 22d of November?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. This is the actual statement that you then signed and then you swore to it, and the notary's signature was put on on the 22d of April?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; the notary's was on April 7, I believe.

Mr. Dulles. 7th day of April, I mean, 7th day of April.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; but this is the report that I signed on the 22d.

Mr. Dulles. This is the actual report that you signed on the 22d?

41 Mr. Revill. On the 22d. This is a copy, I believe.

Mr. Dulles. Yes; this is a copy I have in my hand.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. The original of this was made on November 22?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. And signed on November 22d?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. Dulles. And later sworn to on April 7?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; this is correct.

Mr. Dulles. April 7, 1964.

Mr. Rankin. Is all the information on 709 given by you?

Mr. Revill. Is this 709?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Revill. All of the information, what do you mean by this, sir?

Mr. Rankin. All of the language and everything on that exhibit, did you give that to some stenographer to write?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I wrote it out. My stenographer, she is a clerk typist, and—I roughed it out and then she typed it for me.

Mr. Rankin. Now, the words "subject" Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Was that given by you on the slip of paper you wrote out?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I wrote it out in longhand.

Mr. Rankin. And the words 605 Elsbeth Street, was that given by you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; this is the address we were given or I was given by some of the officers involved in the arrest.

Mr. Rankin. Who gave that to you?

Mr. Revill. I believe Detective Carroll, Carroll or Detective Taylor, they were both there.

Mr. Rankin. And was that at the time you made this out that you were given that information?

Mr. Revill. Shortly before I made this out.

Mr. Rankin. You didn't even know where he lived then?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not. I had never heard of him.

Mr. Rankin. You know that is wrong, don't you?

Mr. Revill. The 605?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Revill. I don't know.

Mr. Rankin. Is it wrong?

Mr. Revill. Yes; it is.

Mr. Dulles. As of the time.

Mr. Revill. That is what they gave me.

Mr. Rankin. You found that out?

Mr. Dulles. This is an address he once lived at.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know that?

Mr. Dulles. This is correct. I want to find out what he knows about it.

Mr. Revill. Is this a—is this an incorrect address on Mr. Oswald where he was living at the time?

Mr. Rankin. If you check it up I think you will find—it is an incorrect address at the time. I think you will also find that 602 Elsbeth Street is where he lived at one time.

Mr. Revill. Now, where they got this address——

Mr. Rankin. You never checked that?

Mr. Revill. I personally have not checked it but I am sure it has been checked.

Mr. Rankin. I see.

Mr. Revill. But this is the address I was given.

Mr. Rankin. Now, you say here that you were told that the subject was a member of the Communist Party. Is that right?

Mr. Revill. This might be my interpretation of Mr. Hosty saying a Communist killed the President and we had him in our security files.

Mr. Rankin. You are an expert in this field, aren't you? You are working in the subversive field?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; but as far as an expert, I wouldn't say I am an expert.

42 Mr. Rankin. You know the difference between membership and a person being a Communist, don't you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And you know it is a very real difference?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; there is a difference.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know which Mr. Hosty told you?

Mr. Revill. He did not say that he was a member. This was my connotation of what he said that a Communist, that "We had him in our security files."

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question? Where did you get this address that you put on of 605 Elsbeth Street, do you recall?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; from Detective E. B. Carroll or Detective Taylor.

Mr. Dulles. Are they subordinates?

Mr. Revill. No; they are detectives assigned to the special service bureau. One of them works the narcotics squad and one of them is assigned to the vice unit.

Mr. Dulles. You never ascertained where they got it?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; this might be the address that they got from Oswald, I do not know. I never even thought about it until you brought up the point that this is not the address.

Mr. Dulles. Can you find out where they got this address?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I can.

Mr. Dulles. I think that would be useful. I would like to know that. I would like to know where they got this address also.

Mr. Revill. It would have been the same day because this was made within an hour——

Mr. Rankin. You didn't put down on this statement anything about what you said, did you?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Rankin. Why didn't you?

Mr. Revill. All I was doing was reporting what Mr. Hosty said to me.

Mr. Rankin. Is that the way you make all your reports just one side?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You never say what you said?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I do not put our opinions or our interpretation in the report.

Mr. Rankin. You don't even say what you asked?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You just put the answer down?

Mr. Revill. Put what was given to me; yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And that is the way all the police department reports are made?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I don't know whether this is the way they are all made. This is the way we do it in our unit.

Mr. Rankin. After you made this report, do you know what happened to it?

Mr. Revill. I gave it to the captain, my captain, Captain Gannaway.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know whether it was given to the Commission when the police reports were furnished to the Commission?

Mr. Revill. This I do not know, sir.

Mr. Rankin. I will tell you that it was not given to the Commission. Do you know any reason why it was withheld?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know any reason why it should have been withheld until Chief Curry came here?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Rankin. Did you have anything to do with that being withheld?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I gave it to my superior, and what he did with it, I do not know.

Mr. Rankin. Did you ever have any discussions about withholding it?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You did want to protect Agent Hosty, you say?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And you hoped the information would not get out?

Mr. Revill. By hoping——

43 The Chairman. He didn't say exactly that, Mr. Rankin. He said he hoped he wouldn't have to use it against Hosty as I understood him to say.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; my opinion, and this was my personal opinion that it would not serve any purpose. In your scope of the investigation, yes, I can see where it would, but I hated to get involved in a controversy with the FBI, because of our past relations.

Mr. Rankin. Did you recently have a conversation with Lieutenant Hopkins of Fort Worth?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Where was that?

Mr. Revill. Lieutenant Hopkins and I went to Sacramento, Calif., to a law enforcement intelligence unit conference and shared a room.

Mr. Rankin. Did you discuss this matter with him?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; it broke in the papers while we were there.

Mr. Rankin. What did you say to him about it?

Mr. Revill. About the report? About this report?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Revill. I told him about the conversation with Mr. Hosty and about according to the news release, the news stories, this thing was released, and the newspaper reporters and television people in Sacramento made it impossible for me to remain at the conference so I returned to Dallas. I was there for 1 day and returned the next, the next evening.

Mr. Rankin. Did you say anything about the report being inaccurate?

Mr. Revill. Inaccurate?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Representative Ford. What was the date of this conference in Sacramento?

Mr. Revill. April 22, 23, and 24, I believe. It was on a Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. It could have been the 23d, 24th, and 25th but I returned on Friday evening.

Mr. Rankin. Did you examine the newspaper report of your report, Exhibit 709?

Mr. Revill. Did I examine it? Yes, sir; I read several newspaper reports of it.

Mr. Rankin. Did you give the reports to the newspapers?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Rankin. Did you have anything to do with giving it to the newspapers?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; this would have been the last thing I would have done.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know who did?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I do not.

Representative Ford. What prompted you to discuss this information with the other officer from Fort Worth?

Mr. Revill. I started getting long-distance telephone calls on the evening, it must have been the 23d, it was Thursday night, I got two long-distance phone calls, and Lieutenant Hopkins and I were sharing a double room and, of course——

The Chairman. Lieutenant who?

Mr. Revill. Lieutenant Hopkins of the Fort Worth Police Department. H. F. Hopkins.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Revill. And I discussed it with him.

Representative Ford. Who was calling you long distance, what relevance does that have to it?

Mr. Revill. To my discussing it with him?

Representative Ford. Yes.

Mr. Revill. The long-distance phone calls were about this report, the Associated Press and the United Press.

Representative Ford. I see. They had heard about it, they called you long distance and you discussed it with Hopkins who was in the room with you?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. That is all that I have, Mr. Chief Justice.

44 The Chairman. Have you anything further, or you?

Mr. Dulles. Tippit was not under your jurisdiction, was he?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; he was not.

The Chairman. Lieutenant, I am not familiar with the newspaper report that you are speaking of. What, in substance, did it say?

Mr. Revill. There were several articles written. The Dallas papers carried articles on it and the Sacramento, Calif., paper carried an article on it. In essence it had to do with this conversation that Hosty and I had and about this report and somewhere, someplace some newspaper reporter must have seen a copy of this because he knew how many paragraphs they had in it and he quoted, I believe, the last paragraph of the report verbatim, and this is what concerned me, that a report such as this would fall into their hands.

Now, who the reporter is, there were several reporters that were curious about the thing, and I don't even recall which newspaper carried the verbatim paragraph about Agent Hosty's conversation.

The Chairman. And that is what caused you and Lieutenant Hopkins to have a discussion?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Did he bring the matter up to you or did you bring it up to him?

Mr. Revill. I might have brought it up to him because I was concerned that this thing had been released.

The Chairman. What was your conversation concerning that?

Mr. Revill. That I had received these calls, the first one must have been around 2 o'clock in the morning, California time, from the Associated Press. It was a lady writer, and she asked about this and I told her that any statement would have to be made by Chief Curry, and she trapped me really. She made a false statement that Hosty was supposed to have said something else and I said no, that is not so. He did not make a statement, and then there was my comment. From that it looked like I had written them out a press release.

The Chairman. Looks like what?

Mr. Revill. It appears as if I had written out a press release from the comment in the newspapers but that was the only statement I made that Hosty had not made such statement, it was a fabrication, he knew he was capable, but he did not make such a statement. Hosty did not make such a statement.

The Chairman. Then you discussed that with Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you recall just what Mr. Hopkins asked you and what you told him about this report?

Mr. Revill. Well, when I received the first call, I was in the coffee shop, it was 2 o'clock in the morning, we had been out with two of the Sacramento County Sheriff's officers and I got the call and after getting the call I went to the room and Hopkins had been awakened by this phone call, and I told him about the call, and then from there on, I had numerous long-distance calls, and I answered the one with the UPI, and then I decided I would not talk to people. Because I couldn't see where it would help anything.

The Chairman. Did he ask you if the substance of this report was true, I am speaking now of Exhibit 709, the one we have been talking about.

Mr. Revill. Mr. Hopkins had never seen this report. I just told him what had transpired between Hosty and I and told him that a report had been made, and this is what they were calling on.

The Chairman. Did you at any time in talking to him repudiate anything that was in this report?

Mr. Revill. No, sir. The only thing I repudiated was the fact that this reporter had said that Hosty had made a statement and I said no, this is not true, about them not believing that he would do it, and I think I told Hopkins that.

The Chairman. Yes. Anything more?

Mr. Dulles. I have nothing more.

The Chairman. Lieutenant, thank you very much, sir, for your help here.

Mr. Revill. Thank you, sir. I am just sorry it happened.

45 The Chairman. You have told us what the truth of the situation is, you could do no more and no less.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Lieutenant, just a question or two, we forgot to ask, Mr. Rankin, would you ask them, please?

Mr. Rankin. You said you made some handwritten notes about this 709 exhibit.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. When you gave them to the typist—do you know what happened to those notes?

Mr. Revill. They were destroyed, I am sure.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know what her name is who typed 709?

Mr. Revill. Mary Jane Robertson.

Mr. Rankin. Is she still with the police department?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. What position is she in now?

Mr. Revill. She is a clerk-typist in the special service bureau.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know where the original of 709 is?

Mr. Revill. With Chief Curry, I assume. Well, let's see. You have a copy; I would assume he has got it.

Mr. Dulles. Wasn't a copy made at the time?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I have it.

Mr. Dulles. The actual copy, you have?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; it is in my little briefcase.

Mr. Rankin. So that original would be available to us?

Mr. Dulles. You have it here now?

Mr. Revill. I have a copy.

Mr. Dulles. A carbon copy?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. He showed us a copy of his testimony.

Representative Ford. Do you know how many copies were made?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; one and one; an original and one.

Representative Ford. And you kept one copy and one went to Captain Gannaway?

Mr. Revill. No; both copies went to Captain Gannaway who is my immediate superior and he later gave me back the carbon and the original went to Chief Curry.

Representative Ford. And you have had the one copy in your possession since how long?

Mr. Revill. Probably a week or two after this thing happened, and I have had it in the Lee Harvey Oswald file.

Representative Ford. You have had this copy in your files in the police department?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. Since about December 1 or thereabouts?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; thereabouts.

The Chairman. Do you number those items in the file?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And the order in which they come in?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Now, this particular report was put in the Lee Harvey Oswald file, and he was given an intelligence number, A & T, if I may get this copy I will explain to you——

The Chairman. Yes; would you do so, please?

Mr. Revill. Excuse me just a moment. You see, he was given A & T 2965, page 34, as it appears in his file. This is indexed with a card with this file number and page number.

The Chairman. May I ask, would the next item in that file be numbered 35?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; it would.

The Chairman. And the one directly preceding it would be 33?

Mr. Revill. Thirty-three; yes, sir.

46 The Chairman. I see, and you have the rest of your file which would indicate that?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I don't have it with me.

The Chairman. No; but you have it in your records.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And that could be produced if we wanted it?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; it is the complete file we have now on Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. May we have——

Mr. Dulles. Could I just see that?

Mr. Rankin. Could we make a copy of that?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I put another piece in there because it is on onion skin.

Mr. Rankin. We could make a photostatic copy quickly and return this to you.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to number this in the next order of exhibits and offer it in evidence, if I may, this copy, the photostatic copy.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. Just as a security matter, would you kindly look in the file and see if by any chance your original longhand notes could have been put in the file, at this place in the file?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I can, but I am sure they were not, because this was not made at my office. You see, we are removed physically from the police department, the intelligence unit, and this was made at the special service bureau office.

Mr. Dulles. I see, not in your own office.

Mr. Revill. No, sir; we are an integral part of the special service bureau office but our files are maintained elsewhere, and this was made at the special service bureau office.

Representative Ford. When you sat down to write out this statement, just describe where you did it and how you did it, what kind of paper you used and so forth.

Mr. Revill. Well, we use the white pads like this, and I wrote it out on the pad, and in the special service bureau office and it was made in Lieutenant Dyson's office, he was out, and I used his desk, and then I took it to Mrs. Robertson, and she typed it.

Representative Ford. Did you consult with Detective Brian?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Representative Ford. During the time you were preparing it?

Mr. Revill. No, sir.

Representative Ford. Or subsequent to its preparation?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not. At the time I couldn't have told you who was with me or who overheard this thing because there was so much confusion in the elevator and going to the elevator.

Representative Ford. But Brian was with you on the elevator?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he was with me in the automobile and on the elevator.

Representative Ford. Was he up in Gannaway's office with you, too?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; he works for me.

Representative Ford. He was with you at the time you went to Gannaway's office?

Mr. Revill. The special service bureau office; yes, sir.

Representative Ford. But he didn't see this at anytime?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; I say he didn't, I don't know whether he ever saw it or not. He might have seen it when I was working on it and I gave both of the copies to the captain.

The Chairman. Lieutenant, did that entire Oswald file that you have just told us about come to the Commission, do you know?

Mr. Revill. I don't know. Now what we did, we made up several large books, and it is my understanding that a copy of one of these was given to the Attorney General Waggoner and he was in turn to furnish it to this Commission, this I was told by Captain Gannaway.

Mr. Rankin. When was that?

Mr. Revill. This was a month or two ago.

Mr. Rankin. Yes; but not when you first gave the files.

47 Mr. Revill. No, sir; because this happened on the same day.

The Chairman. Should that file have included this?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; it didn't. There were only two pieces made of it, one copy and the original made of this.

The Chairman. I see. What I am getting at, when the department sent their reports to us, did they send copies of this file that Exhibit 709 is in?

Mr. Revill. The Lee Harvey Oswald file?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Revill. I don't believe they did, because much of this is, pertains to newspaper articles, and information that we picked up such as leads where Ruby and Oswald were seen together, we ran all these things down, and then we would make a report of the lead, or the findings, and a copy of it would go in their files.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Revill. But this one here, was not placed in that book?

Mr. Dulles. In the original of Commission Exhibit No. 709 that you have just given us prior to the notary public's inscription, subscription to it, there is red ink underlining of Lee Harvey Oswald and James Hosty. When was that put on this copy?

Mr. Revill. I don't know, sir. Captain Gannaway must have done that because he had the thing and then later gave it to me. Now, the reason for it being underlined, I don't know. On the original—yes; I do.

Mr. Dulles. Would that be for filing purposes?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I do. Normally we retain the original copy of every report for our file copy, but I did not have the file copy or the original report so our clerk in indexing this underscored the name and the address and she made cards for the index files.

Mr. Dulles. That was a card, also, under the file of James Hosty?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. His name is also underlined in red?

Mr. Revill. His name indexed; yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. In your original copy of Exhibit 709?

Mr. Revill. No, sir; not the original copy, because the original——

Mr. Dulles. The carbon copy, excuse me, the carbon copy of 709.

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. And I assume that Commission's Exhibit No. 709 which is a photostat is a photostat of the original rather than of the carbon copy?

Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; and I don't know who made the photostat, I did not. I assume Chief Curry had it made.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Reporter, we are giving the number 838 to the carbon copy of Exhibit 709 that Lieutenant Revill has just produced.

The Chairman. You propose to take a photostat of this and return this report to the lieutenant?

Mr. Rankin. If we may, Mr. Chief Justice, this is the only copy that I have.

The Chairman. You should have it back.

Mr. Revill. That is fine.

The Chairman. We will take a photostat and return this to you then.

Mr. Revill. I appreciate that.

The Chairman. It may be admitted in that manner.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 838 for identification, and received in evidence.)

The Chairman. I think that is all. Thank you, again, lieutenant.

Mr. Revill. I will attempt to find out on that address, and I shall let Mr. Sorrels know, with Secret Service.

Mr. Rankin. Yes; that will be fine.

The Chairman. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF V. J. BRIAN

The Chairman. Come right in, sir. Detective Brian, the purpose of today's hearing is to hear the testimony of Lieutenant Revill and yourself with particular regard to an alleged conversation with Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr.48 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation claimed to have occurred on November 22, 1963, in the afternoon and also concerning the facts surrounding the discussion of Commission Exhibits Nos. 709 and 711. 709 is the affidavit of Lieutenant Revill, and 711 is the affidavit that you made concerning that matter.

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; I do.

The Chairman. Please be seated.

Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. Brian. My name is Brian.

Mr. Rankin. Where do you live?

Mr. Brian. In Dallas, Tex.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have some connection with the police department in Dallas?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; I am a detective in the criminal intelligence section.

Mr. Rankin. How long have you occupied that position?

Mr. Brian. Since June of 1955.

Mr. Rankin. What is your function as a detective for the criminal intelligence section?

Mr. Brian. To gain, obtain information and keep records and files, and usually when an important Government official comes to town we guard them or help assist guard them, and furnish information for other agencies outside of the Dallas Police Department and have liaison, and general criminal investigation work.

Mr. Rankin. Did you have anything to do with the Lee Harvey Oswald case?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. When was the first time that you had anything to do with that matter?

Mr. Brian. Well, we started interrogating people and talking to people immediately after the assassination.

Mr. Rankin. About what time of the day?

Mr. Brian. In the middle of the afternoon, probably——

Mr. Rankin. November 22, 1963?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir. The first thing that we done, I was, I personally that day was, assigned at the Dallas Trade Mart where the President was to speak, I was on the side of the speaker stand when he was to come in, and they came in and got us and told us that he had been shot, and the President of the United States had been shot, and that a man in the Book Depository down there and told us to go down there and see if we could get him out, and four of us detectives down there got in a car and we went to the Book Depository and we arrived there a short time, I don't know what time it was, a short time after the shooting occurred.

Mr. Rankin. Who were the four you are describing now?

Mr. Brian. Lieutenant Revill, myself, a detective, O. J. Tarver, and a detective, Roy W. Westphal.

Mr. Rankin. What did you do there?

Mr. Brian. We searched the Book Depository for a couple of hours. We spent about 2 hours, I would guess, approximately 2 hours down there searching the Depository.

Mr. Rankin. Did you find anything at that time?

Mr. Brian. No, sir. I was there on the floor when the man found shells over in a corner when—where the assassin was hidden at. But other than that, I wasn't present when anything was found.

Mr. Rankin. Will you just describe that event when you saw those shells?

Mr. Brian. Well, a police sergeant, Jerry Hill, hollered, I was on the opposite side of the sixth floor, hollered that he had, this is where he shot from, and shells were laying there, and I walked from where I was at over to the other corner of the building and looked, and that is about the extent of my investigation49 there because they called the crime laboratory and everybody else to get down there and they got an officer to guard the place and not let nobody get around and we went on searching the building.

Mr. Rankin. What did you see, how many shells did you see?

Mr. Brian. I am going to guess.

Mr. Rankin. We don't want you to guess. If you can tell us your recollection, that is all.

Mr. Brian. Well, the first time I went over there, I believe I saw two, but I am not sure, but I went back again later and there were three shells there.

Mr. Rankin. Now after that, did you leave the Depository Building?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; after we spent considerable time, we went from the top floor down to the bottom floor, back up, going through it, and we finally wound up on the second floor taking all the acoustic tile out of the ceiling looking up to see if anybody was hidden up there, and I believe that was the last thing we did in the building. By that time, there were a number of people in the building.

Mr. Rankin. You were making a complete search of each floor, were you?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; I was with, I mean there were a number of officers there. I didn't do it by myself, there were a number of us there and we were searching it.

Mr. Rankin. Then you left the building?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you leave with some other officers?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; Lieutenant Revill, myself, and Tarver and Westphal all went back to the car and left to go to city hall.

Mr. Rankin. Then you got back to the city hall. What did you do?

Mr. Brian. We drove into the basement and parked.

Mr. Rankin. What time of the day was that, can you tell us?

Mr. Brian. Probably around 2 o'clock or somewhere in that. I don't really know to be truthful because I didn't pay any attention to the time but it was around 2 o'clock, I would guess.

Mr. Rankin. And the four of you were together at that time?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. What happened at that point?

Mr. Brian. We got out of the car, and as we got out of the car——

Mr. Dulles. Was the car already inside the building or in the driveway there?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Let me explain. City hall basement, as some of you all know——

Mr. Dulles. I was just there so I want to know.

Mr. Brian. We came around the ramp and we parked in the basement. We were parked in the basement, and we got out, and started around, there is a railing there, we started around the railing and at that time Jim Hosty was coming across the basement, at a fast trot, or moving fairly fast——

Mr. Rankin. Special Agent Hosty of the Bureau?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

And he came across there and I know him, and I had known him for a good while to speak to him.

Mr. Rankin. Where were you with reference to Lieutenant Revill at that point?

Mr. Brian. I think I was on his, probably his right-hand side.

Mr. Rankin. Close to him?

Mr. Brian. Fairly close; yes, sir.

And so we walked over to meet, kind of cornered, you cross paths and we walked up there to meet Jim, and he said, he came up there and he said, that Lee Oswald, a Communist, killed the President, and then Revill said, "What?" He said, Lee Oswald, a Communist, killed the President.

He was in—nervous—in a hurry, and was just talking.

And then he said, he said that he knew that he was a Communist and he knew he worked in the Book Depository, and then Lieutenant Revill said something else to him, I am not—I don't know what he said, and they walked off in front of me going in around and in through the door over to the elevator to go up, and then we accompanied Agent Hosty up to Captain Fritz' office which is on the——

50 Mr. Dulles. Was the elevator there at the basement floor when you took it or did you have to wait?

Mr. Brian. We had to wait just a very short time on it. It wasn't standing open waiting; no, sir.

We had to wait on it just a very short time, I believe, and we went up to the third floor, and Hosty and Lieutenant Revill went in there and talked. I went to the door and just stepped inside and waited and then we went back downstairs to our office which is on two, right underneath Captain Fritz' office.

Mr. Dulles. You accompanied them to the third floor and then you came down?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. In the elevator?

Mr. Brian. That I am not sure.

Mr. Dulles. Or did you get out and come down the stairs?

Mr. Brian. I am not sure.

Mr. Dulles. But you weren't with Lieutenant Revill any further?

Mr. Brian. When we came back down to our office, we came back down, I am not sure whether we rode the elevator or not. It is a short trip down and I am—I would be afraid to say whether we walked, rode, or how we got down, but we went into Captain Gannaway's office and Revill told, Lieutenant Revill told the Captain what Hosty had said, so he said, "Write a report."

Mr. Rankin. What did he say at that time? What did he tell the Captain that Agent Hosty had said?

Mr. Brian. He told him, short and very quick, that they knew that Oswald was a Communist and that he was in the Book Depository, and he said, "Write a report and get it back to me right now."

And he went right back and wrote a report.

I forgot about the whole incident, I didn't think it would be important and I didn't—well, in fact, I didn't have time to because when I got back there they had a list of names they were going to start checking out and they handed me six of them and says, "Start going and checking here and here and here and checking these people."

So I never did dwell on it again.

Mr. Rankin. In this conversation down in the basement, have you told us all that Agent Hosty said that you recall?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And have you told us all that Lieutenant Revill said that you recall?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Have you told us all that Lieutenant Revill told to Captain Gannaway that you recall?

Mr. Brian. Well, let's see. I believe that I have, yes, sir. When—Captain Gannaway's office, as you go in the door and turn right and his office is in there and if I recall correctly I didn't go all the way in his office, he did and I stood in the door, and I really didn't make a mental note of what happened and things were moving at a rather fast pace, and I believe that I did; yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You have made an affidavit about this, have you not?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; I made a report to Chief Curry.

Mr. Rankin. And you swore to that?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Is Exhibit 711 a photostatic copy of your report that you made that you have just described?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you swear to that report on the date that it bears?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. April 20, 1964?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You read the Exhibit 711 right now, didn't you?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Is it correct?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

51 Mr. Rankin. Are there any additions or corrections that you wish to make to it?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

The Chairman. I was just going to ask if you fixed the date on which he dictated that or wrote it, whichever he did.

Mr. Rankin. I haven't, but I will.

Will you tell us on what date you wrote or dictated Exhibit 711?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; the day before, I believe it was the day before, Chief Curry came up here. It was either a day or 2 days before April 20th is what it says on there. That is the date that I made the report, the day or 2 days before Chief Curry came up here.

Will you tell us on what date you wrote or dictated Exhibit 711?

Mr. Brian. I didn't think—well, Captain Gannaway told Lieutenant Revill to write a report about the thing the date it happened, and he did, or I assumed he did, and I guess that he did. I haven't——

Mr. Rankin. Have you ever seen that report?

Mr. Brian. I have seen it, but I haven't read it. That is unusual but I haven't. I didn't think the incident was really important, that is the reason why I didn't dwell on it, and I am sure it is now or I wouldn't be up here.

But they, a few days before Chief Curry was to come up here they said they wanted a report, you know, to what I had heard in the basement and this and that and the other, and I said, "Well, I better write one then."

I just assumed it was all taken care of, and so I wrote one on the 20th, I wrote that report on the 20th and swore to it and turned it in and he brought it up here.

Mr. Dulles. You made no contemporaneous memoranda, that is on November 22 you made no notes or memoranda of this?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Mr. Dulles. So the report of April 20 you dictated on or about April 20 is based on your memory?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Exhibit 711, your report, was that written out in longhand or dictated to a girl?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; I typed it myself on the typewriter. We don't have a stenographer in our office to dictate to.

Mr. Rankin. You did type the part about the notary and so forth on the bottom?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Do you know who did that?

Mr. Brian. I believe Bill Biggio.

Mr. Rankin. Who is he?

Mr. Brian. He is a detective who works the desk there, who is a notary who notarized it.

Mr. Rankin. Now, before you made Exhibit 711 did anyone give you Lieutenant Revill's report to examine?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Compare your report with?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. And you have never read that?

Mr. Brian. I don't recall reading it; no, sir. I sure don't. I probably looked at it but as far as sitting down and reading it, I have never read the report, I don't believe.

Mr. Rankin. So if there is any differences between your report and his you are not familiar with them?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Representative Ford. Subsequent to November 22 and prior to April 20, when you prepared this Exhibit 711, did you ever talk to Lieutenant Revill about the incident?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; I sure did. He couldn't remember who was with him down in the basement, and it rocked on there and had rocked on there, and somewhere it came out that somebody said he was lying about it and he was52 telling us, he said, "I am telling you the truth". "You don't have to tell me, I know you are; I was standing there with you."

And he said, "You were the one who was with me?"

And I said, "Yes, I was with you."

And I assumed he knew that I was with him. That is when he talked to Chief Curry and Chief Curry come back and said he needed the report from me, too.

Representative Ford. When did this conversation take place?

Mr. Brian. The date I don't have any idea. Probably 2 or 3 weeks, I will tell you——

Mr. Dulles. 2 or 3 weeks what? After November 22?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; before the date I wrote the report, because I messed around there for another couple of weeks and then I walked in the office one day and he said, "Chief Curry wants it today," and I said, "All right, I will write it," and I sat down and wrote it, and I believe the next day or the day after that he brought it, came up here, and all this come out in the paper about making a statement and me backing the statement up in Dallas, I don't know whether it came up here or not.

Representative Ford. Who prompted this conversation that you have been describing?

Mr. Brian. In our office that day?

Representative Ford. Yes.

Mr. Brian. I am trying to think what brought it on. Somebody, there was a statement in the paper or something that said that—anyway, somewhere down the line it came out, it said it wasn't right what Lieutenant Revill had said.

And I said, "I know it is right, I was standing there," and that was about the extent of that.

And then he said, "Well, I will need"—he talked to Chief Curry, I guess, and they decided they needed a report from me on it, and then I finally wrote the report and he brought it up here. I guess it was just in the course of a conversation more than anything. I don't think anybody prompted it, really.

Representative Ford. In this Commission 711 you actually typed it out yourself?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. Are you a fairly accomplished typist?

Mr. Brian. No, sir. I can type fairly well. I am not a touch typist. I can't copy, but I can type fairly well typing something I don't have to copy off of a sheet of paper. In other words, I have to look at the keys to type it.

Representative Ford. Did you have to rewrite this a second time on the typewriter?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir. I made several strikeovers and some other stuff, and typed it, I had to type it over again.

Representative Ford. In other words, you typed it out once, and then retyped it yourself?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; I typed it twice. The first time everything wasn't right in there and the spelling and the strikeovers and stuff, and not being an accomplished typist I still don't like to throw things out, you know, that don't look too bad so I typed it over again.

Representative Ford. But after you typed it over the first time did you show it to somebody else?

Mr. Brian. I believe Lieutenant Revill looked at it and called a bunch of mistakes to my attention.

Representative Ford. What kind of mistakes?

Mr. Brian. Well, I don't know. There were some strikeovers and some, a couple of misspelled words, I believe, and I don't have a copy of the one that I copied from so I couldn't say, but I did have to type the report over.

Representative Ford. But these mistakes that were pointed out by Lieutenant Revill, were they mistakes of substance or just mistakes involving spelling and the like?

Mr. Brian. Well, what do you mean by substance now?

Representative Ford. Well, I mean as to the precise things that you said as to what transpired?

53 Mr. Brian. I don't believe there were. I am trying to recall what I had to add that took place there, and——

Representative Ford. It is important whether or not any statements of facts were altered or whether the changes were simply typographical errors or otherwise.

Mr. Brian. I will tell you one thing that I recall he called to my attention was 2:05 p.m., I believe, and I told him, I said I can't put that in there because I don't know what time it was, and I don't. I don't have any idea of what time it was, and he said, "Well, all right, leave that out," but I think the substance was probably the same in both reports. In fact, I am sure the substance was probably the same, because it was, the grammar was changed in some places, some spelling was changed, and some strikeovers were changed, and I think probably the second report was copied, that one was copied partially from the first one and then I made some changes.

Representative Ford. While you were in the process of discussing this with Lieutenant Revill he didn't show you his report, Exhibit 709?

Mr. Brian. I don't know whether he did or not. I don't believe that he did. I don't believe he did.

Representative Ford. Had you seen it before?

Mr. Brian. I have seen the report.

Representative Ford. Did you see it before you typed this up?

Mr. Brian. I don't recall seeing it. I may have, but I don't recall it.

Now, he has got something in there that I don't have in mine, I know about him saying that Hosty knew that Oswald, I believe, was capable of assassinating the President, but I didn't hear Hosty say that.

Representative Ford. When did you learn that that statement was in Revill's statement?

Mr. Brian. Just to be truthful, I don't know.

Mr. Rankin. Did Lieutenant Revill ask you to include in your statement that Hosty had said that Oswald was known to be capable of being an assassin?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; he asked me if I heard him say it and I told him no, but I don't believe he asked me to include that in the report.

Mr. Dulles. You told him, no.

Mr. Rankin. When was that?

Mr. Brian. Probably the day—now, this all happened in the course of a week's time and the conversations are hard to put on a day or time, I mean when you don't think—I didn't think all this was real important, and so I didn't try to backlog it to where—it was probably the day, probably about April 20, along in there.

Mr. Rankin. Before or after you wrote your report?

Mr. Brian. In between the first report and the second report I imagine.

Mr. Rankin. I am not quite clear about how you happened to make this report in that I understood you to say that there were some newspaper accounts about it, and the lieutenant said, well, he had said what was true and something like that. Can you tell us what happened?

Mr. Brian. Well, now, to go back. We were in the office talking and I don't know how long this was because it may have been 2 days, 3 days, 2 weeks or 3 weeks, before I wrote that report, we were sitting in the office, and I don't recall whether it was a newspaper account or what it was, but anywhere somewhere down the line he got—somebody said that it wasn't the truth and he was lying or something and he was sitting out there talking and he said, he said he wasn't lying about it and I told him, I said "I know you are not lying because I stood there and heard you."

And he said, "Oh, you are the one who was with me?" And I said, "Yes."

But I assumed that his report, up until that time I had not seen his report, and I have seen it since then and I haven't read it from one end to the other until the other day, and he said, "Well, I am glad to know you are the one who was there then," and evidently he had forgotten I was there, too.

So, he said, "Well, make me a report on what you heard," and I said, "All right, I will," and he talked to Chief Curry and evidently before he told me that it was a matter of days or time differential in there and I said, "All right," and I just did not get around to it until finally one day I came in the office54 and he said, "I've got to have that report today," and I said, "All right," and I sat down and wrote it and I had to write it over again, that happened on the day the report is dated.

Mr. Rankin. All of that happened, though, before any news accounts of it, didn't it?

Mr. Brian. Well, I don't remember when they started putting it in the newspapers. There had been something about it to make him, somewhere to make him say, he was trying to convince me he was telling the truth and I said, "Well, I know you are."

I don't know what brought it on, I don't know whether it was a newspaper report or something, but anyway there was some—maybe Chief Curry was on him about it, I don't know. But he said that he was telling the truth and I told him I knew he was telling the truth because I had heard it.

Mr. Rankin. You said you were there with him?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. How close were you to him when he was talking to Hosty?

Mr. Brian. Right next to him when we were talking with him. We talked around there and how you meet, you know, you walk up together and meet and went on with him.

Mr. Dulles. You were walking toward the elevator at that time, weren't you?

Mr. Brian. Let me draw you a little picture of how that is down there.

Mr. Dulles. I have been in the basement so I know something about it.

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir. But the ramp goes up here, this is why it would be easier to draw a picture and it would be easier than I can explain. He came down the ramp.

Mr. Dulles. In the car?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. And you parked in the basement?

Mr. Brian. And we parked the car, and Hosty had parked over here. You know the ramp is wide here and the other side goes up here, he had parked over in here and he was coming across this way and we coming across this way and we met.

Mr. Dulles. Where is the elevator which takes prisoners up where Oswald was shot?

Mr. Brian. Right through here, right in here somewhere is where Ruby shot Oswald and this is a ramp from the Main Street side and this is the ramp to the Commerce side. And this is the elevator.

Mr. Dulles. Where is the elevator?

Mr. Brian. The elevator is right there.

The Chairman. That is the prisoners' elevator?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

The Chairman. Or the freight elevator?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; that is the elevator going up——

The Chairman. Which one did you take?

Mr. Brian. We took the elevator inside the city hall basement.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Dulles. Is there only one elevator there?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; there are two side by side. Back on this side of the basement there are two elevators over here and one freight elevator right back on in here. But this is to the city hall this direction and this is the ramp coming in from Main Street and the ramp going up to Commerce Street. We drove in this ramp one way going in this way and one way going out.

Mr. Dulles. Where are the stairs?

Mr. Brian. In the basement?

Mr. Dulles. You don't know?

Mr. Brian. There are no stairs in the basement. I mean out here where the cars are parked. Right here is the ramp, there is a walkway going up but it is not a stairway and then it levels off and you go by through here, and the jail is right here, do you recall the jail being here, on the right by the doors as you go in.

Mr. Dulles. I only saw the jail on top side.

Mr. Brian. Well, the jail office is right there at the head of this ramp, the jail office where they book the prisoners through.

55 Mr. Dulles. I didn't go in there.

Mr. Brian. That is the door they brought Lee Oswald out of when he was shot, going into the jail office right there.

Mr. Rankin. There are no stairs from the basement to the third floor?

Mr. Brian. There are stairs inside of the basement but there are none out here, inside of the basement of city hall but none out here in the parking area.

Mr. Rankin. Where are the stairs from the place where the elevators are that you took. Are there any stairs?

Mr. Brian. I didn't take any stairs.

Mr. Rankin. No. You say you took elevators.

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Were there stairs near the elevators?

Mr. Brian. Back right over—let me get a pencil and draw the whole thing for you. That is about the way it is situated right there.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Brian, we will call that Exhibit 839. Will you just briefly tell the Commission what you have done in making that exhibit now?

Mr. Brian. All right, sir. I am not an artist. But we came down the ramp on Main Street, came around here to the parking area. Mr. Hosty was parked over here. There is a bunch of poles out there and I won't try to draw them in here.

Mr. Rankin. Mark that "A" where Mr. Hosty was parked as you just indicated.

Mr. Brian. All right. And he was coming this way and we were coming this way. We met him about in the middle of this ramp out here, and talked, and——

Mr. Rankin. You were right alongside of Lieutenant Revill?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; and they walked on off and I came back behind through here to these elevators and off here we caught the elevators and went on up.

Mr. Rankin. How close were you when you came behind them?

Mr. Brian. Just—I didn't keep a constant pace with them, but as far as—I don't recall exactly——

Mr. Rankin. You were close to them, were you?

Mr. Brian. Here is the stairway in the basement, there is one narrow stairway going up to the first floor, and you pass it and you go by the phone booth and a jail office and you pass the stairway, it is right over here in the basement of city hall.

Mr. Rankin. And you were close to them as you went across there to take the elevator?

Mr. Brian. I was behind them and they were going away from me and I was fairly close, yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. About how far?

Mr. Brian. Probably 6 or 7 feet or 8 feet behind. When we got to the elevator and we all stopped there together and caught the elevator.

Mr. Dulles. Where did the conversation take place, in front of the elevators there?

Mr. Brian. That I heard?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Brian. Right out here, because Mr. Hosty started blurting it out just as soon as he started across here.

Mr. Dulles. And you walked from this point here?

Mr. Brian. Over to here, to the elevators.

Mr. Dulles. Mark that point "B."

Mr. Rankin. Where you met?

Mr. Dulles. Where you met Hosty.

Mr. Brian. OK.

Mr. Dulles. And you walked along, make a mark there, if you would, along there to the elevators where you walked.

Mr. Brian. That is not exactly that way, this is offset, you have to come over here to go up, it is not drawn exactly right, we walked across here to the elevators straight through.

Mr. Dulles. How far is that, a hundred feet—no, less than that.

Mr. Brian. It is much less than a hundred feet.

Mr. Dulles. Fifty feet, something like that.

Mr. Brian. Probably 60, 70 feet.

56 Mr. Dulles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Brian. Something like that.

Mr. Dulles. Where is this, where does that stairway go?

Mr. Brian. Up to the first floor. Back in the hallway.

Mr. Dulles. And you are quite clear you didn't go up that stairway?

Mr. Brian. We didn't go up a stairway, no; not that stairway here.

Mr. Dulles. Or any other stairway?

Mr. Brian. Going up?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Brian. No, sir; we didn't go up the stairway going up.

The Chairman. When you got up to the first floor by that stairway, are there other stairs leading up to the floors above that connect with this?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; you have to go around. This is just a narrow stairway going from the basement, it is probably, well, just a regular narrow staircase that goes up, straight up. After you get to the first floor the stairways widen out probably as wide as that window and go up half a floor and meet another landing and then go up to the third floor that way. They widen out.

Representative Ford. Was anybody with Mr. Hosty?

Mr. Brian. Not when we met him there; no, sir.

Representative Ford. When you got on the elevator, who was on the elevator?

Mr. Brian. It was full.

Mr. Dulles. Were there a lot of pressmen down there, no television——

Mr. Brian. I don't recall seeing any but there may have been some. I don't recall seeing any but there may have been.

The Chairman. You say the elevator was full?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. About how many people would it carry approximately?

Mr. Brian. Probably 10 or 12.

Representative Ford. Did Revill and Hosty and yourself get on the elevator?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. Anybody else get on at that point that you recall?

Mr. Brian. As I recall there was a little interchange of people, some got off and some got on, I believe. I believe there was a little interchange of people.

Mr. Dulles. At the bottom, that is the bottom story for the elevator?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; in the basement.

Representative Ford. As you got on the elevator and as you rode up, did you hear Hosty and Revill converse at all?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Representative Ford. There was no further conversation on this problem?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Representative Ford. When you got off the elevator where did you go?

Mr. Brian. Right on around. You get off the elevator and you come straight out——

Mr. Dulles. What floor—three?

Mr. Brian. Three. Went around to the left to Captain Fritz' office and turned right in Captain Fritz' office and I stopped right there at the door and he took him over and introduced him, talked to, I believe, Lieutenant Wells.

Mr. Dulles. Captain Fritz wasn't there at that time?

Mr. Brian. I don't recall seeing him in there. But Captain Fritz has got him a little office in the side and you have got to walk up in front and see if he is in there because he stays in there all the time.

Representative Ford. What did Revill and you do?

Mr. Brian. Went back down to our office.

Representative Ford. Gannaway's—is that Gannaway's office?

Mr. Brian. Gannaway's; yes, sir.

Representative Ford. As you drove——

Mr. Dulles. What floor is that on?

Mr. Brian. Captain Gannaway's is on the second floor.

Representative Ford. As you drove from the Texas School Depository Building after making a check of the facilities who was in the car?

Mr. Brian. Our car?

57 Representative Ford. Yes.

Mr. Brian. Let me see, Lieutenant Revill, myself, Westphal, Tarver, and we gave a man a lift, and I don't remember whether he was a CID, I don't know the man, I don't remember whether he was a CIC agent or a CID or OSI, he was some type of, as I recall, Army intelligence man.

Mr. Dulles. Army, Air Force, or something?

Mr. Brian. He was connected with the service and we let him out a couple of blocks, if I recall, up about Field Street, somewhere along in there. Lieutenant Revill knew him, who he was, and he rode up there with us.

Representative Ford. Who drove the car?

Mr. Brian. Lieutenant Revill. It was his car.

Representative Ford. Did you sit in the front or back seat?

Mr. Brian. Sat in the back seat on the left-hand side.

Representative Ford. Who sat in the front seat.

Mr. Brian. I don't recall.

Mr. Dulles. You were right behind Lieutenant Revill?

Mr. Brian. I believe I was right behind Lieutenant Revill. Yes, sir; that is, I believe I sat in the back seat.

Representative Ford. When you got into the building and got out of the car, what happened to the other occupants of the car?

Mr. Brian. I don't know. They went on about, probably went up to Captain Gannaway, but I don't recall seeing them after we started talking to Hosty and went on, somewhere in the shuffle they didn't stay with us and went on.

Representative Ford. They didn't accompany you up the elevator?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; and I don't know where they went.

Mr. Dulles. That is they weren't among the possibly 10 men of the police who were in the elevator, as far as you remember, I mean?

Mr. Brian. As far as I remember; no.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Brian, I call your attention to Exhibit 857A and the fact that is a newspaper account and ask you to examine and state whether or not you recall having seen that before. I want to correct the record, that is Commission 857A which is attached to Exhibit 831.

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; I read this in the Dallas paper, I believe.

Mr. Rankin. Did you have anything to do with giving that to the paper?

Mr. Brian. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Did you talk to any newspaper people about it?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; haven't talked to any since it happened.

Mr. Rankin. All you know about it is that you just saw it in the paper?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. Then——

Mr. Brian. I know the next—it was supposed to come out on Friday because on Saturday they started calling my house and I left.

Mr. Rankin. You never answered any of the calls?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; I never talked to any reporters about it.

Mr. Rankin. That is all I have, Mr. Chief Justice.

The Chairman. Congressman, do you have anything?

Representative Ford. I don't believe so, Mr. Chief Justice.

The Chairman. Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Dulles. Give me just 1 minute, Mr. Chief Justice. In the second paragraph of your letter, Commission Exhibit 711, you say "Upon entering the basement of city hall," he, Agent Hosty, that you explained, who had already parked his car, he also parked his car in the basement of the city hall building?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; over here where you told me to put "A" he was or in that area over there and was out of his car walking towards us.

Mr. Dulles. And you go on to say "and was walking very fast toward the entrance of the city hall from the parking area."

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; that is this entrance over here.

Mr. Dulles. What is that marked? Is there a mark on that?

Mr. Brian. No, sir. You didn't tell me to mark "A" and "B" where we met.

Mr. Dulles. You might mark that "C," I think we have "A" and "B."

Mr. Brian. O.K., "C" would be the entrance by the jail office.

58 Mr. Dulles. That is right.

"At this time Hosty made the statement that Lee Oswald had killed the President, and that Oswald was a Communist."

Now, at this time, that is walking toward point "C" you have just marked on exhibit——

Mr. Brian. No, sir; we stopped here for a pause just for a short time, it would be hard to say how long but it wasn't because—it wasn't long because it don't take long to make a statement.

Representative Ford. That is point "B."

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Near point "B" is where this conversation took place.

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. And you did not hear the content of any further conversations?

Mr. Brian. No, sir; other than that he said he knew he was a Communist and knew he was working in the Book Depository.

Mr. Dulles. Did further conversations take place between Lieutenant Revill and Agent Hosty after that?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; they walked on talking.

Mr. Dulles. But you did not hear what they said at that time?

Mr. Brian. I was behind them and Lieutenant Revill got in a hurry when that happened and they got on and I was behind them, and it is pretty hard to hear what people are saying in front of you when they have got their back turned to you and you are behind them.

Mr. Dulles. You have indicated that in paragraph 3 of Exhibit 7. You say, "While we were in the basement Hosty also said several things to Lieutenant Revill that I could not hear," because of the excitement and commotion, that is what you had reference to?

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; they were conversing as they walked on and I couldn't hear them and I didn't hear what they said, I was behind them. I didn't pay a whole lot of attention to the whole thing because like I say I didn't think it would matter any. It was just—and things were happening pretty fast, and along about that time.

Mr. Dulles. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer the diagram, Exhibit 839, if I may.

The Chairman. Yes, all right; it may be admitted under that number. Thank you very much.

(At this point Representative Ford left the hearing room.)

(Commission Exhibit No. 839 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Dulles. That is the original before the notary public put his endorsement on it.

Mr. Brian. Yes, sir; that went forward.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Specter is going to examine these people about the velocity and so forth and I want to speak on—speak to him just a minute about the matter we talked about.

The Chairman. We will take a break now.

(Recess.)

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. FRAZIER

The Chairman. Mr. Specter, you may proceed.

You have been sworn and you are still under oath, as you understand?

Mr. Frazier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Will you state your name again for the record, please?

Mr. Frazier. Robert A. Frazier.

Mr. Specter. Mr. Frazier, you have appeared heretofore to testify about certain tests which you have conducted, but at this phase of the record, will you state briefly your occupation and your specialty, please?

Mr. Frazier. I am a special agent assigned to the FBI laboratory, the firearms identification unit in Washington, D.C., where I make examinations of bullets,59 cartridges, gunpowder tests, bullet holes, examinations of clothing, and other similar types of examinations.

Mr. Specter. In the course of your duties have you had an occasion to examine the clothing which was purportedly worn by President John Kennedy on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. Specter. And do you have that clothing with you at the present time, sir?

Mr. Frazier. I have certain parts of it. I have the coat, shirt, tie, and the bandages and support belt which he allegedly was wearing that day.

Mr. Specter. Would you refer at this time to the coat, if you please, which, may the record show, has heretofore been marked as Commission Exhibit 393.

And by referring to that coat will you describe what, if anything, you observed on the rear side of the coat?

Mr. Frazier. There was located on the rear of the coat 5-3/8 inches below the top of the collar, a hole, further located as 1¾ inches to the right of the midline or the seam down the center of the coat; all of these being as you look at the back of the coat.

Mr. Specter. What characteristics did you note, if any, on the nature of that hole?

Mr. Frazier. I noticed that the hole penetrated both the outer and lining areas of the coat, that it was roughly circular in shape. When I first examined it it was approximately one-fourth of an inch in diameter, and the cloth fibers around the margins of the hole were pushed inward at the time I first examined it in the laboratory.

Mr. Specter. Did any tests conducted on the coat disclose any metallic substance on that area of that hole?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir. I had a spectrographer run an analysis of a portion of the hole which accounts for its being slightly enlarged at the present time. He took a sample of cloth and made an analysis of it. I don't know actually whether I am expected to give the results of his analysis or not.

Mr. Specter. Yes; would you please, or let me ask you first of all, were those tests run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the regular course of its testing procedures?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; they were.

Mr. Specter. And have those results been made available to you through the regular recordkeeping procedures of the FBI?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Would you then please tell us what those tests disclose?

Mr. Frazier. Traces of copper were found around the margins of the hole in the back of the coat, and as a control, a very small section under the collar was taken, and no copper being found there, it was concluded that the copper was foreign to the coat itself.

Mr. Specter. Have you now described all of the characteristics of that hole, which you consider to be important for the Commission's consideration?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Assuming that those clothes, that jacket, specifically, at this juncture, was worn by President Kennedy, and was in the same condition when that hole was made as it is now, and at the time when you made your examination, do you have a professional opinion as to what caused that hole in the back of the jacket?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; I would say that it was an entrance hole for a bullet.

Mr. Specter. And what is the reason for that conclusion, please?

Mr. Frazier. It has all the physical appearance characteristics which are considered when examining holes, such as its shape, its size, and in particular the fact that the fibers around the margins of the hole were all pushed inward where the cloth was torn by the object which passed through, and the fibers were unraveled as they were pushed inward, which is characteristic of a entrance-type bullet hole.

Mr. Specter. Is the presence of the metallic substance relevant in your conclusion that it was a bullet hole?

Mr. Frazier. Not necessarily. It is a factor which corroborates that opinion60 but even without it, it would still have been my opinion that it was a bullet entrance hole.

Mr. Specter. Can you tell the size of the bullet from the hole in the jacket?

Mr. Frazier. The hole in the jacket is approximately a quarter of an inch in diameter.

Mr. Specter. Would that hole be consistent with a hole which would be caused by a 6.5 millimeter bullet?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; the actual bullet which makes a hole cannot be determined because the cloth in one instance may stretch more than it does in another instance causing either a larger or smaller hole even for the same caliber, but it is consistent for a bullet of 6.5 millimeters in diameter to make a hole of approximately this size.

Mr. Specter. Were there any holes indicative of being bullet holes found on the front part of the President's jacket?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Specter. Did you have further occasion to examine the President's shirt?

Mr. Frazier. I did.

Mr. Specter. May the record show that the shirt has heretofore been identified as Commission Exhibit 394?

The Chairman. Yes; it may be.

Mr. Specter. What, if anything, did you observe then on the back side of the shirt, Mr. Frazier?

Mr. Frazier. I found on the back of the shirt a hole, 5¾ inches below the top of the collar, and as you look at the back of the shirt 1-1/8 inch to the right of the midline of the shirt, which is this hole I am indicating.

Mr. Specter. May the record show the witness is examining the shirt, as he has the coat, to indicate the hole to the Commission.

The Chairman. The record may show that.

Mr. Frazier. In connection with this hole, I made the same examination as I did on the coat, Exhibit 393. I found the same situation to prevail, that is the hole was approximately circular in shape, about one-fourth inch in diameter, and again the physical shape of it is characteristic of a bullet hole, that is the edges are frayed, and there are slight radial tears in the cloth, which is characteristic of a bullet having passed through the cloth, and further, the fibers around the margin of the hole were—had been pressed inward, and assuming that, when I first examined the shirt it was in the same condition as it was at the time the hole was made, it is my opinion that this hole, in addition, was caused by a bullet entering the shirt from the back at that point.

Mr. Specter. Is that hole consistent with having been caused by a 6.5 millimeter bullet?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; it is.

Mr. Specter. With respect to the front side of the shirt, what, if any, hole did you find there?

Mr. Frazier. Only one hole.

Mr. Dulles. May I ask one question there?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; certainly.

Mr. Dulles. Is the hole in the shirt and the hole in the coat you have just described in a position that indicates that the same instrument, whatever it was, or the same bullet, made the two?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; they are. They are both—the coat hole is 5-3/8 inches below the top of the collar. The shirt hole is 5¾ inches, which could be accounted for by a portion of the collar sticking up above the coat about a half inch.

Mr. Dulles. I see.

Mr. Frazier. And they are both located approximately the same distance to the right of the midline of both garments.

Now, on the front of the shirt, I found what amounts to one hole. Actually, it is a hole through both the button line of the shirt and the buttonhole line which overlap down the front of the shirt when it is buttoned.

Mr. Specter. Proceed.

Mr. Frazier. This hole is located immediately below the button being centered seven-eighths of an inch below the button on the shirt, and similarly seven-eighths of an inch below the buttonhole on the opposite side.

61 The Chairman. You are speaking of the collar button itself, aren't you?

Mr. Frazier. The collar button.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Frazier. In each instance for these holes, the one through the button line and the one through the buttonhole line, the hole amounts to a ragged slit approximately one-half inch in height. It is oriented vertically, and the fibers of the cloth are protruding outward, that is, have been pushed from the inside out. I could not actually determine from the characteristics of the hole whether or not it was caused by a bullet. However, I can say that it was caused by a projectile of some type which exited from the shirt at that point and that is again assuming that when I first examined the shirt it was—it had not been altered from the condition it was in at the time the hole was made.

Mr. Specter. What characteristics differ between the hole in the rear of the shirt and the holes in the front of the shirt which lead you to conclude that the hole in the rear of the shirt was caused by a bullet but which are absent as to the holes in the front of the shirt?

Mr. Frazier. The hole in the front of the shirt does not have the round characteristic shape caused by a round bullet entering cloth. It is an irregular slit. It could have been caused by a round bullet, however, since the cloth could have torn in a long slitlike way as the bullet passed through it. But that is not specifically characteristic of a bullethole to the extent that you could say it was to the exclusion of being a piece of bone or some other type of projectile.

Mr. Specter. Have you now described all of the characteristics of the front of the shirt holes which you consider to be important?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question there. If the bullet, after entering, hit something that made it tumble or change, would that account for this change in the appearance of the exit through the shirt?

Mr. Frazier. I think not. In my opinion it would not have been necessary, if I may put it that way, for the bullet to have turned sideways or partially sideways in order to make an elongated hole.

Mr. Dulles. I see.

Mr. Frazier. I think the effect in the front of the shirt is due more to the strength of the material being more in the horizontal rather than the vertical direction which caused the cloth to tear vertically rather than due to a change in the shape or size of the bullet or projectile.

Mr. Dulles. Or possibly the velocity of the bullet at that place, would that have anything to do with it?

Mr. Frazier. I think the hole would not have been affected unless it was a very large change in velocity.

The Chairman. Mr. Frazier, I notice that the front of the shirt immediately around the hole you have just been describing and in fact on much of the front of the shirt is bloodsoaked. Would that, with the other evidences you have seen there indicate to you as an expert that this was the exit of the bullet that had entered in the back of the coat as you have described it?

Mr. Frazier. The presence of the blood would have in my opinion no value for determining which was entrance or exit, because I have seen entrance wounds which bleed extensively and exit wounds which bleed not at all and vice versa. It depends entirely on the type of bullet which strikes, whether or not it mutilates itself in the body, and probably more importantly it depends on the position of the person who is shot after the shooting occurs as to where the blood will be located on the garments.

The Chairman. May I put it this way, probably a little better. Do the evidences that you see on this shirt indicate to you that this hole in the front of the shirt that you have just described was made by the bullet which entered in the rear.

Mr. Frazier. I can say that this hole in the collar area could have been made by this bullet but I cannot say that the bullet which entered the back actually came out here or at some other place because I am not aware of the autopsy information as to the path of the bullet through the body.

The Chairman. I see.

62 Mr. Frazier. But if the path of the bullet was such that it came through the body at the right angle, then one bullet could have caused both holes.

The Chairman. Could have caused both holes.

Mr. Frazier. Yes.

The Chairman. That is sufficient.

Mr. Dulles. Is it correct that the blood on the shirt might well have been occasioned by the second wound rather than exclusively by the first wound?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; it could have come from any other wound on the body as well as this one.

Mr. Specter. When you refer to any other wound, Mr. Frazier, are you referring to the head wound which is widely known to have been inflicted on the President at the time of the assassination?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Did you have occasion to examine the President's tie or the tie purportedly worn by the President on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. May the record show at this juncture that that tie has heretofore been marked as Commission Exhibit 395?

The Chairman. Yes; it may show that.

Mr. Specter. What did you note, if anything, with respect to the tie, Mr. Frazier?

Mr. Frazier. When the tie was examined by me in the laboratory I noted that the neck portion had been cut from one side of the knot. However, the knot remained in apparently its original condition. The only damage to the tie other than the fact that it had been cut, was a crease or nick in the left side of the tie when you consider the tie as being worn on a body. As you view the front of the tie it would be on the right side. This nick would be located in a corresponding area to the area in the shirt collar just below the button.

Mr. Specter. As you now indicate on your own tie, you are indicating on the portion of the tie to your right?

Mr. Frazier. If it was on my tie it would be on the left side of the tie.

Mr. Specter. Your left side.

Mr. Frazier. The left side of my tie. There is a nick on the left side of the tie if you consider it as left and right according to the person wearing the tie.

Mr. Specter. Does the nick in the tie provide any indication of the direction of the missile?

Mr. Frazier. The nick is elongated horizontally, indicating a possible horizontal direction but it does not indicate that the projectile which caused it was exiting or entering at that point. The fibers were not disturbed in a characteristic manner which would permit any conclusion in that connection.

Mr. Specter. Is the nick consistent with an exiting path?

Mr. Frazier. Oh, yes.

Mr. Specter. Is there any indication from the nature of the nick as to the nature of the projectile itself?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Specter. Is the nick consistent with a 6.5 millimeter bullet having caused the nick?

Mr. Frazier. Yes. Any projectile could have caused the nick. In this connection there was no metallic residue found on the tie, and for that matter there was no metallic residue found on the shirt at the holes in the front. However, there was in the back.

Mr. Specter. Did any of the other——

Mr. Dulles. Excuse me, on the back of the coat?

Mr. Frazier. The shirt.

Mr. Dulles. Back of the coat and on the shirt?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Did any of the other items of President Kennedy's clothing which you have heretofore referred to contain any indications at all of any bullet holes or any other type of holes?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Specter. Mr. Frazier, did you have occasion to examine the clothing which63 has heretofore been identified in prior Commission proceedings as that worn by Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you what purports to be the Governor's coat, and may the record show that has been heretofore marked as Commission Exhibit No. 683?

(At this point the Chairman left the hearing room.)

Mr. Dulles [presiding]. The record may so show.

Mr. Specter. Have you had opportunity heretofore to examine that coat?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; I have.

Mr. Specter. What did your examination reveal with respect to the back side of the coat?

Mr. Frazier. There was found on the coat by me when I first examined it, near the right sleeve 1-1/8 inches from the seam where the sleeve attaches to the coat, and 7¼ inches to the right of the midline when you view the back of the coat, a hole which is elongated in a horizontal direction to the length of approximately five-eights of an inch, and which had an approximate one-quarter inch height.

Mr. Specter. Were you able to determine from your examination of the Governor's clothing whether or not they had been cleaned and pressed prior to the time you saw them?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; they had.

Mr. Specter. Is that different from or the same as the condition of the President's clothing which you have just described this morning?

Mr. Frazier. It is different in that the President's clothing had not been cleaned. It had only been dried. The blood was dried. However, the Governor's garments had been cleaned and pressed.

Mr. Specter. Had the President's clothing been pressed then?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Specter. Will you proceed to describe any other characteristics——

Mr. Dulles. Had been dried artificially or let nature take its course?

Mr. Frazier. It appeared to be air dried.

Mr. Dulles. Air dried, artificially?

Mr. Frazier. I couldn't say whether any outside heat had been applied but it did not appear that any heat had been applied to the blood.

Mr. Specter. Proceed.

Mr. Frazier. On the hole on the back of the coat although it had the general appearance and could have been a bullet hole, possibly because of the cleaning and pressing of the garment. I cannot state that it actually is a bullet hole nor the direction of the path of the bullet, if it were a bullet hole.

Mr. Specter. Is the nature of the opening consistent with being a bullet hole?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. Specter. And is it consistent with a bullet hole caused by a missile traveling from the back to the front of the wearer of the garment?

Mr. Frazier. I could not determine that.

Mr. Specter. You couldn't determine that it was, but could it have been?

Mr. Frazier. It could have been, yes; either way.

Mr. Specter. All right. Will you now turn to the front side of the coat and state what, if any, damage you observed on the body of the garment?

Mr. Frazier. When considered from the wearer's standpoint, on the right chest area of the coat there is a hole through the lining and the outer layer of the coat which is located 6½ inches from the right side seam line and also 6½ inches from the armpit which places this hole approximately 5 inches to the right of the front right edge of the coat.

This hole was approximately circular in shape, three-eights of an inch in diameter, and again possibly because of the cleaning and pressing of the garment, I could not determine whether it actually was a bullet hole or whether or not it entered or exited if it were a bullet hole.

64 Mr. Specter. Was the hole consistent with being an exit bullet hole? That is to say, could it have been caused by an exiting bullet?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Did you find any damage on the right sleeve of the jacket?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; on more or less the top portion of the right sleeve very near the end of the sleeve there is a very rough hole which penetrates both the outside layer, the lining and the inside layer of the sleeve.

Mr. Specter. Were you able to observe sufficient characteristics to formulate any conclusion as to the cause of that tear?

Mr. Frazier. This also did not indicate direction from the condition of the fibers, possibly due to the cleaning and pressing of the garment.

However, it could have been a bullet which struck the garment at an angle to the surface which caused a slight elongation. The hole was approximately five-eights of an inch in length, and three-eights of an inch in width. The elongation could also have been the result of a mutilated bullet having struck the garment or it could have been caused by a fold in the garment at the time the object or bullet struck.

Mr. Specter. Did you have occasion to examine the shirt, which was purportedly worn by Governor Connally, and which has heretofore been identified by the Governor in Commission proceedings, as that worn by him on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. May the record show at this point that Mr. Frazier is examining the shirt heretofore identified on the back side with a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 685 and on the front side with a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 686.

Now, referring to that shirt, Mr. Frazier, what, if anything, did you observe on the rear side by way of an imperfection, hole or defect?

Mr. Frazier. I found a hole which is very ragged. An L-shaped tear actually is what it amounted to in the back of the shirt near the right sleeve, 2 inches from the seam line where the sleeve attaches to the shirt, and 7½ inches to the right of the midline of the shirt, the right side being as you look at the back of the shirt.

This tear amounted to a five-eights of an inch long horizontal and approximately one-half inch long vertical break in the cloth, with a very small tear located immediately to its right, as you look at the back of the shirt, which was approximately three-sixteenths of an inch in length.

This hole corresponds in position to the hole in the back of the coat, Governor Connally's coat, identified as Commission No. 683.

Mr. Specter. Were there sufficient characteristics observable to formulate a conclusion as to the cause and direction of that hole?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; there were no characteristics on which you could base a conclusion as to what caused it, whether or not it was a bullet and if it had been, what the direction of the projectile was.

Mr. Specter. Could it have been caused by a 6.5-mm. bullet coming from the rear of the wearer toward his front?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Referring now to the front side of the Governor's shirt, what, if anything, did you observe with respect to a tear or a hole thereon, as to the body of the shirt?

Mr. Frazier, I found in the right chest area of the shirt, considering the shirt when it is being worn, a very irregular tear more or less in the form of an "H," of the letter "H." This tear was approximately 1½ inches in height, with the crossbar tear being approximately 1 inch in width, which caused a very irregularly shaped and enlarged hole in the front of the shirt. The hole is located 5 inches from the right-side seam, and 9 inches below the top of the right sleeve. The 9-inch figure is from the top of the right shoulder where the sleeve adjoins the yoke of the shirt.

Mr. Specter. Had that garment been cleaned and pressed, Mr. Frazier, prior to the time you examined it?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

65 Mr. Specter. Were there sufficient characteristics then remaining on the hole on the front side to enable you to formulate an opinion as to the cause of the hole?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Specter. Could it have been caused by a 6.5 millimeter bullet exiting from the chest of the Governor?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, it could.

Mr. Specter. Now what, if anything——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask there, would the size and character of this hole indicate the condition of the bullet, I mean as to whether it was tumbling or whether it was a mutilated bullet or anything of that kind?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; it would not.

Mr. Dulles. Even a bullet in full flight, full velocity could have made this kind of a hole in the shirt?

Mr. Frazier. It could have, particularly if the shirt had been wrinkled at the time it passed through, and particularly because the material in this shirt tore rather severely at the time the object passed through, indicating a very weak structure of the cotton fiber, so that it would tear out of all proportion to a stronger fabric.

And for that reason, the shape of the hole could be affected by the condition of the material as well as any folds in the material or, as you say, by a mutilated bullet or a passage of a bullet through the cloth at an angle to the surface or the passing of a bullet partially sideways through the cloth.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Dulles. Will you proceed?

Mr. Specter. Mr. Frazier, what, if any, defect or hole did you observe on the right sleeve of the Governor's shirt?

Mr. Frazier. I found in the cuff of the shirt which is a French cuff, through both the outer and inner layers of the cuff, a hole which is ragged in contour, irregularly shaped, and which had more or less star-shaped tears extending outward from the hole into the material, located 1½ inches up from the end of the sleeve, and 5½ inches from the outside cuff link hole, through both, as I said, through both layers of the cuff, and the hole was in such a condition, possibly due to the washing of the material, that I could not determine what actually caused it or if it had been caused by a bullet, the direction of the path of the bullet with reference to entrance and exit.

Mr. Specter. Could those holes have been caused by a bullet passing through the Governor's wrist from the dorsal or upper portion to the volar or palmar side?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; they could.

Mr. Specter. Did you have occasion to examine the trousers which have been heretofore identified in Commission hearings as those worn by Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, I did.

Mr. Specter. May the record show that Mr. Frazier has taken and is observing the trousers which have been identified in the record, through a picture of the front side, bearing Commission Exhibit No. 687 and a picture of the rear side bearing Commission Exhibit No. 688.

Now, referring to those trousers, what if anything did you observe in the nature of a defect or hole, Mr. Frazier?

Mr. Frazier. In the area which would be the left-knee area of the person wearing the trousers, there was a hole which is roughly circular in shape, and approximately one-quarter of an inch in diameter with some possible expansion of the hole due to slight tearing of the cloth at the outer margins of the hole.

Mr. Specter. Had the trousers been cleaned and pressed prior to your examination?

Mr. Specter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Were there sufficient characteristics available for you to formulate any conclusion as to the cause of that hole?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; I can say that it had the general appearance of a bullet hole but I could not determine the direction of the bullet if, in fact, it had been caused by a bullet.

66 Mr. Specter. What are the characteristics which led you to believe that it had the characteristics of a bullet hole?

Mr. Frazier. It has the roughly circular shape with slight tearing away from the edges of the material.

Mr. Specter. Is there any other hole on the trousers which could be a hole of exit?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Specter. Mr. Frazier, did you have occasion to examine an automobile which was the vehicle used customarily by the President of the United States in parades?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. When did that examination occur?

Mr. Frazier. In the early morning hours of November 23, 1963, at the Secret Service garage here in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph previously identified for the record as Commission Exhibit No. 344 and ask you if that depicts the car which you examined?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. Specter. I hand you a subsequent exhibit of the Commission, No. 346, showing the interior view of the automobile and ask you if that depicts the automobile which you examined?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; however, it wasn't in this condition. It wasn't as clean as it is in Exhibit 346.

Mr. Specter. What was the condition with respect to cleanliness?

Mr. Frazier. There were blood and particles of flesh scattered all over the hood, the windshield, in the front seat and all over the rear floor rugs, the jump seats, and over the rear seat, and down both sides of the side rails or tops of the doors of the car.

Mr. Specter. Is that condition depicted by Commission Exhibits 352 and 353 to the extent that they show the interior of the automobile?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. What was the purpose of the examination which you made of the car at that time and place?

Mr. Frazier. I examined the car to determine whether or not there were any bullet fragments present in it, embedded in the upholstery of the back of the front seat, or whether there were any impact areas which indicated that bullets or bullet fragments struck the inside of the car.

Mr. Specter. With respect to the fragments first, what did your examination disclose?

Mr. Frazier. We found three small lead particles lying on the rug in the rear seat area. These particles were located underneath or in the area which would be underneath the left jump seat.

Mr. Specter. Have those particles been identified during the course of your prior testimony?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; they have not?

Mr. Specter. Will you produce them at this time then, please? May we assign to this group of particles Commission Exhibit No. 840?

Mr. Dulles. These have not been discussed before, have they?

Mr. Specter. They have not.

Mr. Dulles. It shall be admitted as Commission Exhibit No. 840.

(Commission Exhibit No. 840 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Specter. I move formally for their admission, then, into evidence at this time.

Mr. Dulles. They shall be admitted.

Mr. Specter. Will you describe the three pieces of metal which are contained within this vial, please?

Mr. Frazier. The three pieces of metal are lead. They were weighed immediately upon recovery and were found to weigh nine-tenths of a grain, seven-tenths of a grain, and seven-tenths of a grain, respectively. Since that time small67 portions have been removed for spectrographic analysis and comparison with other bullets and bullet fragments.

Mr. Specter. Has that comparison been made with a whole bullet heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit 399 which in other proceedings has been identified as the bullet from the Connally stretcher?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; the comparison was made by comparing Exhibit 399 with a bullet fragment found in the front seat of the Presidential limousine and then comparing that fragment with these fragments from the rear seat of the automobile.

Mr. Specter. For identification purposes, has that fragment from the front seat been heretofore identified during your prior testimony?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; it has. It bears Commission No. 567.

Mr. Specter. Now, what did the comparative examination then disclose as among Commission Exhibits 399, 567, and 840?

Mr. Frazier. That examination was performed by a spectrographer, John F. Gallagher, and I do not have the results of his examinations here, although I did ascertain that it was determined that the lead fragments were similar in composition.

Mr. Specter. So that they could have come from, so that the fragments designated 840 could have come from the same bullet as fragment designated 567?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Were the tests sufficient to indicate conclusively whether fragments 840 did come from the fragment designated as 567?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Specter. Did you personally find any other fragments in the President's car during the course of your examination?

Mr. Frazier. No; I did not.

Mr. Specter. Now, where, according to information provided to you then, was the fragment designated Commission Exhibit 567 found?

Mr. Frazier. That was found by the Secret Service upon their examination of the limousine here in Washington when it first arrived from Dallas, and Commission No. 567 was delivered by Deputy Chief Paul Paterni and by a White House detail chief, Floyd M. Boring, to a liaison agent of the FBI, Orrin Bartlett, who delivered them to me in the laboratory at 11:50 p.m., on November 22, 1963.

Mr. Specter. Does that constitute the total chain of possession then from the finder with the Secret Service into your hands, as reflected on the records of the FBI?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Was there another fragment, was there any other fragment found in the front seat of the car?

Mr. Frazier. Yes. Alongside the right side of the front seat, Commission Exhibit No. 569, which is the base portion of the jacket of a bullet, was found, and handled in identical manner to the Exhibit 567.

Mr. Dulles. And the front seat is the seat which would be the driver's seat?

Mr. Frazier. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. And the Secret Service man on his right, I believe?

Mr. Specter. Mr. Kellerman.

Mr. Dulles. That was the seat from which this came?

Mr. Frazier. Commission Exhibit 567 was found on the seat right beside the driver, and Exhibit 569 was found on the floor beside the right side of the front seat.

Mr. Specter. The right side of the front seat, Mr. Dulles, as the prior testimony shows was occupied by Roy Kellerman and the driver was William Greer.

Mr. Dulles. Right. Thank you.

Mr. Specter. Would you state what the chain of possession was from the time of discovery of Exhibit 569 until the time it came into your possession, based on the records of the FBI, please, if you have those records available?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir. It was delivered by Secret Service Deputy Chief Paul Paterni, and SAC of the White House detail Floyd M. Boring of the Secret68 Service again, to Special Agent Orrin Bartlett of the FBI who delivered it to me at 11:50 p.m. on November 22, 1963.

Mr. Specter. Are the records which you have just referred to relating to the chain of possession of Exhibits 567 and 569 maintained by you in the normal course of your duties as an examiner of those items?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Mr. Frazier, is it possible for the fragments identified in Commission Exhibit 840 to have come from the whole bullet heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit 399?

Mr. Frazier. I would say that based on weight it would be highly improbable that that much weight could have come from the base of that bullet since its present weight is—its weight when I first received it was 158.6 grains.

Mr. Specter. Referring now to 399.

Mr. Frazier. Exhibit 399, and its original normal weight would be 160 to 161 grains, and those three metal fragments had a total of 2.1 grains as I recall—2.3 grains. So it is possible but not likely since there is only a very small part of the core of the bullet 399 missing.

Mr. Specter. Have you now described all of the bullet fragments which you found in the President's automobile?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Was it your job to analyze all of the bullets or bullet fragments which were found in the President's car?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; it was, except for the spectrographic analysis of the composition.

Mr. Specter. Have you now described all of the bullet fragments which were brought to you by anyone else and identified as having been found in the President's car?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; not this morning but at previous times during my testimony I have; yes.

Mr. Specter. But then there is on the record now all of the identification of the metallic or bullet fragments found in connection with your examination of the President's car or which were examined by you after having been found by someone else?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir. There is one other, it is not a metal particle but it is a residue of metal on the inside of the windshield.

Mr. Specter. Aside from that residue of the windshield which I am going to come to now, have we placed on the record a description of all of the bullets or bullet fragments?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Now——

Mr. Dulles. Just one moment. You mean bullet fragments related to the car or bullet fragments found anywhere?

Mr. Specter. Related to the President's automobile.

Mr. Frazier. Yes; you have.

Mr. Specter. Did you have occasion then to examine the windshield of the Presidential limousine?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. What did that examination disclose?

Mr. Frazier. On the inside surface of the windshield there was a deposit of lead. This deposit was located when you look at the inside surface of the windshield, 13½ inches down from the top, 23 inches from the left-hand side or driver's side of the windshield, and was immediately in front of a small pattern of star-shaped cracks which appeared in the outer layer of the laminated windshield.

Mr. Dulles. What do you mean by the "outer layer of the laminated windshield"?

Mr. Frazier. The windshield is composed of two layers with a very thin layer of plastic in between which bonds them together in the form of safety glass. The inside layer of the glass was not broken, but the outside layer immediately on the outside of the lead residue had a very small pattern of cracks and there was a very minute particle of glass missing from the outside surface.

69 Mr. Dulles. And the outside surface was the surface away from where the occupants were sitting?

Mr. Frazier. That is correct; yes.

Mr. Dulles. And the inside surface was the surface nearest the occupants?

Mr. Frazier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. What do those characteristics indicate as to which side of the windshield was struck?

Mr. Frazier. It indicates that it could only have been struck on the inside surface. It could not have been struck on the outside surface because of the manner in which the glass broke and further because of the lead residue on the inside surface. The cracks appear in the outer layer of the glass because the glass is bent outward at the time of impact which stretches the outer layer of the glass to the point where these small radial or wagon spoke-wagon wheel spoke-type cracks appear on the outer surface.

Mr. Dulles. So the pressure must have come from the inside and not from the outside against the glass?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. Dulles. As far as the car is concerned from the back to the front?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Not from outside against the glass—from the front against the glass.

Mr. Frazier. That is right.

Mr. Specter. Was a comparison made of the lead residues on the inside of the windshield with any of the bullet fragments recovered about which you have heretofore testified?

Mr. Frazier. Yes. They were compared with the bullet fragment found on the front seat, which in turn was compared with Commission 399. The lead was found to be similar in composition. However, that examination in detail was made by a spectrographer, Special Agent John F. Gallagher.

Mr. Specter. Was that examination made in the regular course of examining procedures by the FBI?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. And was that information made available to you through the normal conference procedures among FBI examiners?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir. He submitted his report to me and I prepared the formal report of the entire examination.

Mr. Specter. Are his report and your formal report a part of the permanent record of the FBI then?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. I now show you Commission Exhibit No. 350 which has heretofore been identified as a picture of the windshield of the Presidential limousine and I ask you if that is the crack about which you have just testified?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; it is. This Exhibit 350 is a photograph which I took on the 23d of November, showing a view from the front toward the rear of the Presidential limousine and showing the crack in the glass and the lead residue on the inside surface.

Mr. Specter. Would you produce at this time the lead residue obtained by you from that inside surface, please? May it please the Commission, I would like to mark this as Commission Exhibit 841 and move for its admission into evidence at this time.

Mr. Dulles. It shall be admitted into evidence.

(Commission Exhibit No. 841 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Dulles. May I just ask a question of you, Mr. Specter, and possibly of the witness.

I assume that the windshield we are now discussing is the windshield that was exhibited to the Commission several weeks ago and which members of the Commission examined?

Mr. Specter. It was, Mr. Dulles, and we can establish that, of record, through another Commission Exhibit which is 351, which was the number given to the windshield and we have a reproduction here through the photograph.

70 Mr. Dulles. You don't have the windshield here today, though?

Mr. Specter. No, we do not.

Mr. Dulles. It would be the same windshield that the Commission saw.

Mr. Specter. We can establish it through the witness, too.

Mr. Frazier, for that purpose can you identify what is depicted in a photograph heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit 351?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; this is a photograph of the very small pattern of cracks in the windshield which was on the Presidential limousine at the time I examined it, and which I also later examined in the FBI laboratory.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Specter. Mr. Frazier, have you now described all of your findings on the windshield of the Presidential limousine?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; that is concerning the glass itself and not the molding around the windshield.

Mr. Specter. Will you then move to the molding around the windshield and state what, if anything, you found there?

Mr. Frazier. On the strip of chrome which goes across the top of the windshield and again on the passenger side of the windshield or the inside surface, I found a dent in the chrome which had been caused by some projectile which struck the chrome on the inside surface.

Mr. Specter. Was there one dent or more than one dent or what?

Mr. Frazier. One dent.

Mr. Specter. Will you identify what is depicted by a photograph heretofore marked as Commission Exhibit 349?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; this is a photograph which I took of this dent at that time, showing the damaged chrome, just to the right of the rearview mirror support at the top of the windshield.

Mr. Specter. Did your examination of the President's limousine disclose any other holes or markings which could have conceivably been caused by a bullet striking the automobile or any part of the automobile?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir.

Mr. Dulles. I wonder if I could go back just a moment to the indentation in the chrome around the windshield at the top of the windshield, but on the inside, could that have been caused by a fragment of a bullet?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, it very easily could have. It would not have been caused, for instance, by a bullet which was traveling at its full velocity from a rifle, but merely from a fragment traveling at fairly high velocity which struck the inside surface of the chrome.

Mr. Dulles. Could that have been caused by any of the fragments that you have identified as having been found on the front seat or near the front seat of the car?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; I believe it could have by either, in fact, of the two fragments of rifle bullets found in the front seat.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Specter. Mr. Frazier, assume certain facts to be true for purposes of expressing an opinion on a hypothetical situation, to wit: that President Kennedy was struck by a 6.5 millimeter bullet which passed through his body entering on the rear portion of his neck 14 centimeters to the left of his right acromion process and 14 centimeters below his mastoid process, with a striking velocity of approximately 1,904 feet per second, and exited after passing through a fascia channel in his body, through the lower anterior third of his neck with an exit velocity of approximately 1,772 to 1,779 feet per second; and that bullet had then traveled from the point where it exited from his neck and struck the front windshield in some manner. What effect would that have had on the front windshield and the subsequent flight of the missile?

Mr. Frazier. It would have shattered the front windshield. It would have caused a very large, relatively large hole, approximately three-eighths to an inch in diameter with radiating cracks extending outward into the glass for several inches, even to the side of the glass.

Mr. Dulles. It would have penetrated the windshield?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

71 Mr. Specter. Would the missile then have proceeded in a forward direction?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; it would.

Mr. Specter. Do you have an opinion as to how far it would have gone?

Mr. Frazier. Until it struck some other object in the area of approximately a mile.

Mr. Specter. Now assume the same sequence with respect to exit velocity from the point of the President's neck at the same rate of 1,772 to 1,798 feet per second, and assume still further that the bullet had, the whole bullet had, struck the metal framing which you have heretofore described and identified. What effect would that have had on the metal framing?

Mr. Frazier. It would have torn a hole in the chrome, penetrated the framing both inside and outside of the car. I can only assume, since I haven't tested the metal of that particular car, I would assume that the bullet would completely penetrate both the chrome, the metal supporting the chrome, on the inside, and the body metal on the outside which supports the windshield of the car.

Mr. Specter. Now, assume the same set of factors as to the exit velocity from the President's neck. What effect would that bullet have had on any other portion of the automobile which it might have struck in the continuation of its flight?

Mr. Frazier. In my opinion it would have penetrated any other metal surface and, of course, any upholstery surface depending on the nature of the material as to how deep it would penetrate or how many successive layers it may have penetrated.

Mr. Specter. Was there any evidence in any portion of the car that the automobile was struck by a bullet which exited from the President's neck under the circumstances which I have just asked you to assume?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. Specter. And had there been any such evidence would your examination of the automobile have uncovered such an indication or such evidence?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; I feel that it would have.

Mr. Specter. Was your examination a thorough examination of all aspects of the interior of the automobile?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; for our purpose. However, we did not tear out all of the rugs on the floor, for instance. We examined the rugs carefully for holes, for bullet furroughs, for fragments. We examined the nap of the rug, in the actual nap of the rug, for fragments and bullet holes. We pulled the rug back as far as we could turn it back and even tore the glue or adhesive material loose around the cracks at the edges of the rug so we could observe the cracks to see whether they had been enlarged, and we examined all of the upholstery covering, on the back of the front seat, on the doors, and in the rear seat compartment, the jump seats, the actual rear seat, the back of the rear seat, and we examined the front seat in a similar manner, and we found no bullet holes or other bullet impact areas, other than the one on the inside of the windshield and the dent inside the windshield chrome.

Mr. Specter. Had any of those portions of the automobile been struck by the bullet exiting from the President's neck, which I have described hypothetically for you, would you have found some evidence of striking?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. When was this examination made?

Mr. Frazier. Between 2 and 4:30 a.m. on November 23, 1963.

Mr. Dulles. That was about 10 hours, 12 hours after the assassination?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; 14 to 16 hours.

Mr. Dulles. Fourteen to sixteen hours.

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. May I ask, do you know in whose custody the automobile was prior to your examination from the time it was shipped on the airplane?

Mr. Frazier. When I arrived there were two Secret Service men present but I do not recall their names. They were introduced to me, and they were there during the entire examination but I don't recall their actual names. The car was under guard in the Secret Service garage in Washington, D.C.

72 Other than that I do not know.

Mr. Dulles. Was this a joint examination by you and by the Secret Service or was the examination made by the FBI?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; by the FBI at the request of the Secret Service who had already examined the interior of the car for personal effects and other items.

Mr. Dulles. Did they certify to you or advise you that the car had been under their custody during this 14-to 16-hour period?

Mr. Frazier. I don't recall whether they actually stated that. What they stated was that the car had immediately been flown to Washington and placed in this garage and kept under surveillance the entire time.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Specter. Was a fragment of metal brought to you which was identified as coming from the wrist of Governor Connally?

Mr. Frazier. It was identified to me as having come from the arm of Governor Connally.

Mr. Specter. Will you produce that fragment at this time, please?

Mr. Frazier. This one does not have a Commission number as yet.

Mr. Specter. May it please the Commission, I would like to have this fragment marked as Commission Exhibit 842.

(Commission Exhibit No. 842 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Specter. Now, referring to a fragment heretofore marked as Q9 for FBI record purposes, and now marked as Commission Exhibit No. 842, will you describe that fragment for us, please?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; this is a small fragment of metal which weighed one-half a grain when I first examined it in the laboratory. It is a piece of lead, and could have been a part of a bullet or a core of a bullet.

However, it lacks any physical characteristics which would permit stating whether or not it actually originated from a bullet.

Mr. Specter. Are its physical characteristics consistent with having come from Commission Exhibit 399?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; it could have.

Mr. Specter. Are they consistent with that fragment identified as Commission Exhibit No. 842, as having come from fragment identified as Commission Exhibit 567?

Mr. Frazier. Which is 567?

Mr. Specter. 567 is the one which was found on the front seat.

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; it could have.

Mr. Specter. Were the characteristics of the fragment identified as Commission Exhibit 842 consistent with having come from the fragment heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit 569?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Would you set forth from the records of the FBI, if you have those before you, the chain of possession of the fragment identified as Commission Exhibit 842, please?

Mr. Frazier. Commission Exhibit 842, that is the one from Governor Connally's arm, was delivered to me in the FBI laboratory on November 23, 1963, by Special Agent Vincent E. Drain of the Dallas Office of the FBI, who stated he had secured this item from Capt. Will Fritz of the Dallas Police Department.

I do not know where Captain Fritz obtained it.

Mr. Specter. Referring back for just a moment to the coat identified as that worn by Governor Connally, Mr. Frazier, was there any observable angle of elevation or declination from the back side of the Governor's coat to the front side of the Governor's coat?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; there was, approximately a 35-degree downward angle.

Mr. Specter. Measuring from——

Mr. Frazier. That is——

Mr. Specter. Back to front or front to back?

Mr. Frazier. From back towards the front.

Mr. Specter. How about the same question as to the Governor's shirt?

Mr. Frazier. I would say it was approximately the same angle or slightly less. I think we measured approximately 30 degrees.

73 Mr. Specter. Was that from the front to back or from the back to front of the Governor's shirt?

Mr. Frazier. That would be from the back towards the front. Downward from back towards the front.

Mr. Specter. Mr. Dulles, those questions complete the ones which we have to ask, sir.

Mr. Frazier, one additional question: Do you have any knowledge through any source whatsoever of any bullets or bullet fragments found anywhere in the vicinity of the assassination other than those which you have already testified to, which were in the car, or the whole bullet from the Connally stretcher or the fragments from Governor Connally's wrist?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; I have never heard of any nor have any been submitted to me.

Mr. Specter. During the regular processing of the FBI examination in this case, would all such bullets or bullet fragments be brought to you for examination in accordance with your assignment to this matter generally?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; they would.

Mr. Specter. Were any metallic fragments brought to you which were purported to have been found in the head of President Kennedy?

Mr. Dulles. Or body?

Mr. Specter. Or body of President Kennedy?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; they were.

On November 23, 1963, at 1:35 a.m., the two metal fragments in this container were delivered to me in the FBI laboratory by Special Agent James W. Sibert, and Special Agent Francis O'Neill of the Baltimore office of the FBI who stated they had obtained these in the autopsy room at the Naval Hospital near Washington, D.C., where they were present when they were removed from the head of President Kennedy.

Mr. Specter. Is there any specification as to the portion of the President's head from which they were removed?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; they told me that there had been numerous particles in the head but only these two had been removed, the others being very small.

Mr. Specter. May it please the Commission I would like to have those marked and admitted into evidence as Commission Exhibit No. 843.

Mr. Dulles. It shall be so marked and admitted under those numbers.

(Commission Exhibit No. 843 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Specter. In the event we have not already had 842 admitted into evidence, I move, Mr. Dulles, for the admission into evidence of 842 which was the fragment from Governor Connally's arm.

Mr. Dulles. That shall be admitted.

Mr. Specter. Moving back to 843 will you describe those fragments indicating their weight and general composition?

Mr. Frazier. These fragments consisted of two pieces of lead, one weighed 1.65 grains. The other weighed .15 grain. They were examined spectrographically so their present weight would be somewhat less since a very small amount would be needed for spectrographic analysis.

Mr. Specter. Was a comparison made between or among these two fragments with the other metal from the bullets heretofore identified as Commission Exhibits 399, 567, 569, 840, and 842?

Mr. Frazier. Yes; they were.

Mr. Specter. What did that examination disclose?

Mr. Frazier. Possibly my numbers do not agree with those you have. These two particles from the President's head were compared with the lead of Exhibit 842.

Mr. Specter. Which is the fragment from the arm of Governor Connally?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir; they were compared with the lead scraping from the inside of the windshield.

Mr. Specter. Which is Exhibit 841.

Mr. Frazier. And with the three lead fragments found on the rear floorboard carpet of the limousine.

Mr. Specter. Which is Exhibit 840.

74 Mr. Frazier. And they were found to be similar in metallic composition.

Mr. Specter. Can you state with any more certainty——

Mr. Frazier. Excuse me, one thing. These, as a group, were compared with the bullet fragment, Commission Exhibit 567, which was found on the front seat of the automobile, which also was found to be similar in metallic composition.

Mr. Specter. Is it possible to state with any more certainty whether or not any of those fragments came from the same bullet?

Mr. Frazier. Not definitely, no; only that they are of similar lead composition.

Mr. Specter. Have you now described fully all of the relevant characteristics of the fragments identified as Commission Exhibit 843?

Mr. Frazier. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Are there any other bullets or bullet fragment or metallic substances of any sort connected with this case in any way which you have examined which you have not already testified to here today or on your prior appearance?

Mr. Frazier. No, sir; that is all of them.

Mr. Dulles. Is there anything further?

Mr. Specter. No.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you very much, Mr. Frazier.

The Commission will reconvene at 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Afternoon Session
TESTIMONY OF DR. ALFRED G. OLIVIER

The President's Commission reconvened at 3 p.m.

The Chairman. The Commission will come to order.

Mr. Specter, has the doctor been sworn yet?

Mr. Specter. No, sir; he has not.

The Chairman. Doctor, would you raise your right hand and be sworn, please? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in the matter before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You may be seated.

Mr. Specter. State your full name for the record.

Dr. Olivier. Dr. Alfred G. Olivier.

Mr. Specter. What is your occupation or profession?

Dr. Olivier. A supervisory research veterinarian and I work for the Department of the Army at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

Mr. Specter. Would you describe the nature of your duties at that arsenal, please?

Dr. Olivier. Investigating the wound ballistics of various bullets and other military missiles.

Mr. Specter. Would you describe the general nature of the tests which are carried on at Edgewood Arsenal?

Dr. Olivier. For example, with a bullet we run tissue studies getting the retardation of the bullet through the tissues, the penetration, various characteristics of it. We use as good tissue simulant 20 percent gelatin. This has a drag coefficient of muscle tissue and makes an excellent homogenous medium to study the action of the bullet. We also use animal parts and parts of cadavers where necessary to determine the characteristics of these things.

Mr. Specter. Would you set forth your educational background briefly, please?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did 2 years of preveterinary work at the University of New Hampshire and 4 years of veterinary school at the University of Pennsylvania, and I hold a degree doctor of veterinary medicine at the University of Pennsylvania.

75 Mr. Specter. In what year did you complete your educational work?

Dr. Olivier. 1953.

Mr. Specter. Would you outline your experience in the field subsequent to 1953?

Dr. Olivier. In this field?

Mr. Specter. Yes, sir.

Dr. Olivier. I came to Edgewood Arsenal, then the Army Chemical Center, in 1957, and originally to work, take charge of the animal colonies but immediately I got interested in the research and started working in the field of wound ballistics and have been in it ever since, and am presently Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch.

Mr. Specter. Have you been in charge of a series of tests performed to determine certain wound ballistics on circumstances analogous to the underlying facts on wounds inflicted upon President Kennedy and Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I have.

Mr. Specter. And in the course of those tests what weapon was used?

Dr. Olivier. It was identified as Commission Exhibit 139. It was a 6.5 mm. Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.

Mr. Specter. Did the designation, Commission Exhibit No. 139, appear on the body of that rifle?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; it did.

Mr. Specter. What type of bullets were used in the tests which you performed?

Dr. Olivier. We used the Western ammunition, Western being a division of Olin Industries, Winchester Western, it was lot 6,000 to 6.5 mm. round. Has a muzzle velocity of approximately 2,160 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. And were those bullets obtained by you upon information provided to you by the Commission's staff as to the identity of the bullets which were believed to have been used during the assassination?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I first got the identity from the people at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and then I further checked with the Commission to see if that was right before ordering this type of ammunition.

Mr. Specter. And where were those bullets obtained from?

Dr. Olivier. I obtained 100 rounds from Remington at Bridgeport. Conn., and Dr. Dziemian obtained another 160 rounds, I believe, from Winchester in New Haven.

Mr. Specter. Did you perform certain tests to determine the wound ballistics and include in that the penetration power of the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, which you referred to, firing the Western Cartridge Co. bullet by comparison with other types of bullets?

Dr. Olivier. We didn't fire any of the others at the same time. These had been fired previously. We have all these records for comparison.

Mr. Specter. Was the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle then fired for comparison purposes with the other bullets where you already had your experience?

Dr. Olivier. No; it was fired for the purposes for which—to try to shed some light on say the factors leading to the assassination and all, not for comparison with the other bullets.

Mr. Specter. I now show you a photograph which is marked as Commission Exhibit No. 844, may it please the Commission, and ask you if this photograph was prepared by you in conjunction with the study on the Mannlicher-Carcano and the Western Cartridge Co. bullet?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; it was.

Mr. Specter. Would you explain to the Commission what that photograph depicts?

Dr. Olivier. Actually, the bullet passed through two gelatin blocks. This was done as part of an energy study to see the amount of energy imparted to the block of gelatin taking a high-speed motion picture. These blocks show a record of the permanent cavity left in the gelatin. This is not necessarily the total penetration. This bullet when it comes out of the second block still has quite a bit of penetrating power. Quite a few of these bullets would go into a dirt bank and imbed themselves so deeply that they couldn't be recovered.

76 Mr. Specter. I now show you Commission Exhibit No. 845 which is a photograph, and ask you to state for the record what that photograph represents?

Dr. Olivier. This has been adopted as standard military ammunition of the U.S. Army. It is known as the NATO round. It is M-80 ball fired in the M-14 rifle. It has a different—it is a full jacketed military bullet but has a different point, what they call a no jag point, a sharp point. It has tumbling characteristics. When it goes in a certain block it tumbles and does the same in the body. It is more efficient in producing wounds than the bullet under study.

Mr. Specter. How do the impact, penetration, and other characteristics of the bullet depicted in 845 compare with the Western Cartridge Co. bullet fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano in 844?

Dr. Olivier. It has better wounding potential due to the quicker tumbling but it would not have as good penetrating ability, when it starts tumbling and releasing all that energy doing all that damage it comes to a stop in a shorter distance.

Mr. Specter. Would the Western bullet be characterized as having the qualities of a more stable bullet?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; it would. You mean in the target?

Mr. Specter. Yes, sir.

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. The stability in the air would be the same for any missile, would it not?

Dr. Olivier. To be a good bullet they should be stable in air in order to hit what you are aiming at, yes.

Mr. Specter. Then would the characteristics of stability in the air be the same for either of the two bullets you have heretofore referred to?

Dr. Olivier. Essentially so.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you photograph marked as Commission Exhibit No. 846 and ask you to state what that depicts?

Dr. Olivier. This is a 257 Winchester Roberts soft nose hunting bullet. This one pictured fired from right to left instead of left to right and the bullet didn't even go out of the block. It deforms almost immediately on entering the block and releases its energy rather rapidly. This type of ammunition is illegal for military use. We are just studying the wounding characteristics of various bullets, but this is not a military bullet.

Mr. Specter. How does it compare with the Western bullet?

Dr. Olivier. It would be better for wounding, better for hunting purposes. But as I said, it isn't acceptable as a military bullet.

Mr. Specter. How does it compare with respect to penetration power?

Dr. Olivier. Much less than the Mannlicher-Carcano.

Mr. Specter. In the normal course of the work that you perform for the U.S. Army at Edgewood Arsenal, do you have occasion to simulate substances for testing purposes on determining the path of a bullet through the human body?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; we do use animal tissues or gelatin as simulants for tissues of the human body.

Mr. Specter. Has the autopsy report on President John F. Kennedy been made available to you for your review?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; it has.

Mr. Specter. And subsequent to your review of that report, did you make an effort to simulate the body tissue through which the bullet is reported to have passed through the President in accordance with the report of the autopsy surgeon; entering on the rear of his neck, 14 cm. below the mastoid process and 14 cm. to the left of the right acromion process, passing through a fascia channel, striking the trachea and exiting through the lower anterior of the neck?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. What substance did you prepare to simulate that portion of the President's body?

Dr. Olivier. We determined the distance on various people by locating this anatomical region and using people of various sizes we found that regardless of general body build, the distance penetrated was around 13½ to 14½ cm.

As a consequence, I used gelatin blocks 20 percent gelatin cut at 13½ cm.77 lengths and also used horsemeat and goatmeat placed in a box so that—this was a little harder to get the exact length but that varied between 13½ and 14½ cm. of muscle tissue.

Mr. Specter. Did that simulate, then, the portion of the President's body through which the bullet is reported to have passed, as closely as you could for your testing purposes?

Dr. Olivier. As closely as we could for these test purposes; yes.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph marked as Commission Exhibit No. 847 and ask you to testify as to what that depicts?

Dr. Olivier. This is a box containing—I couldn't say looking at it whether it is the horsemeat or the goatmeat but one of the two. The distance traveled through that meat would be 13½ to 14½ centimeters. It is also covered with clothing and clipped goatskin on the entrance and exit sides, and behind that are the screens for measuring the exit velocity. We had already determined the striking velocity by firing I believe it was—I have it right here if you want——

Mr. Specter. Before you proceed to that, describe the type of screens which are shown in the picture which were used to measure exit velocity, if you please?

Dr. Olivier. Yes. These screens are known as the break-type screen. They are silver imprinted on paper and when the bullet passes through it breaks the current. When it passes through the first screen it breaks the current activating a chronograph, counting chronograph. When it passes through the second screen it stops. This is over a known distance, and so the time that it took to pass between the first and the second will give you the average velocity halfway between the two screens.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 848 and ask you to describe what that shows?

Dr. Olivier. This was a similar setup used for firing through gelatin. It had clothing and skin over the entrance side only. If it had been placed on the other side it would have just flown off.

Mr. Specter. And that is similar to that depicted in 846?

Dr. Olivier. Essentially; yes.

Mr. Specter. Except that it is——

Dr. Olivier. Gelatin instead of the tissues.

Mr. Specter. Now at what range was the firing performed on the gelatin, goatmeat and horsemeat?

Dr. Olivier. This firing was done at a 60-yard range.

Mr. Specter. And what gun was used?

Dr. Olivier. The 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano that was marked Commission Exhibit 139.

Mr. Specter. And what bullets were used?

Dr. Olivier. The Western ammunition lot 6,000, 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano.

Mr. Specter. And was there any substance placed over the gelatin, horsemeat and goatmeat?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; over the gelatin we had clothing; had a suit, shirt and undershirt, and underneath that a clipped goatskin. The same thing was over the meat, and on the other side of the meat was also clipped goatskin.

Mr. Specter. Would there be any significant difference to the test by leaving out the undershirt if the President had not worn an undershirt?

Dr. Olivier. No.

Mr. Specter. So that the circumstance was simulated with the actual type clothing and a protective skin over the substance just as realistically as you could make it?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. What measurement was obtained as to the entrance velocity of the bullet at the distance of 60 yards which you described?

Dr. Olivier. The striking velocity at an average of three shots was 1,904 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. And what was the average exit velocity on each of the substances used?

Dr. Olivier. For the gelatin the average exit velocity was 1,779 feet per78 second. The horsemeat, the average exit velocity was 1,798 feet per second. And the goatmeat the average exit velocity was 1,772 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 849 and ask you what that picture represents?

Dr. Olivier. This is one of the gelatin blocks used in that test. It shows the type of track left by the bullet passing through it. That bullet is very stable. Passing through the body and muscle, it would make a similar type wound. Of course, you couldn't observe it that nicely.

Mr. Specter. Would you describe that as being a straight line?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a picture marked Commission Exhibit No. 850 and ask you what that represents?

Dr. Olivier. These are pieces of clipped goatskin, clipped very shortly. There is still some hair on it. These were placed, these particular ones were placed over the tissues. This would be placed over the entrance side of the animal.

Mr. Specter. When you say "this," you are referring to a piece of goatskin which is marked "enter"?

Dr. Olivier. Marked "enter." The one marked "exit" was placed on the far side of the tissues and the bullet passed through that after it came out of the tissues.

Mr. Specter. For the record, will you describe the characteristics, which are shown on the goatskin at the point of entry, please?

Dr. Olivier. At the point of entry the wound holes through the skin are for all purposes round. On the exit side they are more elongated, two of them in particular are a little more elongated. The bullet had started to become slightly unstable coming out.

Mr. Specter. And how about the third or lower bullet on the skin designated exit?

Dr. Olivier. That hole appears as more stable than the other two. In all three cases the bullet is still pretty stable. The gelatin blocks, there were gelatin blocks placed behind these things too, and for all practical purposes, the tracks through them still indicated a stable bullet.

Mr. Specter. Are there any other conclusions which you would care to add to those which you have already indicated, resulting from the tests you have heretofore described?

Dr. Olivier. Well, it means that the bullet that passed through the President's neck had lost very little of its wounding potential and was capable of doing a great deal of damage in penetrating. I might mention one thing showing how great its penetrating ability was. That say on one of the gelatin shots, it went through a total, counting the gelatin block, it went through plus the backing up blocks of gelatin, it went through a total of 72½ centimeters of gelatin, was still traveling and buried itself in a mound of earth so it has terrific penetrating ability. This means that had the bullet that passed through the President's neck hit in the car or anywhere you would have seen evidence, a good deal of evidence.

Mr. Specter. Dr. Olivier, in the regular course of your work for the U.S. Army, do you have occasion to perform tests on animal materials where the characteristics of those animals materials are sufficiently similar to human bodies to make a determination of the effect of the bullet wounds in human bodies?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I do.

Mr. Specter. And did you have occasion to make a test on goat material in connection with the experiments which you ran?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Are you familiar with the wounds inflicted on Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; from reading the surgeon's report and also from talking to Dr. Gregory and Dr. Shaw.

Mr. Specter. Did you have access to the medical reports of Parkland Hospital concerning the wounds of Governor Connally in all respects?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And did you have occasion to discuss those wounds in great79 detail with Dr. Shaw and Dr. Gregory when they were present in Washington, D.C. on April 21, 1964, preparatory to their testifying before this Commission?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. What was the nature of the wound on Governor Connally's back?

Dr. Olivier. The surgeon's report described it as about 3 centimeters long, its longest dimension, and it is hard for me to remember reading it or discussing it with him but I did both. Apparently it was a jagged wound. He said a wound like this consists of two things, usually a defect in the epidermis and a central hole which is small, and he could put his finger in it so it was a fairly large wound.

Mr. Specter. What was the path of the bullet in a general way, based on the information provided to you concerning Governor Connally's wound in the back?

Dr. Olivier. Apparently it passed along the rib. I don't recall which rib it was but passed the fifth rib, passed along this rib causing a fracture that I believe removed about 10 centimeters of the rib through fragments through the pleura, lacerating the lung. I asked Dr. Shaw directly whether he thought the bullet had gone through the pleural cavity and he said he didn't believe that it had, that the damage was done by the rib fragments. Then the bullet exited as described somewhat below the right nipple.

Mr. Specter. Did you perform a test on goat substance to endeavor to measure the reduction in velocity of a missile similar to the one which passed through Governor Connally?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. Why was goat substance selected for that purpose in the testing procedure?

Dr. Olivier. We usually use this in our work so we are familiar with it. I am not saying it is the only substance that could be used, but we were not using any unknown procedures or any procedures that we hadn't used already.

Mr. Specter. Does it closely simulate the nature of a wound in the human body?

Dr. Olivier. In this particular instance it did.

Mr. Specter. Was the wound inflicted on the goat, then, subjected to X-ray analysis for the purpose of determining the precise nature of the wound and for comparison purposes with that wound——

Dr. Olivier. Yes; it was.

Mr. Specter. Inflicted on Connally?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; it was.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you an X-ray marked Commission Exhibit 851 and ask you to state what that shows?

Dr. Olivier. It shows a fractured rib. From this you wouldn't be able to—well, if you were a better radiologist than I was, you might be able to tell which one, but it was the eighth left rib. It shows a comminuted fracture extending some distance along the rib.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you Commission Exhibit No. 852, which is a photograph, and ask you to testify as to what that depicts, please?

Dr. Olivier. This is a photograph taken from the same X-ray again showing the comminuted fracture of the eighth left rib.

Mr. Specter. And is that a photograph then of the X-ray designated Commission Exhibit 851?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; it is.

Mr. Specter. Did you have an opportunity to observe personally the X-rays showing the wound on Governor Connally's rib?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. And how do those X-rays compare with the wound inflicted as depicted in Exhibits 851 and 852?

Dr. Olivier. They are very similar.

Mr. Specter. When the wounds were inflicted, as depicted in 851 and 852, what weapon was used?

Dr. Olivier. This was again the 6.5 millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.

80 Mr. Specter. And what bullets were used?

Dr. Olivier. The 6.5 millimeter Western ammunition lot 6,000.

Mr. Specter. And what distance was utilized?

Dr. Olivier. On the goat the distance was 70 yards.

Mr. Specter. And was there any covering over the goat?

Dr. Olivier. Yes. There was a suit, shirt, and undershirt.

Mr. Specter. What was the entrance velocity of the bullet?

Dr. Olivier. Striking velocity for an average of 11 shots was 1,929 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. And what was the exit velocity?

Dr. Olivier. The exit velocity was 1,664 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a box containing a bullet, which has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 853, and ask you if you have ever seen that bullet before?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I have.

Mr. Specter. And under what circumstances have you previously seen that bullet?

Dr. Olivier. This was the bullet that was fired through the goat. It went through the velocity screens into some cotton waste, dropped out of the bottom of that and was lying on the floor. It was picked up immediately afterwards still warm, so we knew it was the bullet that had fired that particular shot.

Mr. Specter. Was that fired through the goat depicted in the photographs and X-ray, 851 and 852?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; that was the goat.

Mr. Specter. Would you describe for the record, verbally please, the characteristics of that bullet?

Dr. Olivier. The bullet has been quite flattened. The lead core is extruding somewhat from the rear. We weighed the bullet. It weighs 158.8 grains.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you Commission Exhibit 399, which has been heretofore in Commission proceedings identified as the bullet found on the stretcher of Governor Connally, and ask if you have had an opportunity to compare 399 with 853?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I have.

Mr. Specter. And what did you find on that comparison?

Dr. Olivier. The bullet recovered on the stretcher has not been flattened as much, but there is a suggestion of flattening there from a somewhat similar occurrence. Also, the lead core has extruded from the rear in the same fashion, and it appears that some of it has even broken from the rear.

Mr. Specter. Is there some flattening on both of those bullets in approximately the same areas toward the rear of the missiles?

Dr. Olivier. In the bullet, our particular bullet is flattened the whole length, but you say towards the rear?

Mr. Specter. You say our bullet; you mean 853?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, 853 is flattened. No. 399 is flattened more towards the rear.

Mr. Specter. Are there any other conclusions which you have to add to the tests performed on the goat?

Dr. Olivier. Well, again in this test it demonstrates that the bullet that was stable when it struck in this fashion again lost very little velocity in going through that much goat tissue.

Incidentally, the amount of goat tissue it traversed was probably somewhat less than the Governor, but in any case it indicates the bullet would have had a lot of remaining velocity and could have done a lot of damage.

Another thing that hasn't been brought up is the velocity screen immediately behind the goat, the imprint of the bullet left on it was almost the length of the bullet.

Mr. Specter. What does that indicate?

Dr. Olivier. This indicates that the bullet was now no longer traveling straight but either traveling sideways or tumbling end over end at the time it hit the screen.

Mr. Specter. And that was after the point of exit from the goat?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

81 Mr. Specter. Are there any other conclusions which you found from the studies on the goat?

Dr. Olivier. No, I believe that is all I can think of right at this moment.

Mr. Specter. In the regular course of your work for the U.S. Army, do you have occasion to perform tests on parts of human cadavers to determine the effects of bullets on human beings?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, I do.

Mr. Specter. And was a series of tests performed under your supervision on the portions of human cadavers simulated to the wound inflicted on the wrist of Governor Connally?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Were you familiar with the nature of the wound on Governor Connally's wrist prior to performing those tests?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, I was.

Mr. Specter. What was the source of your information on those wounds?

Dr. Olivier. I had read the surgeon's report, also talked with Dr. Gregory, the surgeon who had done the surgery, and had looked at the X-rays.

Mr. Specter. Had you had an opportunity to discuss the wounds with Dr. Gregory and view the X-rays taken at Parkland Hospital, here in the Commission headquarters?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. On April 21, 1964?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you an X-ray marked as Commission Exhibit 854, and ask you what that depicts?

Dr. Olivier. This is a comminuted fracture of the distal end of the radius of a human arm.

Mr. Specter. And in what manner was that wound caused?

Dr. Olivier. It was caused by a bullet from the Commission Exhibit 139. This was again the 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano Western ammunition lot 6,000.

Mr. Specter. Fired at what distance?

Dr. Olivier. Fired at a distance of 70 yards.

Mr. Specter. And was there anything protecting the wrist at the time of impact?

Dr. Olivier. Not protection but there was again clothing, this time suit material or suit lining, at least suit material and shirt. I am not sure about the lining. I can tell you. I have it right here. Suit material, suit lining material, and shirt material.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph marked as Commission Exhibit 855 and ask you what that represents?

Dr. Olivier. This is a photograph taken from the X-ray, Commission Exhibit 854.

Mr. Specter. Will you describe for the record the details of the injuries shown on 854 and 855, please?

Dr. Olivier. This is a comminuted fracture of the distal end of the radius. It was struck directly by the bullet. It passed through, not directly through but through at an oblique angle so that it entered more proximal on the dorsal side of the wrist and distal on the volar aspect.

Mr. Specter. How does the entry and exit compare with the wound on Governor Connally which you observed on the X-rays?

Dr. Olivier. In this particular instance to the best of my memory from looking at the X-rays, it is very close. It is about one of the best ones that we obtained.

Mr. Specter. Is there any definable difference at all?

Dr. Olivier. I couldn't determine any.

Mr. Specter. It is close, you say?

Dr. Olivier. Yes. If I had both X-rays in front of me if there was a difference I could determine it, but from memory I would say it was for all purposes identical.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a bullet in a case marked Commission Exhibit 856 and ask if you have ever seen that before?

82 Dr. Olivier. Yes. This is the bullet that caused the damage shown in Commission Exhibits Nos. 854 and 855.

Mr. Specter. Would you describe that bullet for the record, please?

Dr. Olivier. The nose of the bullet is quite flattened from striking the radius.

Mr. Specter. How does it compare, for example, with Commission Exhibit 399?

Dr. Olivier. It is not like it at all. I mean, Commission Exhibit 399 is not flattened on the end. This one is very severely flattened on the end.

Mr. Specter. What was the velocity of the missile at the time it struck the wrist depicted in 854 and 855?

Dr. Olivier. The average striking velocity was 1,858 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. Do you have the precise striking velocity of that one?

Dr. Olivier. No; I don't. We could not put velocity screen in front of the individual shots because it would have interfered with the gunner's view. So we took five shots and got an average striking velocity.

Mr. Specter. When you say five shots with an average striking velocity, those were at the delineated distance without striking anything on those particular shots?

Dr. Olivier. Right, and after establishing that velocity, then we went on to shoot the various arms.

Mr. Specter. And what was the exit velocity?

Dr. Olivier. On this particular one?

Mr. Specter. If you have it?

Dr. Olivier. Yes. Well, I don't know if I have that or not. We didn't get them in all because some of these things deflect. No, I have no exit velocity on this particular one.

Mr. Specter. What exit velocity did you get on the average?

Dr. Olivier. Average exit velocity was 1,776 feet per second. This was for an average of seven. We did 10. We obtained velocity on seven.

Mr. Specter. Would the average reduction be approximately the same, in your professional opinion, as to the bullet exiting from the wrist depicted in 854 and 855?

Dr. Olivier. Somewhat. Let me give you the extremes of our velocities. The highest one was 1,866 and the lowest was 1,664, so there was a 202-feet-per-second difference in the thing. Some of the cases bone was missed, in other cases glancing blows. But I would say it is a close approximation to what the exit velocity was on that particular one.

Mr. Specter. And what would the close approximation be, the average?

Dr. Olivier. The average.

Mr. Specter. Would you compare the damage, which was done to Governor Connally's wrist, as contrasted with the damage to the wrist depicted in 854 and 855?

Dr. Olivier. The damage in the wrist that you see in the X-ray on 854 and 855, the damage is greater than was done to the Governor's wrist. There is more severe comminution here.

Mr. Specter. How much more severe is the comminution?

Dr. Olivier. Considerably more. If I remember correctly in the X-rays of the Governor's wrist, I think there were only two or three fragments, if that many. Here we have many, many small fragments.

Mr. Specter. In your opinion, based on the tests which you have performed, was the damage inflicted on Governor Connally's wrist caused by a pristine bullet, a bullet fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle 6.5 missile which did not hit anything before it struck the Governor's wrist?

Dr. Olivier. I don't believe so. I don't believe his wrist was struck by a pristine bullet.

Mr. Specter. What is the reason for your conclusion on that?

Dr. Olivier. In this case I go by the size of the entrance wound and exit wound on the Governor's wrist. The entrance wound was on the dorsal surface, it was described by the surgeon as being much larger than the exit wound. He said he almost overlooked that on the volar aspect of the wrist.

In every instance we had a larger exit wound than an entrance wound firing83 with a pristine bullet apparently at the same angle at which it entered and exited the Governor's wrist.

Also, and I don't believe they were mixed up on which was entrance and exit. For one thing the clothing, you know, the surgeon found pieces of clothing and the other thing the human anatomy is such that I don't believe it would enter through the volar aspect and out the top.

So I am pretty sure that the Governor's wrist was not hit by a pristine or a stable bullet.

Mr. Specter. What is there, in and of the nature of the smaller wound of exit and larger wound of entrance in the Governor's wrist as contrasted with a smaller wound of entrance and larger wound of exit in 854 and 855, which leads you to conclude that the Governor's wrist was not struck by a pristine bullet?

Dr. Olivier. Do you want to repeat that question again?

Mr. Specter. What is there about the wound of entry or exit which led you to think that the Governor's wrist wasn't struck by a pristine bullet?

Dr. Olivier. Well, he would have had a larger exit wound than entrance wound, which he did not.

Mr. Specter. And if the velocity of the missile is decreased, how does that effect the nature of the wounds of entry and exit?

Dr. Olivier. If the velocity is decreased, if the bullet is still stable, he still should have a larger exit wound than an entrance.

Now, on the other hand, to get a larger entrance wound and a smaller exit wound, this indicates the bullet probably hit with very much of a yaw. I mean, as this hole appeared in the velocity screen the bullet either tumbling or striking sideways, this would have made a larger entrance wound, lose considerable of its velocity in fracturing the bone, and coming out at a very low velocity, made a smaller hole.

Mr. Specter. So the crucial factor would be the analysis that the bullet was characterized with yaw at the time it struck?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Causing a larger wound of entry and a smaller wound of exit?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Now is there anything in the——

Dr. Olivier. Also at a reduced velocity because if it struck at considerable yaw at a high velocity as it could do if it hit something and deflected, it would have, it could make a larger wound of exit but it would have been even a more severe wound than we had here. It would have been very severe, could even amputate the wrist hitting at high velocity sideways. We have to say this bullet was characterized by an extreme amount of yaw and reduced velocity. How much reduced, I don't know, but considerably reduced.

Mr. Specter. Does the greater damage, inflicted on the wrist in 854 and 855 than that which was inflicted on Governor Connally's wrist, have any value as indicating whether Governor Connally's wrist was struck by a pristine bullet?

Dr. Olivier. No; because holding the velocity the same or similar the damage would be greater with a tumbling bullet than a pristine.

I think it reflects both instability and reduced velocity. You have to show the two. I mean, the size of the entrance and exit are very important. This shows that the thing was used when it struck. The fact that there was no more damage than was done by a tumbling bullet indicates the bullet at a reduced velocity. You have to put these two things together.

Mr. Specter. Had Governor Connally's wrist been struck with a pristine bullet without yaw, would more damage have been inflicted——

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Than was inflicted on the Governor's wrist?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. So then the lesser damage on the Governor's wrist in and of itself indicates in your opinion——

Dr. Olivier. That it wasn't struck by a pristine bullet; yes.

Mr. Specter. Are there any other conclusions which flow from the experiments which you conducted on the wrist?

Dr. Olivier. We concluded that it wasn't struck by a pristine bullet. Also drew the conclusion that it was struck by an unstable bullet, a bullet at a much84 reduced velocity. The question that it brings up in my mind is if the same bullet that struck the wrist had passed through the Governor's chest, if the bullet that struck the Governor's chest had not hit anything else would it have been reduced low enough to do this, and I wonder, based on our work—it brings to mind the possibility the same bullet that struck the President striking the Governor would account for this more readily. I don't know, I don't think you can ever say this, but it is a very good possibility, I think more possible, more probable than not.

The Chairman. What is more probable than not, Doctor?

Dr. Olivier. In my mind at least, and I don't know the angles at which the things went or anything, it seems to me more probable that the bullet that hit the Governor's chest had already been slowed down somewhat, in order to lose enough velocity to strike his wrist and do no more damage than it did. I don't know how you would ever determine it exactly. I think the best approach is to find out the angles of flight, whether it is possible. But I have a feeling that it might have been.

The Chairman. It might have been?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

The Chairman. The one that went through his chest went through his hand also.

Dr. Olivier. Yes; and also through the President.

The Chairman. The first shot?

Dr. Olivier. Well, I don't know whether the first or second. The first one could have missed. It could have been the second that hit both.

The Chairman. The one that went through his back and came out his trachea?

Dr. Olivier. It could have hit the Governor in the chest and went through because it had so little velocity after coming out of the wrist that it barely penetrated the thigh.

The Chairman. May I ask one more question? Would you think, that the same bullet could have done all three of those things?

Dr. Olivier. That same bullet was capable.

The Chairman. Gone through the President's back as it did, gone through Governor Connally's chest as it did, and then through his hand as it did?

Dr. Olivier. It was certainly capable of doing all that.

The Chairman. It was capable?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

The Chairman. The one shot?

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Doctor Olivier, based on the descriptions of the wound on the Governor's back, what in your opinion was the characteristic of the bullet at the time it struck the Governor's back with respect to the course of its flight?

Dr. Olivier. Let's say from the size of the wound as described by the surgeon, it could have been tipped somewhat when it struck because that is a fairly large wound. Another thing that could have done it is the angle at which it hit. On the goat some of the wounds were larger than others. On the goat material some of the wounds were larger than others because of the angle at which it hit this material. The same thing could happen on the Governor's back.

Mr. Specter. And how was that wound described with respect to its size?

Dr. Olivier. The Governor's wound?

Mr. Specter. On the Governor's back?

Dr. Olivier. About 3 centimeters at its largest dimension.

Mr. Specter. And would you have any view as to which factor was more probable, as to whether it was a tangential strike on the Governor's back, or whether there was yaw in the bullet at the time it struck the Governor's back?

Dr. Olivier. I couldn't as far as being tangential. I couldn't answer that, not knowing the position of the Governor. But it could have been caused by a bullet yawing. I mean it would have made a larger wound, as that was.

Mr. Specter. Is there any other cause which could account for that type of a large wound on the Governor's back other than with the bullet yawing?

Dr. Olivier. With this particular bullet those would be the two probable causes of this wound of this size.

85 Mr. Specter. And those two probable causes are what?

Dr. Olivier. One, the bullet hitting not perpendicular to the surface of the Governor, in other words, hitting tangential at a slight angle on his back so that it came in cutting the skin. Another, the bullet hitting that wasn't perpendicular to the surface as it hit. The bullet did go along, the surgeon described the path as tangential but he is speaking of along the rib. It isn't clear it was, as it struck, whether it was a tangential shot or actually perpendicular to the Governor's back.

Mr. Specter. Permit me to add one additional factor which Dr. Shaw testified to during the course of the proceeding after he measured the angle of decline through the Governor; and Dr. Shaw testified that there was a 25° to 27° angle of declination measuring from front to back on the Governor, taking into account the position of the wound on the Governor's back and the position of the wound on the Governor's chest below the right nipple.

Now with that factor, added to those which you already know, would that enable you to form a conclusion as to whether the nature of the wound on the Governor's back was caused by yaw of the bullet or by a tangential strike?

Dr. Olivier. I don't think I would want to say. If I could have seen the Governor's wound, this would have been a help.

Mr. Specter. Would the damage done to the Governor's wrist indicate that a bullet which was fired approximately 160 to 250 feet away with the muzzle velocity of approximately 2,000 feet per second, would it indicate that the bullet was slowed up only by the passage through the Governor's body, in the way which you know, or would it indicate that there was some other factor which slowed up the bullet in addition?

Dr. Olivier. It would indicate there was some other factor that had slowed up the bullet in addition.

Mr. Specter. What is your reason for that conclusion, sir?

Dr. Olivier. The amount of damage alone; striking that end it would have caused more severe comminution as we found. You know—if it hadn't been slowed up in some other fashion. At that range it still had a striking velocity of 1,858 or in the vicinity of 1,800 feet per second, which is capable of doing more damage than was done to the Governor's wrist.

Mr. Specter. Had the same bullet which passed through the President, in the way heretofore described for the record, then struck the Governor as well, what effect would there have been in reducing its velocity as a result of that course?

Dr. Olivier. You say the bullet first struck the President. In coming out of the President's body it would have had a tendency to be slightly unstable. In striking the Governor it would have lost more velocity in his chest than if it had been a pristine bullet striking the Governor's chest, so it would have exited from the Governor's chest I would say at a considerably reduced velocity, probably with a good amount of yaw or tumbling, and this would account for the type of wound that the Governor did have in his wrist.

Mr. Specter. The approximate reduction in velocity on passage through the goat was what, Doctor?

Dr. Olivier. The average velocity loss in the seven cases we did was 82 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. If the bullet had passed through the President prior to the time it passed through the Governor, would you expect a larger loss than 82 feet per second resulting from the passage through the body of the Governor?

Dr. Olivier. I am not sure if I heard you correctly. This is if it hit the Governor without hitting the President or hitting the President first?

Mr. Specter. Let me rephrase it for you, Dr. Olivier.

Dr. Olivier. Yes; please.

Mr. Specter. You testified that the bullet lost 82 feet per second when it passed through the goat.

Dr. Olivier. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Now what would your expectations be as to the reduction in velocity on a bullet which passed through the Governor, assuming that it struck nothing first?

Dr. Olivier. It would be greater; the distance through the Governor's chest would have been greater.

86 Mr. Specter. Would that be an appreciable or approximately the same?

Dr. Olivier. Can I bring in any other figures? Dr. Dziemian has computed approximately what he thought it would have lost.

Mr. Specter. Yes, of course, if you have any other figure which would be helpful.

Dr. Dziemian. I believe you misunderstood Mr. Specter. I think you gave the figure for the loss of velocity through the Governor's wrist instead of through his chest.

Dr. Olivier. I am sorry. We were on the wrist; okay.

Mr. Specter. Let me start again then. In an effort to draw some conclusion about the reduction in velocity through the Governor's chest, I am now going back and asking you what was the reduction in velocity of the bullet which passed through the goat?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did misunderstand you. I am sorry. The loss in velocity passing through the goat was 265 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. Now, would that be the approximate loss in velocity of a pristine bullet passing through the Governor?

Dr. Olivier. The loss would be somewhat greater.

Mr. Specter. How much greater in your opinion?

Dr. Olivier. Do you have that figure, Dr. Dziemian?

Dr. Dziemian. I would say a pristine bullet of the Governor was about half again thicker. It would be about half again as great velocity, somewhere around 400.

Mr. Specter. Had the bullet passed through only the Governor, losing velocity of 400 feet per second, would you have expected that the damage inflicted on the Governor's wrist would have been about the same as that inflicted on Governor Connally or greater?

Dr. Olivier. My feeling is it would have been greater.

Mr. Specter. Had the bullet passed through the President and then struck Governor Connally, would it have lost velocity of 400 feet per second in passing through Governor Connally or more?

Dr. Olivier. It would have lost more.

Mr. Specter. What is the reason for that?

Dr. Olivier. The bullet after passing through, say a dense medium, then through air and then through another dense medium tends to be more unstable, based on our past work. It appears to be that it would have tumbled more readily and lost energy more rapidly. How much velocity it would have lost, I couldn't say, but it would have lost more.

Mr. Specter. Are there any indications from the internal wounds on Governor Connally as to whether or not the bullet which entered his body was an unstable bullet?

Dr. Olivier. The only thing that might give you an indication would be the skin wound of entrance, the type of rib fracture and all that I think could be accounted for by either type, because in our experiment we simulated, although not to as great a degree, the damage wasn't as severe, but I think it would be hard to say that.

One thing comes to my mind right now that might indicate it. There was a greater flattening of the bullet in our experiments than there was going through the Governor, which might indicate that it struck the rib which did the flattening at a lower velocity. This is only a thought.

Mr. Specter. It struck the rib of the Governor?

Dr. Olivier. It struck the rib of the Governor at a lower velocity because that bullet was less flattened than the bullet through the goat material.

Mr. Specter. Based on the nature of the wound inflicted on the Governor's wrist, and on the tests which you have conducted then, do you have an opinion as to which is more probable on whether the bullet passed through only the Governor's chest before striking his wrist, or passed through the President first and then the Governor's chest before striking the Governor's wrist?

Dr. Olivier. Will you say that again to make sure I have it?

Mr. Specter. [To the reporter.] Could you repeat that question, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Dr. Olivier. You couldn't say exactly at all. My feeling is that it would be87 more probable that it passed through the President first. At least I think it is important to establish line of flight to try to determine it.

Mr. Specter. Aside from the lines of flight, based on the factors which were known to you from the medical point of view and from the tests which you conducted, what would be the reason for the feeling which you just expressed?

Dr. Olivier. Because I believe you would need that, I mean to account for the damage to the wrist. I don't think you would have gotten a low enough velocity upon reaching the wrist unless you had gone through the President's body first.

Mr. Specter. The President's body as well as the Governor's body?

Dr. Olivier. As well as the Governor's.

Mr. Specter. Does the nature of the wound which was inflicted on Governor Connally's thigh shed any light on this subject?

Dr. Olivier. This, to my mind, at least, merely indicates the bullet at this time was about spent. In talking with doctor, I believe it was Gregory, I don't think he did the operation on the thigh but at least he saw the wound, and he said it was about the size of an eraser on a lead pencil. This could be accounted for—and there was also this small fragment of bullet in this thigh wound—this, to me, indicates that this was a spent bullet that had gone through the wrist as the Governor was sitting there, went through the wrist into his thigh, just partly imbedded and then fell out and I believe this was the bullet that was found on the stretcher.

Mr. Specter. Would you have any opinion as to the velocity of that bullet at the time it struck the Governor's thigh?

Dr. Olivier. No. We didn't do any work to simulate this, but it would have been at a very low velocity just to have gone in that far and drop out again.

Mr. Specter. Dr. Olivier, in the regular course of your work for the U.S. Army, do you have occasion to perform tests on reconstructed human skulls to determine the effects of bullets on skulls?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I do.

Mr. Specter. And did you have occasion to conduct such a test in connection with the series which you are now describing?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. And would you outline briefly the procedures for simulating the human skull?

Dr. Olivier. Human skulls, we take these human skulls and they are imbedded and filled with 20 percent gelatin. As I mentioned before, 20 percent gelatin is a pretty good simulant for body tissues.

They are in the moisture content. When I say 20 percent, it is 20 percent weight of the dry gelatin, 80 percent moisture.

The skull, the cranial cavity, is filled with this and the surface is coated with a gelatin and then it is trimmed down to approximate the thickness of the tissues overlying the skull, the soft tissues of the head.

Mr. Specter. And at what distance were these tests performed?

Dr. Olivier. These tests were performed at a distance of 90 yards.

Mr. Specter. And what gun was used?

Dr. Olivier. It was a 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano that was marked Commission Exhibit 139.

Mr. Specter. What bullets were used?

Dr. Olivier. It was the 6.5 millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano Western ammunition lot 6,000.

Mr. Specter. What did that examination or test, rather, disclose?

Dr. Olivier. It disclosed that the type of head wounds that the President received could be done by this type of bullet. This surprised me very much, because this type of a stable bullet I didn't think would cause a massive head wound, I thought it would go through making a small entrance and exit, but the bones of the skull are enough to deform the end of this bullet causing it to expend a lot of energy and blowing out the side of the skull or blowing out fragments of the skull.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a case containing bullet fragments marked Commission Exhibit 857 and ask if you have ever seen those fragments before.

Dr. Olivier. Yes, I have.

88 Mr. Specter. And under what circumstances have you viewed those before, please?

Dr. Olivier. There were, the two larger fragments were recovered outside of the skull in the cotton waste we were using to catch the fragments without deforming them. There are some smaller fragments in here that were obtained from the gelatin within the cranial cavity after the experiment. We melted the gelatin out and recovered the smallest fragments from within the cranial cavity.

Mr. Specter. Now, I show you two fragments designated as Commission Exhibits 567 and 579 heretofore identified as having been found on the front seat of the President's car on November 22, 1963, and ask you if you have had an opportunity to examine those before.

Dr. Olivier. Yes, I have.

Mr. Specter. And have you had an opportunity to compare those to the two fragments identified as Commission Exhibit 857?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, I have.

Mr. Specter. And what did that comparison show?

Dr. Olivier. They are quite similar. These two fragments on, what is the number?

Mr. Specter. 857.

Dr. Olivier. On 857 there isn't as much of the front part in this one, but in other respects they are very similar.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 858 and ask you what that depicts.

Mr. Dulles. Could I see that other exhibit?

Dr. Olivier. These are the same fragments as marked 857.

Mr. Specter. That is a photograph of the fragments marked 857?

Dr. Olivier. 857.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 859 and ask you what that depicts?

Dr. Olivier. These are the smaller fragments that have been labeled, also, Exhibit 857. This picture or some of the fragments labeled 857, these are the smaller fragments contained in the same box.

Mr. Specter. Are all of the fragments on 859 contained within 857?

Dr. Olivier. They are supposed to be, photographed and placed in the box. If they dropped out they are supposed to be all there.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Dulles. Back on the record.

Mr. Specter. At what point on the skull did the bullet, which fragmented into Commission Exhibit 857, strike?

Dr. Olivier. I would have to see the picture. I mean I can't remember exactly what point. I can tell you the point we were aiming at and approximately where it hit.

Mr. Specter. Permit me to make available a photograph to you, then, for purposes of refreshing your recollection, and in testifying as to the point which was struck, for that purpose.

Dr. Olivier. We did 10 skulls so I can't remember offhand where everyone struck.

Mr. Specter. For that purpose I hand you Commission Exhibit 860 and ask you if that is designated in any way to identify it.

Mr. Dulles. This is the test we are talking about now, is it?

Mr. Specter. Yes, sir; where the bullet fragmented into pieces in 857.

Mr. Dulles. Are you introducing that into evidence?

Mr. Specter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Have you already introduced it in the record?

Mr. Specter. May I at this point move for the admission into evidence of Commission Exhibits 844 through 860, and they have been identified in sequence as being the photographs, X-rays, and other tangible exhibits used in connection with these tests.

Mr. Dulles. They shall be admitted.

(The documents heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibits Nos. 844 through 860 were received in evidence.)

89 Dr. Olivier. This photograph is the skull that was shot with the bullet, the fragments which are marked 857.

Mr. Specter. At what point on the skull did the bullet strike?

Dr. Olivier. From this I couldn't tell you exactly the point. We were aiming, as described in the autopsy report if I remember correctly the point 2 centimeters to the right of the external occipital protuberance and slightly above it. We placed a mark on the skull at that point, according to the autopsy the bullet emerged through the superorbital process, so we drew a line to give us the line of flight, put unclipped goat hair over the back to simulate the scalp and put a mark on the area which we wished to shoot.

Now, every shot didn't strike exactly where we wanted, but they all struck in the back of the skull in the vicinity of our aiming point, some maybe slightly above the external occipital protuberance. In some cases very close to our aiming spot.

This particular skull blew out the right side in a manner very similar to the wounds of the President, and if I remember correctly, it was very close to the point at which we aimed.

In other words, a couple centimeters to the right.

Mr. Specter. Do you have any record which would be more specific on the point of entrance?

Dr. Olivier. Our notebook has all——

Mr. Specter. Will you refer to your notes, then?

Dr. Olivier. The notebook is in the safe in there in the briefcase.

Mr. Specter. Would you get the notebook and refer to it so we can be as specific as possible on this point.

Dr. Olivier. I have the location of that wound.

Mr. Specter. Would you give us then the precise location of the wound caused by bullet identified as 857?

Dr. Olivier. The entrance wound is 2.9 centimeters to the right and almost horizontal to the occipital protuberance. This is almost exactly where we were aiming. We were aiming 2 centimeters to the right.

Mr. Specter. I now hand you a photograph marked as Commission Exhibit 861, move its admission into evidence, and ask you to state what that depicts.

Dr. Olivier. This is the skull in question, the same one from which the fragments marked Exhibit 857 were recovered.

Mr. Specter. And what does that show as to damage done to the skull?

Dr. Olivier. It blew the whole side of the cranial cavity away.

Mr. Specter. How does that compare, then, with the damage inflicted on President Kennedy?

Dr. Olivier. Very similar. I think they stated the length of the defect, the missing skull was 13 centimeters if I remember correctly. This in this case it is greater, but you don't have the limiting scalp holding the pieces in so you would expect it to fly a little more but it is essentially a similar type wound.

Mr. Specter. Does the human scalp work to hold in the human skull in such circumstances to a greater extent than the simulated matters used?

Dr. Olivier. Yes; we take this into account.

Mr. Specter. I hand you Commission Exhibit 862, move its admission into evidence, and ask you what that depicts?

Dr. Olivier. This is the same skull. This is just looking at it from the front. You are looking at the exit. You can't see it here because the bone has been blown away, but the bullet exited somewhere around—we reconstructed the skull. In other words, it exited very close to the superorbital ridge, possibly below it.

Mr. Specter. Did you formulate any other conclusions or opinions based on the tests on firing at the skull?

Dr. Olivier. Well, let's see. We found that this bullet could do exactly—could make the type of wound that the President received.

Also, that the recovered fragments were very similar to the ones recovered on the front seat and on the floor of the car.

This, to me, indicates that those fragments did come from the bullet that wounded the President in the head.

90 Mr. Specter. And how do the two major fragments in 857 compare, then, with the fragments heretofore identified as 567 and 569?

Dr. Olivier. They are quite similar.

Mr. Specter. Do you have an opinion as to whether the wound on the Governor's wrist could have been caused by a fragment of a bullet coming off of the President's head?

Dr. Olivier. I don't believe so. Frankly, I don't know, but I don't believe so, because it expended so much energy in blowing the head apart and took a lot of energy that I doubt if they could have fractured the radius. The radius is a very strong, hard bone and I don't believe they could have done that much damage. I believe they could have caused a superficial laceration on someone or a mark on the windshield, but I don't believe they could have done that damage to the wrist.

Mr. Dulles. And it couldn't have then gone through the wrist into the thigh?

Dr. Olivier. I don't believe so.

Mr. Specter. Have you had an opportunity to examine a fragment identified as Commission Exhibit 842 which is the fragment taken from Governor Connally's wrist?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, I have.

Mr. Specter. Could that fragment have come from the bullet designated as Commission Exhibit 399?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, I believe it would have, I will add further I believe it could have because the core of the bullet extrudes through the back and would allow part of it to break off very readily.

Mr. Specter. Do you have an opinion as to whether, in fact, bullet 399 did cause the wound on the Governor's wrist, assuming if you will that it was the missile found on the Governor's stretcher at Parkland Hospital?

Dr. Olivier. I believe that it was. That is my feeling.

Mr. Specter. To be certain that the record is complete on the skull tests, would you again state the distance at which those tests were performed?

Dr. Olivier. Yes, the skulls—it was fired at the skulls at a range of 90 yards.

Mr. Specter. With what gun?

Dr. Olivier. The 6.5 mm. Carcano which was marked Commission Exhibit 139 and using Western ammunition lot 6,000, again the 6.5 mm. Mannlicher-Carcano.

Mr. Specter. Going to the results of the test on the cadavers, what was the average exit velocity?

Dr. Olivier. The average exit velocity on the wrist was 1,776 feet per second.

Mr. Specter. Had Governor Connally's wrist been struck with a pristine bullet and the bullet exited at that speed, what damage would have been inflicted had it then struck the area of the thigh which was struck on the Governor according to the Parkland Hospital records which you have said you have examined?

Dr. Olivier. It would have made a very severe wound.

Mr. Specter. Would it have been more severe than the one which was inflicted?

Dr. Olivier. Much more so.

Mr. Specter. Do you have anything to add, Dr. Olivier, which you think would be helpful to the Commission in any way?

Dr. Olivier. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. Dulles. I have no further questions.

Mr. Specter. That completes my questions, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you very much. We appreciate very much your coming.

(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF DR. ARTHUR J. DZIEMIAN

Mr. Specter. Dr. Dziemian.

Mr. Dulles. Doctor, will you raise your right hand, please? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give in this proceeding is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

91 Dr. Dziemian. Yes, sir.

Mr. Specter. Dr. Dziemian, as you know, the purpose of the proceeding is to question you concerning the experiments which were performed at Edgewood Arsenal which may shed light on the assassination of President Kennedy. With that brief statement of purpose, will you state your full name for the record, please?

Dr. Dziemian. Arthur J. Dziemian.

Mr. Specter. What is your profession or occupation, sir?

Dr. Dziemian. I am a physiologist at the U.S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories, and am chief of the Biophysics Division.

Mr. Specter. Would you outline your educational background briefly, please?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes; A.B. and Ph. D. from Princeton, Ph. D. in 1939. I was national research fellow at the University of Pennsylvania in the physiology department of the medical school and fellow in anatomy at Johns Hopkins University Medical School.

Mr. Specter. In a general way, what have your professional activities been since 1939?

Dr. Dziemian. Since 1939?

Well, these fellowships that I had. Then I went to Edgewood Arsenal, was there for a few months and then went into the Army, was in the Army for 3 years, in the sanitary corps, officer in the sanitary corps, and then I returned to Edgewood Arsenal in 1947 and in 1947 I went into wound ballistics work and have been in it since 1947.

Mr. Specter. And how long have you been chief of the Biophysics Division?

Dr. Dziemian. Since November of 1959.

Mr. Dulles. Where is this Biophysics Division?

Dr. Dziemian. U.S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

Mr. Specter. Would you describe in a general way the tests which are performed at the Edgewood Arsenal, please?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes; well, our mission, the division's mission is to study the antipersonnel effects of munitions, including kinetic energy munitions, incendiary, and some chemical munitions.

Mr. Specter. Is it the regular function of your unit then to test the effects of bullet wounds on various parts of the human body?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes; it is.

Mr. Specter. And does Dr. Olivier function under your direction in his capacity as chief of the Wounds Ballistics Branch?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes; his branch is one of the branches of the Biophysics Division.

Mr. Specter. Have you been present today to hear the full testimony of Dr. Olivier?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes; I have.

Mr. Specter. Were the tests which he described, performed under your general supervision and direction as his superior?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes; they were.

Mr. Specter. As to the underlying facts which those tests disclosed, do you have any details to add as to results which you think would be helpful or significant for the Commission to know?

Dr. Dziemian. Well, I think that Dr. Olivier described them pretty well on the whole, got all the details in.

Mr. Specter. Do you agree with the recitation of the detailed findings, then, as described by Dr. Olivier?

Dr. Dziemian. I do, yes.

Mr. Specter. Then moving to the general topic of reconstructing the events in terms of what professional opinion you may have as to what actually occurred at Dallas, permit me to ask you some questions in terms of the known medical facts, and in the light of the results of this series of tests which you have performed. First of all, have you had access to the autopsy report on President Kennedy?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes, I have.

92 Mr. Specter. And have you had access to the same general information described by Dr. Olivier on the wounds inflicted on Governor Connally?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes, I have. I did not speak to the surgeons. I was not here at that time. My information on Dr. Connally's wounds——

Mr. Dulles. Governor Connally.

Dr. Dziemian. Governor Connally, are from the reports and from discussions with Dr. Light or Dr. Olivier.

Mr. Specter. So that all of the information available to Dr. Light and Dr. Olivier obtained through consultations with Governor Connally's doctors, Dr. Shaw and Dr. Gregory, have been passed on to you? In addition, you have had access to the records of Parkland Hospital on Governor Connally's treatment there?

Dr. Dziemian. That is right.

Mr. Specter. And have you had an opportunity to observe certain films known as the Zapruder films showing the assassination?

Dr. Dziemian. No; I did not see those.

Mr. Specter. Have you had, then, brought to your attention the approximate distances involved from the situation here, to wit; that the shots were fired from a 6th floor window at a distance of approximately 160 to 250 feet at a moving vehicle, striking the Governor and the President at angles estimated from 25 to 45 degrees, the angle of impact on President Kennedy being given by the autopsy surgeon as a 45-degree angle of declination, and the angle on Governor Connally being described as 25 to 27 degrees?

Dr. Dziemian. Yes, I did——

Mr. Dulles. You are speaking now of the first two wounds, aren't you?

Mr. Specter. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. You are not speaking now of the brain wound at all, are you?

Mr. Specter. Correct, Mr. Dulles. The wound that I am referring to on the President is the wound which entered the back of his neck and exited from the front part of his neck in accordance with the prior testimony of the doctors in the case.

Now, based on the tests which have been performed, and the other factors which I will ask you to assume, since you weren't present; for purposes of expressing an opinion, what is your opinion as to whether all of the wounds on Governor Connally were inflicted by one bullet?

Dr. Dziemian. My opinion is that it is most probably so, that one bullet produced all the wounds on Governor Connally.

Mr. Specter. And what is your opinion as to whether the wound through President Kennedy's neck and all of the wounds on Governor Connally were produced by one bullet?

Dr. Dziemian. I think the probability is very good that it is, that all the wounds were caused by one bullet.

Mr. Specter. When you say all the wounds, are you excluding from that the head wound on President Kennedy?

Dr. Dziemian. I am excluding the head wound, yes.

Mr. Specter. And what is the reasoning behind your conclusion that one bullet caused the neck wound on President Kennedy and all of the other wounds on Governor Connally?

Dr. Dziemian. I am saying that the probability is high that that was so.

Mr. Specter. What is the reason for your assessment of that high probability?

Dr. Dziemian. The same reasons that Dr. Olivier gave, based on the same information, that especially the wound to the wrist. That higher velocity strike on the wrist would be caused by the bullet slowing down by going through all this tissue would cause more damage to the wrist and also more damage to the thigh.

Mr. Specter. Had the bullet only gone through Governor Connally's chest then, what is your opinion as to whether or not there would have been greater damage to the Governor's wrist?

Dr. Dziemian. I think there would have been greater damage to the Governor's wrist, and also to the thigh from the information, from the experiments obtained by Dr. Olivier's group.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question here? Does that take into account any93 evidence as to the angle of fire and the relative positions of the two men, or excluding that?

Dr. Dziemian. Excluding that. I do not know enough details about that to make an opinion on that. This is just on the basis of the velocities of the bullets.

Mr. Specter. Would the nature of the wounds on the Governor's wrist and thigh, then, be explained by the hypothesis that the bullet passed through the President first, then went through the Governor's chest before striking the wrist and in turn the thigh?

Dr. Dziemian. I think that could be a good explanation.

Mr. Specter. What is your opinion as to whether or not a fragment of a bullet striking the President's head could have caused the wound to Governor Connally's wrist?

Dr. Dziemian. I think it is unlikely.

Mr. Specter. What is your opinion as to whether or not Governor Connally's wrist wound could have been caused by a pristine bullet?

Dr. Dziemian. That is unlikely, too. Our results with pristine bullets were very different from the wound that the Governor had.

Mr. Specter. Based on the description provided to you of the nature of the wound in the Governor's back, what is your opinion as to whether, or not, that was a pristine bullet or had yaw in it, just on the basis of the nature of the wound on the Governor's back?

Dr. Dziemian. It could very well have yaw in it because of the rather large wound that was produced in the Governor's back. The wound from a nonyawing bullet could be considerably smaller.

Mr. Specter. For the record, would you define in lay terms what yaw means?

Dr. Dziemian. It is the procession of the bullet. The bullet is wobbling on its axis, so that as it wobbles, it presents different presented areas to the target or to the air, and this changes the drag coefficient of the bullet. It will slow down the bullet more both in the air and in tissues, in the yawing.

Mr. Specter. What is the course of a bullet, then, which is a pristine bullet or the nature of the bullet immediately after coming out of the muzzle of a rifle before it strikes anything?

Dr. Dziemian. A pristine bullet is normally stable. It does not wobble in the air. It presents the same presented area along most of its trajectory until it slows down, so that the drag coefficient in air or in the tissue of this type of bullet is less than the drag coefficient——

Mr. Specter. What do you mean by drag coefficient?

Dr. Dziemian. It is a measurement of the resistance of the target material or the air to the bullet. The greater the drag coefficient, the more the resistance to the bullet, the more the bullet slows down within a given time.

Mr. Specter. So would a bullet with yaw cause a greater or lesser hole on the surface which it strikes than a bullet without yaw?

Dr. Dziemian. It would normally cause a greater hole. It usually would have more presented area, that is more the surface of the bullet would hit the skin.

Mr. Specter. And would a bullet with yaw decrease in velocity to a greater, lesser, or the same extent as a bullet without yaw?

Dr. Dziemian. It would decrease in velocity to a greater extent.

Mr. Specter. Whether it passed through air or——

Dr. Dziemian. Or through tissue, and the important thing in tissue is that it transfers more energy to the target than would a nonyawing bullet.

Mr. Specter. Dr. Dziemian, Governor Connally testified that he experienced the sensation of a striking blow on his back which he described as being similar to a hard punch received from a doubled-up fist. Do you have an opinion as to whether that sensation would necessarily occur immediately upon impact of a wound such as that received by Governor Connally, or could there be a delayed reaction in sensing that feeling?

Dr. Dziemian. I don't have too much of an opinion on that. All I can say is that some people are struck by bullets and do not even know they are hit. This happens in wartime. But I don't know about that.

Mr. Specter. So that it is possible in some situations there is some delay in reaction?

94 Dr. Dziemian. I couldn't say.

Mr. Specter. Is it a highly individual matter as to the reaction of an individual on that subject?

Dr. Dziemian. I don't know.

Mr. Dulles. But take a wound like the wrist wound of Governor Connally. He couldn't get that without knowing it, could he?

Dr. Dziemian. I think he said that he didn't know he had a wrist wound until much later.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Specter. I have no further questions of Dr. Dziemian, Commissioner Dulles.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF DR. FREDERICK W. LIGHT, JR.

Mr. Dulles. Doctor, would you give your full name?

Dr. Light. Frederick W. Light, Jr.

Mr. Dulles. Would you raise your right hand? Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before this Commission is the truth, the whole truth, so help you God?

Dr. Light. I do.

Mr. Specter. Dr. Light, the purpose of asking you to appear today is to question you concerning the results of tests taken at the Edgewood Arsenal. With that brief statement of purpose, I will ask you to state your full name for the record, please.

Dr. Light. Frederick W. Light, Jr.

Mr. Specter. What is your business or profession, sir?

Dr. Light. I am a physician specializing in pathology.

Mr. Specter. What is your educational background?

Dr. Light. I have an A.B. from Lafayette in 1926, M.D. from Johns Hopkins Medical School in 1930, and Ph. D. from Hopkins in 1948.

Mr. Specter. Would you outline your experience since 1933 in a very general way, please?

Dr. Light. Well, in 1933 I was still at the Reading Hospital, resident in pathology. Between then and 1940 I was pathologist in Clarksburg, W. Va., and later in Springfield, Ill. In 1940 I returned to Johns Hopkins University to study mathematics for awhile.

Mr. Dulles. To study mathematics?

Dr. Light. Yes. And then in 1952, or 1951, excuse me, I began working at Edgewood Arsenal where I am at the present time.

Mr. Specter. What have your duties consisted of while working at Edgewood Arsenal?

Dr. Light. Primarily the study of pathology of wounding.

Mr. Specter. What is your formal title there now, Dr. Light?

Dr. Light. I am chief of the Wound Assessment Branch and assistant chief of the Biophysics Division.

Mr. Specter. And what is your relationship to Dr. Olivier and Dr. Dziemian?

Dr. Light. Dr. Dziemian is the chief of the division. Dr. Olivier is chief of one of the branches, and I am chief of one of the other branches.

Mr. Specter. Have you been present here today to hear the full testimony of Dr. Olivier?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And were the tests which he described conducted under your joint supervision with Dr. Olivier?

Dr. Light. Only a very general way. I wouldn't want to say I supervised him at all. We discussed what he was going to do.

Mr. Specter. Would it be more accurate to state that you coordinated with him in the tests which were under his general supervision?

Dr. Light. Yes; that might be stretching it a bit even.

Mr. Specter. How would you characterize your participation?

Dr. Light. Largely—originally Dr. Dziemian, as I recall, was ill, and by the95 time we began to do these specific tests that you mention, Dr. Dziemian was back on the job again. So he took over whatever supervision was needed.

Mr. Specter. Were the tests which Dr. Olivier described made at the request of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy?

Dr. Light. Yes; they were.

Mr. Specter. Do you have anything to add by way of any detail to the findings reported by Dr. Olivier in his testimony here earlier today?

Dr. Light. No; I think he covered it very thoroughly.

Mr. Specter. And as to the conclusions and opinions which he expressed, do you agree or disagree, to some extent, on his conclusions?

Dr. Light. I agree in general at least. I am not quite so certain about some of the things, but generally I certainly agree with what he said.

Mr. Dulles. What are the things on which you are not quite so certain?

Dr. Light. For example, I am not quite as sure in my mind as I believe he is that the bullet that struck the Governor was almost certainly one which had hit something else first. I believe it could have produced that wound even though it hadn't hit the President or any other person or object first.

Mr. Dulles. That is the wound, then, in the thigh?

Dr. Light. No; in the chest.

Mr. Dulles. I was thinking that the wound in the thigh—let me start again. As I understand the previous testimony, Dr. Olivier would have expected the wound in the thigh to be more serious if it had not hit some object.

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. Prior to entering Governor Connally's body, but you feel that the wound in the thigh might be consistent?

Dr. Light. The wound in the thigh is the terminal end, is the far end of the whole track. I don't believe that in passing through the tissue which was simulated by what Dr. Olivier described first, 13 or 14 centimeters of gelatin, I don't believe that the change in velocity introduced by the passage through that much tissue can be relied upon to make such a definite difference in the effect.

Mr. Specter. Do you believe that if the Governor had been struck by a pristine bullet which had gone through his chest, that it would have caused no more damage than which appeared on the Governor's chest?

Dr. Light. I think that is possible; yes. I might say I think perhaps the best, the most likely thing is what everyone else has said so far, that the bullet did go through the President's neck and then through the chest and then through the wrist and then into the thigh.

Mr. Specter. You think that is the most likely possibility?

Dr. Light. I think that is probably the most likely, but I base that not entirely on the anatomical findings but as much on the circumstances.

Mr. Specter. What are the circumstances which lead you to that conclusion?

Dr. Light. The relative positions in the automobile of the President and the Governor.

Mr. Specter. Are there any other circumstances which contribute to that conclusion, other than the anatomical findings?

Dr. Light. And the appearance of the bullet that was found and the place it was found, presumably, the bullet was the one which wounded the Governor.

Mr. Specter. The whole bullet?

Dr. Light. The whole bullet.

Mr. Specter. Identified as Commission Exhibit No. 399?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And what about that whole bullet leads you to believe that the one bullet caused the President's neck wound and all of the wounds on Governor Connally?

Dr. Light. Nothing about that bullet. Mainly the position in which they are seated in the automobile.

Mr. Specter. So in addition to the——

Dr. Light. And the fact that the bullet that passed through the President's body lost very little velocity since it passed through soft tissue, so that it would strike the Governor, if it did, with a velocity only, what was it, 100 feet per second, very little lower than it would have if it hadn't struck anything else96 first. I am not sure, I didn't see, of course, none of us saw the wounds in the Governor in the fresh state or any other time, and I am not too convinced from the measurements and the descriptions that were given in the surgical reports and so on that the actual holes through the skin were unusually large.

Mr. Specter. Have you had access to the autopsy records?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And have you had access to the reports of Parkland Hospital on the Governor's operations there?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. All three of them?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And have you had an opportunity to view the films of the assassination commonly known as the Zapruder films?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And the slides?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And have you had an opportunity to talk to Dr. Shaw and Dr. Gregory who performed the thoracic and wrist operations on Governor Connally?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. And you heard Governor Connally's version yourself?

Dr. Light. Yes; but not in——

Mr. Specter. Not in the Commission?

Dr. Light. Not in the Commission session.

Mr. Specter. But at the time when the films were viewed by the Governor?

Dr. Light. Yes; I did.

Mr. Specter. At the VFW building on the first floor?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Focusing on a few of the specific considerations, do you believe that there would have been the same amount of damage done to the Governor's wrist had the pristine bullet only passed through the Governor's body without striking the President first?

Dr. Light. I think that is possible; yes. It won't happen the same way twice in any case, so you have got a fairly wide range of things that can happen if a person is shot in more or less this way.

Mr. Specter. Do you think it is as likely that the damage would have been inflicted on the Governor's wrist as it was, with the bullet passing only through the Governor's chest as opposed to passing through the President's neck and the Governor's chest?

Dr. Light. I think the difference in likelihood is negligible on that basis alone.

Mr. Specter. So the damage on the Governor's wrist would be equally consistent——

Dr. Light. Equally consistent; yes.

Mr. Specter. With (A) passing only through the Governor's chest, or (B) passing through the President's neck and the Governor's chest?

Dr. Light. Yes.

Mr. Specter. Now, as to the damage on the thigh, would the nature of that wound again be equally consistent with either going through (A) the President's neck, the Governor's chest, the Governor's wrist, and then into the thigh, or (B) only through the Governor's chest, the Governor's wrist and into the thigh?

Dr. Light. I'd say equally consistent; yes.

Mr. Specter. And based on the descriptions which have been provided to you about the nature of the wound on the Governor's back, do you have an opinion as to whether the bullet was yawing or not at the time it struck the Governor's back?

Mr. Light. No; I don't. That is really one of the points——

Mr. Specter. It would be either way?

Dr. Light. Yes; I don't feel too certain that it was yawing. The measurements were not particularly precise as far as I could tell. You wouldn't expect them to be in an operating room. So I think it is difficult to be sure there that97 the missile wasn't presenting nose on. It undoubtedly struck not at normal instance, that is to say it was a certain obliquity, just in the nature of the way the shoulder is built.

Mr. Specter. Then do you think based on only the anatomical findings and the results of the tests which Dr. Olivier has performed that the scales are in equipoise as to whether the bullet passed through the President first and then through the Governor or passed only through the Governor?

Dr. Light. Yes; I would say I don't feel justified in drawing a conclusion one way or the other on that basis alone.

Mr. Specter. Do you have any preference of any sort?

Dr. Light. Yes; I do, for other reasons.

Mr. Specter. But only for the other reasons?

Dr. Light. As I mentioned, their positions in the automobile, the fact that if it wasn't the way—if one bullet didn't produce all of the wounds in both of the individuals, then that bullet ought to be somewhere, and hasn't been found. But those are not based on Dr. Olivier's tests nor are they based on the autopsy report or the surgeon's findings in my mind.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Dulles. On the record.

Mr. Specter. Dr. Light, do you have an opinion as to whether or not the wound inflicted on Governor Connally's wrist could have been caused by a fragment which struck the President's head?

Dr. Light. It is barely conceivable but I do not believe that that is the case.

Mr. Specter. You say barely?

Dr. Light. Barely conceivable. I mean a fragment probably had enough velocity, it couldn't have produced that wound, in my mind, but it can't be ruled out with complete certainty.

Mr. Specter. Do you have anything to add which you think would be helpful to the Commission in any way?

Dr. Light. I don't believe I do.

Mr. Specter. Those are all the questions I have, Commissioner Dulles.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you very much indeed. I express our appreciation. I didn't realize these tests were being carried out. I am very glad they have been. It is a very useful thing to do and very helpful to the Commission. Thank you very much. I want to thank all three of you doctors for having so fully cooperated in this matter, and I think that these tests that you have run have made a real contribution to the Commission's work.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Thursday, May 14, 1964
TESTIMONY OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, JOHN A. McCONE, AND RICHARD M. HELMS

The President's Commission met at 9:15 a.m., on May 14, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Hale Boggs, Representative Gerald R. Ford, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Charles Murray and Walter Craig, observers; and Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas.

TESTIMONY OF J. EDGAR HOOVER

The Chairman. The Commission will be in order.

Director Hoover, will you please raise your right hand to be sworn, please. You solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Commission98 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Hoover. I do.

The Chairman. Mr. Rankin will carry on the examination, Mr. Director.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, do you want to tell him briefly what our purpose is?

The Chairman. Oh, yes; it is our practice to make a brief statement before the testimony of each witness, and I will do it now.

Mr. Hoover will be asked to testify in regard to whether Lee H. Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence of any conspiracy, either domestic or foreign, involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

What he has to say about an article in the National Enquirer, Commission Exhibit No. 837, and concerning the failure to include the name and information concerning special agent Hosty in the initial report of the Oswald address book and any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States. Now, Mr. Rankin, you may proceed.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, will you state for the record your name and position?

Mr. Hoover. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

Mr. Rankin. Where do you live, Mr. Hoover?

Mr. Hoover. I live at 4936 30th Place, Northwest, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Rankin. And you have been Director of the Bureau for some 40 years according to the newspapers?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct; since 1924.

Mr. Rankin. You have furnished us a considerable amount of information, Mr. Hoover, about whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent or acting for the Bureau in any capacity as informer or otherwise at any time. Are those statements correct?

Mr. Hoover. They are correct. I can most emphatically say that at no time was he ever an employee of the Bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as a special employee, or as an informant.

Mr. Rankin. I call your particular attention to Exhibit 835, and suggest that you will find that that is your letter, together with your affidavit about this subject matter, and other matters that you furnished to us concerning this particular subject.

Mr. Hoover. That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. Do you wish to add anything?

Mr. Hoover. No; there is nothing that I desire to add to what appears in this letter and my affidavit which accompanied it to the Commission.

Mr. Rankin. You have provided many things to us in assisting the Commission in connection with this investigation and I assume, at least in a general way, you are familiar with the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, is that correct?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there is no Federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime to kill or attack the President or the Vice President or any of the continuity of officers who would succeed to the Presidency.

However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make special investigations, and in this instance he asked that this investigation be made. I immediately assigned a special force headed by the special agent in charge at Dallas, Tex., to initiate the investigation, and to get all details and facts concerning it, which we obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted to the Attorney General for transmission to the President.

Mr. Rankin. From your study of this entire matter of the assassination and work in connection with it, do you know of any credible evidence that has ever come to your attention that there was a conspiracy either foreign or domestic involved in the assassination?

99 Mr. Hoover. I know of no substantial evidence of any type that would support any contention of that character. I have read all of the requests that have come to the Bureau from this Commission, and I have read and signed all the replies that have come to the Commission.

In addition, I have read many of the reports that our agents have made and I have been unable to find any scintilla of evidence showing any foreign conspiracy or any domestic conspiracy that culminated in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Representative Ford. May I ask this, Mr. Hoover. As I understand your testimony, it is based on the evidence that has been accumulated thus far?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct, sir.

Representative Ford. Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation continuing its investigation of all possible ramifications of this assassination?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct. We are receiving and we, I expect, will continue to receive for days or weeks to come, letters from individuals that normally would probably be in the category of what we would call crank letters in which various weird allegations are made or in which people have reported psychic vibrations. We are still running out letters of that character and in turn making a report to this Commission upon it, notwithstanding the fact that on the face of it the allegation is without any foundation. Individuals who could not have known any of the facts have made some very strange statements. There have been publications and books written, the contents of which have been absurd and without a scintilla of foundation of fact. I feel, from my experience in the Bureau, where we are in constant receipt over the years of these so-called crank letters, that such allegations will be going on possibly for some years to come.

I, personally, feel that any finding of the Commission will not be accepted by everybody, because there are bound to be some extremists who have very pronounced views, without any foundation for them, who will disagree violently with whatever findings the Commission makes. But I think it is essential that the FBI investigate the allegations that are received in the future so it can't be said that we had ignored them or that the case is closed and forgotten.

Representative Ford. Could you give us some idea of how many agents are currently working to one degree or another on any aspects of this case?

Mr. Hoover. I would estimate, Congressman Ford, that there are at the present time at least 50 or 60 men giving their entire time to various aspects of the investigation, because while Dallas is the office of origin, investigation is required in auxiliary offices such as Los Angeles or San Francisco, and even in some foreign countries like Mexico. We have representatives in Mexico City.

At the outset of the investigation, following the assassination, it was the desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau just as quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible, and I would say we had about 150 men at that time working on the report in the field, and at Washington, DC.

Now, all the reports that come in from the field are, of course, reviewed at Washington by the supervisor in charge of the case, and then in turn by the assistant director of the division, and then in turn by Mr. Belmont, who is the assistant to the Director.

Reports in which there is a controversial issue or where statements have been made of the existence of some particular thing that we have never heard of before, I myself, go over these to see that we haven't missed anything or haven't had any gap in the investigation so it can be tied down.

Recently the National Enquirer had a fantastic article in it as to the existence of a letter that had been written or a request that had been made by the Department of Justice to Chief Curry of the Dallas Police Department, to withhold arresting Rubinstein, or Ruby, and Oswald after the Oswald attempt on General Walker's life.

First, I had the agent in charge at Dallas interview Chief Curry and I have sent to the Commission a letter as to what Chief Curry had to say. He branded it as an entire lie—that he had never received any request of that kind. I had our files searched to be certain we had not written any such letter as that and found we had not. I requested the Department of Justice to advise me whether they had written any such letter and Mr. Katzenbach advises there is no reference100 in the Department files to the alleged letter from any Department of Justice official to Chief Curry nor any reference that an FBI official was asked to request the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald or Ruby. A letter is being sent to the Commission today setting forth this information.

Representative Ford. The point that I think ought to be made is that despite the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the FBI and by other agencies, and despite the tremendous effort that has been made, I believe, by the Commission to help and assist and to consolidate all of the evidence that we possibly could, that there is always the possibility at some future date that some evidence might come to the surface.

Mr. Hoover. That is, of course, possible; yes.

Representative Ford. I want just to be sure that no leads, no evidence regardless of its credibility will be ignored, that it will be pursued by the Bureau or any other agency to make certain that it is good, bad or of no value.

Mr. Hoover. Well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned, the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to either prove or disprove the allegation. We found in the course of our investigations that individuals have made statements. Yet, when we investigate they will frankly admit that the statement is an entire falsehood, or that they don't know why they wrote the letter or why they made the statement. But, nevertheless, we have the record and generally in those instances we try to get a signed statement from that individual so it can be made a part of the record.

Representative Ford. Under your authority from the President, the authority which gave you the FBI, the responsibility to conduct this investigation it is not an authority with a terminal point. It is an authority that goes on indefinitely?

Mr. Hoover. Very definitely so. The President wanted a full and thorough investigation made of this matter, and we have tried to do so. As I have stated, I think we will continue to receive allegations. I think this will be a matter of controversy for years to come, just like the Lincoln assassination. There will be questions raised by individuals, either for publicity purposes or otherwise, that will raise some new angle or new aspect of it. I think we must, and certainly we intend in the FBI to continue to run down any such allegations or reports of that kind.

Representative Boggs. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Yes, Congressman Boggs.

Representative Boggs. Mr. Hoover, I don't want any cover—to cover any ground which has been covered but I just have one or two questions. First, let me say that you and the Bureau have been very cooperative with this Commission.

Mr. Hoover. Thank you.

Representative Boggs. And tremendously helpful. I have been concerned about some of these wild press reports and concerned about what impact it may have ultimately on the history of this thing. For instance there is a man named Buchanan who has written a series of articles.

Mr. Dulles. A book now. A book is out; yes.

Representative Boggs. A book now. I understand they have been widely circulated in the European press, and this man came here and was, as I got it from some other sources, he took in some people here, some American journalists, and I am told that this man has a Communist background, and in addition to that is a most unreliable person. He has made these allegations that the Dallas police force was involved in the assassination and so on.

Would you have any suggestions on how this Commission should deal with this sort of thing?

Mr. Hoover. We have received a request from the Commission to review that book and to make a report upon any portions of it that can be contradicted or substantiated by actual facts or documents. I know Buchanan's background. He worked on the Washington Star and he was dismissed from the Washington Star because he was a member of the Communist Party. He spent much of his time in recent years in France writing for French newspapers. I have followed101 the articles that he has written about this matter and they are what I would call "journalistic garbage." There is not a scintilla of truth to most of the things he has written in these articles and in his book which I have had a chance to scan but haven't actually reviewed yet. It is being reviewed by my research section. Some of the allegations are utterly fantastic. I often wonder where some of these individuals get such ideas and why they make such statements without foundation.

Now, he makes many wild charges there, and to read it, a person not knowing him, or his views, or his background, would be inclined to wonder. I think you are going to have that problem, as I say, for years to come. I don't know how you can handle individuals like him other than to have the record clear upon the facts of the case, and either substantiate or disprove his statements. I don't think too much time should be given to these individuals who have such unsavory backgrounds as Buchanan has and who makes statements that have been proved to be untrue. But, at the same time I think when a book like that comes out or an article of that type comes out that deals with the assassination of the late President, I think it should be gone into from an investigative point of view. We should then submit to this Commission, even after it has concluded its hearings, for record purposes, what we have found in each particular instance.

Representative Boggs. Now, on the other side of the fence——

Mr. Dulles. May I add one other thing just to interrupt. I wish you would add to your list a book called "The Red Roses of Dallas" by a man named Gun. He is a more reliable correspondent.

Mr. Hoover. He is a Philadelphia correspondent.

Mr. Dulles. He has been living in this country since 1946. I have met him over here. Let's see, he was at Dallas at the time. He was then reporting, I think, for the Italian newspaper Epoca.

Mr. Hoover. That is not the same one.

Mr. Dulles. He might have been lying. This book is full of lies. But I think it is a book that ought to be added, too, and I will see that a copy is sent to the Bureau.

Mr. Hoover. I would appreciate that.

Representative Boggs. On the other side of the spectrum some professor out at the University of Illinois wrote a piece in which he alleged the President was a Communist agent, President Kennedy, and Buchanan's allegations are that the extreme right assassinated the President and this fellow's allegations are that the Communists assassinated the President. Would you care to comment? Have you read that piece?

Mr. Hoover. I have read that piece. My comment on it is this in general: I think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the freedom of this country as the extreme left. There are groups, organizations, and individuals on the extreme right who make these very violent statements, allegations that General Eisenhower was a Communist, disparaging references to the Chief Justice and at the other end of the spectrum you have these leftists who make wild statements charging almost anybody with being a Fascist or belonging to some of these so-called extreme right societies. Now, I have felt, and I have said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much a danger, at either end of the spectrum. They don't deal with facts. Anybody who will allege that General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has something wrong with him.

A lot of people read such allegations because I get some of the weirdest letters wanting to know whether we have inquired to find out whether that is true. I have known General Eisenhower quite well myself and I have found him to be a sound, level-headed man.

In New York City there is a woman by the name of Kraus who must be mentally deranged as she stands on a Broadway corner there handing out leaflets in which she charges me with being in the conspiracy with the Communists to overthrow this Government and so forth.

Well now, if any person has fought communism, I certainly have fought it. We have tried to fight it and expose it in democratic ways I think that is the thing we have to very definitely keep in mind in this whole problem in the102 security of the President and the successor to office. Just how far you are going to go for his protection and his security. I don't think you can get absolute security without almost establishing a police state, and we don't want that. You can't put security in a black groove or a white groove. It is in a gray groove, and certain chances have to be taken. You are dealing with a human being when you are dealing with the President of the United States. President Johnson is a very down to earth human being, and it makes the security problem all the more difficult, but you can't bar him from the people.

There are certain things that can be done, and I submitted a memorandum to the Secret Service, and to the White House on certain security steps that might be taken and tightened up. But you are dealing with the general public and that is what has given me great concern in the recent expansion, of the criteria for dissemination that we adopted after the assassination.

Prior to that time we reported to the Secret Service all information that dealt with individuals who were potential killers or by whom acts of violence might be anticipated. The Secret Service would take that information and would do with it as they saw fit. I gave great consideration to it because I am not very happy with the criteria expansion, but I felt we had to include subversives of various character, and extremists. We have, in turn, furnished their names to the Secret Service. I think 5,000 names up to the present time already have been submitted and there are at least three or four thousand more that will be submitted within the next few months.

Then you come to the problem of what you are going to do when the Secret Service gets those names. They have to call upon the local authorities. Just recently, in the city of Chicago, when the President was there, the local authorities were asked to give assistance as they usually do to the Secret Service and they went to the homes of some of these people, and it resulted really almost in a house arrest.

Now, I don't think there is any place in this country for that kind of thing, but these people who belonged to extreme subversive organizations or organizations that advocated the overthrow of government by force and violence were told that they couldn't leave their house or if they did they would be accompanied by a police officer. That gives me great concern because in New York City alone, you run into maybe three or four thousand such individuals who would be members of subversive organizations, and then you get into the twilight zone of subversive fronts.

Now, there again, merely because a man belongs to a subversive front organization, in my estimation doesn't mean that he is blacklisted and is a menace to the country for life. If he belongs to 20 of them, it certainly shows either one of two things, he is either very gullible and dumb or he is a menace. That has been my attitude in regard to Government service where you find a Government employee who belonged to one or two, maybe in his early days. I don't believe this necessarily makes him a security risk. Rather, this would be dependent on the degree of his activity in the front group and his purpose and intent in associating himself with it. But where he has belonged to 15, 18, 20 of them, I don't think he has enough good judgment to be in the Government.

Some ministers get drawn into organizations, some of which are under the domination of the Communist Party. Now, those ministers don't know that. They are just as loyal and patriotic as you and I are, but they happen to belong. Now, that is where the question of human judgment has to be used. We try to use it in selecting these names. But I was startled when I learned of the incident in Chicago because there you come pretty close to a house arrest and we don't want that. We don't want a gestapo. We have to, I think, maintain an even balance.

I think it was very well expressed—

Mr. Dulles. May I ask you, Mr. Hoover, was this house arrest based on names you had furnished the Secret Service and they furnished the local authorities?

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Representative Boggs. That brings me back to the question I think I heard103 Congressman Ford ask you as I came into the room, because I think this is the crux of our investigation.

I read the FBI report very carefully and the whole implication of the report is that, number one, Oswald shot the President; number two, that he was not connected with any conspiracy of any kind, nature or description.

Mr. Hoover. Correct.

Representative Boggs. Do you still subscribe to that?

Mr. Hoover. I subscribe to it even more strongly today than I did at the time that the report was written. You see, the original idea was that there would be an investigation by the FBI and a report would be prepared in such form that it could be released to the public.

Representative Boggs. Surely.

Mr. Hoover. Then a few days later, after further consideration, the President decided to form a commission, which I think was very wise, because I feel that the report of any agency of Government investigating what might be some shortcomings on the part of other agencies of Government ought to be reviewed by an impartial group such as this Commission. And the more I have read these reports, the more I am convinced that Oswald was the man who fired the gun; and he fired three times, killed the President, and wounded Governor Connally.

And I also am further convinced that there is absolutely no association between Oswald or Ruby. There was no such evidence ever established.

Mr. Dulles. Or Oswald and anybody else? Would you go that far?

Mr. Hoover. Anybody else who might be——

Mr. Dulles. In connection with the assassination?

Mr. Hoover. Yes; I would certainly go that far. There was suspicion at first this might be a Castro act.

Representative Boggs. Right.

Mr. Hoover. We had information that had been obtained in Mexico City by another intelligence agency indicating there was a man who had seen a certain amount of money passed to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate. I think it was $6,000 that was passed. We went into that very thoroughly. The man later retracted his statement and stated it was not true. He was asked whether he would take a lie detector test, and he did. The lie detector test showed that he was telling a lie.

As to the lie detector, I do want to make this comment on it. I have always held to the opinion that it is not a perfect piece of machinery. It is an interpretation made by human beings of what the machine, the polygraph, shows. I would never want to convict or to send to the penitentiary any person solely on the evidence of the lie detector. It is a contribution in an investigation, a more or less psychological contribution.

But I have seen individuals who have failed the lie detector test and who were just as innocent as they could be. That particular lead in Mexico City was completely disproved; there was no foundation for it.

We found no associations between Oswald and Ruby. There has been a story printed that Ruby and Oswald worked together and were close friends.

There was no evidence, there was never any indication that we could find that Oswald had ever been in Ruby's nightclub or had had any association with him.

Ruby comes from Chicago, he was on the fringe of what you might call the elements of the underworld there. He came to Dallas, opened up the nightclub and it was a place where, certainly not the better class of people went, but it wasn't any so-called "joint," to use the vernacular. It was just another nightclub. So far as we have been able to establish there was no relationship or contact between Oswald and Ruby or anyone else allegedly involved in this assassination.

Representative Boggs. The FBI interviewed practically everybody who ever associated with Oswald?

Mr. Hoover. It did.

Representative Boggs. You didn't find any indication of why anyone should even suspect that Oswald would do this, did you?

104 Mr. Hoover. We found no indication at all that Oswald was a man addicted to violence. The first indication of an act of violence came after he, Oswald, had been killed, and Mrs. Oswald told us about the attempt on General Walker's life by Oswald. No one had known a thing about that.

I think in the Enquirer article there is reference to the fact that the Dallas Police knew or suspected Oswald of possibly being a party to the shooting into the house of General Walker. Chief Curry specifically denies that. There was no connection of that kind and there was no evidence that Oswald had any streak of violence.

We went back into his Marine Corps record. He was a "loner." He didn't have many friends. He kept to himself, and when he went abroad, he defected to Russia. The first evidence we had of him in our file was a statement to the press in Moscow. And then later, about 22 months later, he returned to the Embassy there and according to the report of the Embassy we have and which the Commission has been furnished, the Embassy gave him a clean bill. He had seen the error of his ways and disliked the Soviet atmosphere, et cetera, and they, therefore, cleared him, paid his way and paid his wife's way to come back to this country.

At no time, other than the so-called street disturbance in New Orleans, was there any indication that he might be a fighter. Well, in that particular instance he was handing out leaflets that he printed for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and some of the anti-Castro forces, we have several thousand of them in New Orleans alone, happened to see him and they moved in on him and immediately the police moved in and arrested him. I believe they fined him $10 for disorderly conduct. There was no evidence in the place where he was employed in Dallas of acts of violence or temper or anything of that kind on his part.

Representative Boggs. You have spent your life studying criminology and violence and subversion. Would you care to speculate on what may have motivated the man? I know it would be just speculation.

Mr. Hoover. My speculation, Mr. Boggs, is that this man was no doubt a dedicated Communist. He prefers to call himself a Marxist, but there you get into the field of semantics. He was a Communist, he sympathized thoroughly with the Communist cause.

I don't believe now, as I look back on it, that he ever changed his views when he asked to come back to this country. I personally feel that when he went to the American Embassy in Moscow originally to renounce his citizenship he should have been able right then and there to sign the renouncement. He never could have gotten back here. I think that should apply to almost all defectors who want to defect and become a part of a system of government that is entirely foreign to ours. If they have that desire, they have that right, but if they indicate a desire for it, let them renounce their citizenship at once.

That was not done. He stayed in Moscow awhile and he went to Minsk where he worked. There was no indication of any difficulty, personally on his part there, but I haven't the slightest doubt that he was a dedicated Communist.

There has been some question raised which cannot be resolved, because Oswald is dead, as to whether he was trying to kill the President or trying to kill the Governor. He had had some correspondence with the Governor as to the form of his discharge from the Marine Corps. It was not a dishonorable discharge, but a discharge less than honorable after he defected.

Governor Connally had left the Navy Department, and was back in Texas as Governor. Oswald may have had his anger or his animosity against the Governor, but no one can say definitely—that is mere speculation, no one can tell that, because the gun and the sighting of the gun was directed at the car.

Now, first, it was thought that the President had been shot through the throat that is what the doctors at the Parkland Hospital felt when he was brought in.

If that had been true, the shot would have had to come from the overpass. But as soon as the body arrived in Washington, the doctors at Bethesda Hospital performed the autopsy and it was then determined definitely from their point of view that he had been shot from the rear, and that portions of the skull had been practically shot off. There was no question but that the gun and the telescopic lens could pinpoint the President perfectly. The car was moving105 slowly. It wasn't going at a high rate of speed, so that he had perfect opportunity to do it.

Now, some people have raised the question: Why didn't he shoot the President as the car came toward the storehouse where he was working?

The reason for that is, I think, the fact there were some trees between his window on the sixth floor and the cars as they turned and went through the park. So he waited until the car got out from under the trees, and the limbs, and then he had a perfectly clear view of the occupants of the car, and I think he took aim, either on the President or Connally, and I personally believe it was the President in view of the twisted mentality the man had.

But he had given no indication of that—we had interviewed him, I think, three times. Of course, our interviews were predicated to find out whether he had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service, because they frequently do that.

Representative Boggs. And had he been?

Mr. Hoover. He had not been, so he said, and we have no proof that he was. He had been over there long enough but they never gave him citizenship in Russia at all. I think they probably looked upon him more as a kind of a queer sort of individual and they didn't trust him too strongly.

But just the day before yesterday information came to me indicating that there is an espionage training school outside of Minsk—I don't know whether it is true—and that he was trained at that school to come back to this country to become what they call a "sleeper," that is a man who will remain dormant for 3 or 4 years and in case of international hostilities rise up and be used.

I don't know of any espionage school at Minsk or near Minsk, and I don't know how you could find out if there ever was one because the Russians won't tell you if you asked them.

They do have espionage and sabotage schools in Russia and they do have an assassination squad that is used by them but there is no indication he had any association with anything of that kind.

Representative Boggs. Now we have some people, including this man's mother, talk about Oswald having been an agent of the Government of the United States. I think his mother mentioned the CIA; she has made these statements publicly for money, apparently.

Mr. Hoover. Yes; she has.

Representative Boggs. Just for the purpose of the record, I think it would be well if you would comment on that, Mr. Director.

Mr. Hoover. Of course, we have interviewed his mother and his wife, and all his relatives, and everybody that he is known to have associated with. His mother I would put in a category of being emotionally unstable. She has been around the country making speeches, and the first indication of her emotional instability was the retaining of a lawyer that anyone would not have retained if they really were serious in trying to get down to the facts. But she has been in New York City; she has been in Chicago; I think other parts of the country, always speaking for money.

Now, that kind of an individual is the type we have seen over the years, who will say almost anything to draw a crowd. Just to be able to say something sensational. Many times we have gone out to such people and asked them specifically, "Now, what is your basis for this?" And they will say, "Well, I just had a feeling that that was true, so I said it."

She has never made that statement to us, but we have many other instances where that kind of statement is made. They don't have the legal evidence that you must have if you are going to take any positive action. I would put very little credence in anything that his mother said.

I think his wife was a far more reliable person in statements that she made, so far as we were able to ascertain, than his mother. I think the mother had in mind, naturally, the fact she wanted to clear her son's name, which was a natural instinct, but more importantly she was going to see how much money she could make, and I believe she has made a substantial sum.

Representative Boggs. And the allegations she has made about this man being an agent either of the CIA or the FBI are false?

Mr. Hoover. Well, I can certainly speak for the FBI that it is false, and I106 have discussed the matter, naturally, with Mr. McCone, the Director of CIA, and he, of course, will no doubt appear himself, but there is no indication at all that he was employed by them. We frequently get that kind of a story from individuals who, when they get into some kind of difficulty, will claim they were working for the CIA or they were working for the FBI.

Representative Boggs. Surely.

Mr. Hoover. Now, no one can work for the FBI without the approval being given at Washington and a record kept of it, even of the confidential informants. That is very tightly controlled. We have no so-called lump sum that we can use to hire people. So there has to be a voucher and specific details of payment. And I know at no time was he an informant or agent or a special employee or working in any capacity for the FBI.

As to the interviews we had with him in which he gave us some information, some of it was not the truth, but this was not particularly significant. The interviews we had with him I would not term as talking with an informant. He was interviewed while under arrest by the New Orleans police, and then after he had committed this act of assassination we interviewed him in police headquarters in Dallas. But they were the only contacts we had, I think four contacts altogether, and he received no money of any kind, no promise of any kind, and there was no indication that he was rendering assistance to the U.S. Government. We looked upon him as a criminal after the assassination, of course, and prior to that time we looked upon him as an individual who we suspected might become an agent of the Soviet government. There was no proof of that, and we checked him carefully.

We knew of his contact with the Soviet Embassy here at Washington, his contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and his contact with the Worker publication in New York. And none of those contacts gave any indication of any tendency to commit violence.

There are many people who read the Daily Worker, or what is now the Worker, and you certainly can't brand them as hazards to the security of the country or as potential assassins. It is in that area that I am particularly concerned that we don't become hysterical and go too far in restricting the citizens of our country from exercising their civil and constitutional rights. The mere fact a person disagrees with you in a matter on communism doesn't mean he should be arrested. Many Communists make very violent speeches, and we know them, but I don't feel that the time has come that they should be arrested. If they have violated the laws of the United States, we will, then, proceed with prosecution, and the cases can then go through the courts. Such cases last for years before they get to the Supreme Court, and even then such cases often start over on some legal angle. But, all in all, I think that the enforcement of security and the enforcement of laws dealing with subversion ought to be handled in the American manner.

I am criticized by the extreme right for that. They put me in the category, I guess, along with General Eisenhower. But the extreme left criticizes me, saying I believe that any person who has on a red necktie may be addicted to communism, and, therefore, is a great danger. That is why I say the extremists at both ends are bad, and I have repeated that several times publicly.

Representative Boggs. No doubt about the problem being a difficult one. I remember some years back when these fanatics started shooting up the House of Representatives.

Mr. Hoover. I recall that.

Representative Boggs. I happened to be there on the occasion and there were many suggestions that we build a bulletproof glass enclosure around the Members of Congress and so on. Of course, all of us rejected those ideas because it would be totally incompatible with our democratic institutions and this, obviously, becomes a problem in the security of the President; that is what you are telling us, isn't it?

Mr. Hoover. That is the great problem. We have participated in the protection of the President since the assassination. The Secret Service indicates how many agents it needs when the President is traveling somewhere or going somewhere in Washington, and then I assign that number of agents to the Secret Service. They are not under my direction. They are under the direction107 of the Secret Service because under law they are charged with the protection of the President. We have never done that before, but I felt that it was something we must do if the Secret Service desired it. Sometimes, such as at the funeral of the late President Kennedy, the procession walked up Connecticut Avenue, which created a very, very grave security problem because they were walking with these tall building on either side. As I recall, we had the responsibility for the Cathedral, and we had 43 agents in the Cathedral during the services. I was more concerned about these tall buildings, because all the small buildings have been torn down along Connecticut Avenue, and there were about six or seven blocks to walk. Not only the high officials of this Government, including the President, but the Queen of Greece, General de Gaulle, Emperor Haile Selassie, and many Prime Ministers were present. They were a perfect target for someone in some window.

Now, you can't empty these buildings. It is impossible to do that, because you can't go to the Mayflower Hotel and say all front rooms must be vacated. Other office buildings are there, even taller than the Mayflower, and you can't make them keep everybody out of the front offices because then you get into a police state.

The Secret Service does try to check to find out who have these various offices. We also check so if there is anything in our files on those individuals the Secret Service is at once advised. When the President goes to a banquet or a social occasion, all of the employees in the hotel, the cooks, waiters, and busboys, and so forth, are all checked by Secret Service to be certain there is no one with a background that would indicate a hazard to the President. But that is as far as I think you can go. You can't put in a whole new staff of waiters and you can't make people move out. People going to a Presidential function are generally invited by card or by list, and that is very carefully checked at the entrance by the Secret Service.

We suggested a few more things that possibly could be done, and some of which I have doubts about. You speak about this matter of glass around the galleries in the House. One of the suggestions that we made was that there be bulletproof glass in front of the President's lectern. In my own mind, I question whether that is wise. Knowing this President as this President is, he wants to get close to the audience; he wants to reach over and shake hands with people. That concerns me because you never know when an emotionally unstable person may be in that crowd. As you noted, he has frequently brought groups into the White House gardens and walked around with people he didn't know. I know the Secret Service people are concerned about it. I am concerned about it.

President Truman last week expressed his concern that the President was taking unnecessary chances.

But the governmental agency having the responsibility for guarding him, the Secret Service, has a natural hesitancy to say, "You can't do this."

Representative Boggs. Of course, for the record, President Kennedy had the same difficulty.

Mr. Hoover. That is right. It was best expressed at Parkland Hospital. One of President Kennedy's staff made the statement that the whole fault in this matter was that, in the choice between politics and security, politics was chosen. That is exactly what happened. It was an open car. I am thoroughly opposed to the President riding in an open car.

They did not have any armored car in the Secret Service at that time. I have now sent one of our armored cars over for the President, but it is a closed limousine. But on occasion, such as at Gettysburg and Atlanta the other day, the President got out of the armored car which had been flown there for his use, and commandeered the car of the Secret Service which is wide open, so he could wave and see the people. Now, that is a great hazard. I think he should always be in an armored car that is closed, that can't have the top put down. But as you recall, President Kennedy had the bubble top off of the car that he was in. It was not armored and the bubble top was made of plastic so a bullet could have gone through it very easily.

Representative Ford. Mr. Hoover, you have categorically testified that the108 FBI never at any time had Oswald as an agent, as an informant, or in any other way.

Mr. Hoover. That is correct. I couldn't make it more emphatic.

Representative Ford. And Mr. Belmont testified to the same last week when he was before us.

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. Both you and he would be fully familiar with all of the records of the FBI in this regard?

Mr. Hoover. We would, and we would not only be fully familiar with it because while Mr. Belmont is in charge of the Investigative Branch of the Bureau—we have two assistants to the Director, one in charge of administrative work and the other in charge of investigative work—we have also checked the administrative records where vouchers or payments would have been made and there is no indication that any money was ever paid to Oswald. We have obtained, and they are on file with the Commission, the affidavits of the agents, who at various times were in contact with Oswald, to the effect that he was not an informant; that they had never paid him anything; that he was being questioned as to possible recruitment by the Soviet intelligence; so there was no evidence at any time indicating employment by the FBI.

Representative Ford. And you were not under any limitation or restriction from any other authority in this regard?

Mr. Hoover. Absolutely not. I have the entire control of whether a man shall be an informant or shall not be an informant. That comes under my chain of command from the local office which has the matter at hand. They can't just put on an informant without our approval. The recommendation on security informants comes to the Bureau; it goes through the Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and, in significant cases, goes to Mr. Belmont, and then to my desk for my specific approval. So I, or my seat-of-government staff, have to approve every one of those who are used as informants in all classes of cases, not only in intelligence cases but in white-slave cases, automobile thefts, and all of these cases.

Representative Ford. There is no limitation on what you can tell us about this situation?

Mr. Hoover. None whatsoever.

Representative Ford. No limitation; no restrictions?

Mr. Hoover. No restriction. So far as the record of vouchers in the Bureau are concerned, they are open to the inspection of this Commission at any time going back as far as you may want to go.

Senator Cooper. May I ask just one question there? I think you have answered it, but in your examination of this aspect as to whether or not Oswald was an informer or employee or held any relationship to the FBI, you, yourself, have looked into all of the means you have of determining that fact when you make the statement to us?

Mr. Hoover. I have personally looked into that for two reasons: Because the President asked me personally to take charge of this investigation and to direct it, and I knew that the report ultimately would be made to him. For that reason I became familiar with every step and every action that was taken. Then when the allegation was made by someone—I think it was the mother of Oswald first, if I recall correctly—that he was employed by some Government agency, the CIA, or FBI, and maybe both, I insisted upon a check being made and any record showing any indication of that being brought to me. When they could find none, I then asked for affidavits from the field force that had dealt with Oswald as to whether they had hired him or paid him anything or given him anything, and the affidavits are on file here that they had not.

Senator Cooper. I think you have said there is no sum available to the FBI which would enable these men, these agents, to employ him out of any funds that are made available to them.

Mr. Hoover. Oh, no; it must be done by voucher, and those vouchers are examined by the General Accounting Office every year or so. We have no lump sum in the field offices for employment of informants as such which is not supported by vouchers.

Senator Cooper. I have just about two questions, I may have to go in a few109 minutes to the Senate. I would like to direct your attention to that period of time when Oswald was a defector, beginning when he left the United States and when he returned.

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Senator Cooper. During that period, did the FBI have any jurisdiction over intelligence regarding him, or any capacity to know?

Mr. Hoover. While he was in Russia?

Senator Cooper. Yes.

Mr. Hoover. No; we did not. We were interested in knowing what he might say in Russia that appeared in the press. That was our first intimation that this man had defected, when we read it in a newspaper article. We were, of course, interested in knowing when he would return or if he would return. We had no jurisdiction as to what he was doing in Russia after he had gone there.

Senator Cooper. As I understand it, you had no capacity at that time to follow his activities?

Mr. Hoover. That is true. We have no agents in Russia. Foreign intelligence is handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, and our responsibility is domestic. We work very closely together.

Senator Cooper. Have you had the jurisdiction since the assassination or the occasion to examine persons connected with the State Department concerning the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. Hoover. Well——

Senator Cooper. Would that be a matter for some other agency?

Mr. Hoover. That could be a matter for CIA or for us after Oswald had returned here.

Senator Cooper. Yes.

Mr. Hoover. Then he becomes a civilian in the country here. Now, there is what we call a delimitation agreement among the Government intelligence agencies. For instance, the military branches of the Government have their own intelligence services and they handle all military deviations in regard to espionage or things of that kind. If they want our assistance and ask for it we, of course, will always cooperate. In regard to CIA, there are many cases which CIA and the FBI work jointly on, of individuals that may have been recruited over in Europe by the CIA, not by us, because we don't have authority to do that abroad, but when that man comes to this country, the best ends of intelligence are served by having the two agencies work very closely together, conduct joint interviews, and exchange information very, very freely. That has been going on ever since I can recall CIA being existence.

Mr. Dulles. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation existed during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has continued now with great cooperation on both sides.

Mr. Hoover. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence agency of many of these foreign countries will cover the whole world and the country itself. Whereas in this country you have separate agencies covering espionage activities. CIA covers the foreign activity, and the FBI the domestic activities, and they must be interlocking. An espionage agent of the Soviet Government can arrive in New York today by plane from Paris and he can be in Mexico City tomorrow. Then, CIA would pick him up there. We would not pick him up there. We would watch him while in this country, but as soon as he takes that plane and leaves the United States CIA moves in on him. If he comes back to the United States, we move in on him. Therefore, we have a very close liaison.

As a matter of fact, what we have done in government agencies is to have a liaison agent in our Bureau assigned to contact CIA, the Pentagon, State Department, and various other agencies to cut out the red tape of writing letters back and forth. In order to orally relay information which has come to his attention, our representative can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if there is need, for instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that is docking at New York, it is all accomplished within a matter of 45 minutes or an hour.

110 If you went through this letter-writing process and the paper war that goes on so often in the Government it might take a week or 10 days.

The FBI does have 10 legal attaches attached to 10 embassies abroad. Their purpose is not operational. They don't investigate in those countries any matters that have to be investigated. That, if it is to be done, is handled by CIA. Our purpose in being there is to maintain liaison with our opposite number such as the Surete Nationale in France and with the national police in the Philippines, to exchange information that is vital to our internal security, and also vital to the internal security of the other country.

Senator Cooper. May I ask one other question?

Is there any, considering the number of defectors in the United States to Communist countries, which cannot be large, I would assume——

Mr. Hoover. I think there are about 36.

Senator Cooper. Which would indicate, I would think either a lack of reliability on their part and stability or beyond that a dedicated purpose to become Communists, then upon their return, wouldn't it seem to you they should be given some special attention?

Mr. Hoover. We have now——

Senator Cooper. To determine whether they are a risk to become Soviet or Communist espionage agents or in fact become dangerous?

Mr. Hoover. We have taken steps to plug that gap.

Prior to the assassination of the President, a defector, before he came back was always cleared for return by a representative of the State Department or the military abroad. When he came back we immediately interviewed him if he was a civilian. It had to be done promptly to determine whether he could be a potential intelligence agent.

Now, in December of last year, following the assassination, we expanded the criteria of what should be furnished to the Secret Service, and all defectors automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret Service.

There are 36 defectors that we know of in this country who have been under investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views sincerely. Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general precaution, as a result of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all go to the Secret Service.

Mr. Dulles. That includes military defectors, does it not?

Mr. Hoover. Military defectors and defectors from any private agency, after they return to the U.S. and become civilians. Some have defected to China, to the satellite nations and to Russia.

Senator Cooper. Just one other question, because I have to go.

In the course of this investigation, as you know so well, there have been a number identified who were very close, at least to Mrs. Oswald, and a few, I can't say that were close to Oswald yet they had association with him, such as the man who drove him back and forth, Mrs. Paine, with whom Mrs. Oswald lived, and others, has there been any credible, I won't say credible because if you had you would have presented it to us in your report, has there been any claims by persons that these people are in any way related to the Communist Party?

Mr. Hoover. We have had no credible evidence that they have been related to the Communist Party in this country.

Now, as to Mrs. Oswald, the wife of Oswald, there is no way of knowing whether she belonged to the Russian Communist Party in Russia. She is a rather intelligent woman, and notwithstanding that you have to talk with her through an interpreter, we have had no indication of her association with Communists in this country, nor have any of her close friends or relatives.

As to his mother, we found no indication she is associated or closely associated with the Communists. She is the only one of the group that we have come in contact with that I would say is somewhat emotionally unstable. Our agents have interviewed her. She sometimes gets very angry and she won't answer questions. As to the rest of the group who had been friends of his, or worked with him in the Texas School Book Depository, none of them have indicated any Communist associations of any kind.

Senator Cooper. Thank you.

111 Mr. Hoover. Thank you.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, I hand you Exhibit 863 and ask you to examine that and state whether or not that is the letter that you referred to in which you answered questions of the Commission concerning the National Enquirer magazine or newspaper?

Mr. Hoover. This letter of May 8 addressed to the Commission is the letter that dealt with our interview with Chief Curry and was predicated upon the article which appeared in the National Enquirer of May 17, 1964.

Mr. Rankin. I ask you if you would care to add anything to that letter except what you have already testified to?

Mr. Hoover. No; I have nothing to add to that. Chief Curry was very specific, I am told by my agent in charge at Dallas, that this article is an absolute lie; that none of these things set forth in the article occurred; that he received no phone call or any request of any kind oral or by phone or in writing from the Department of Justice or from the FBI. As I stated earlier, the report from the Department of Justice indicated that they made no request.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 863, being the letter just referred to.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 863 for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, is Exhibit 837 the article that you referred to in the National Enquirer?

Mr. Hoover. Yes; that is the one.

Mr. Rankin. I call your attention to Exhibit 836 and ask you if that is the letter that you referred to which describes the criteria in the handling of the security of the President that you have described in your testimony.

Mr. Hoover. This is the letter. It sets forth the criteria which were adopted, originally about 1942 and later incorporated in the manual of instructions in 1954. It also includes the amended instructions to our field offices, prepared in December of 1963, which extended the criteria.

Mr. Rankin. Does that Exhibit correctly set forth the information you had in regard to those matters?

Mr. Hoover. It does.

Mr. Rankin. Do you care to add anything to it?

Mr. Hoover. No; I have nothing to add to it at all.

Mr. Rankin. Now, in light of what happened. Mr. Hoover, I think the Commission would desire to have your comments or whatever you care to tell them, concerning the reasons why you did not furnish the information you had concerning Lee Harvey Oswald to the Secret Service prior to the time of the President's assassination.

Mr. Hoover. Well, I have gone into that very thoroughly because that was obviously one of the questions that I had in my mind when the tragedy occurred in Dallas.

In going back over the record, and I have read each one of the reports dealing with that and the reports of Mr. Hosty who had dealt with the Oswald situation largely in Dallas, we had the matter that I have previously referred to, the report of the State Department that indicated this man was a thoroughly safe risk, he had changed his views, he was a loyal man now and had seen the light of day, so to speak.

How intensive or how extensive that interview in Moscow was, I don't know. But, nevertheless, it was in a State Department document that was furnished to us.

Now, we interviewed Oswald a few days after he arrived. We did not interview him on arrival at the port of entry because that is always undesirable by reason of the fact it is heavily covered by press, and any relatives generally are there, so we prefer to do it after the man has settled down for two or three days and become composed. We do it in the privacy of our office or wherever he may be, or in his own home or apartment. We interviewed him twice in regard to that angle that we were looking for. We had no indication at this time of anything other than his so-called Marxist leanings, Marxist beliefs.

112 We wanted to know whether he had been recruited by the Soviet government as an intelligence agent, which is a frequent and constant practice. There is not a year goes by but that individuals and groups of individuals, sometimes on these cultural exchanges, go through Russia and recruits are enlisted by the Russian intelligence, usually through blackmail. The individual is threatened that if he doesn't come back to this country and work for them they will expose the fact that he is a homosexual or a degenerate or has been indiscrete.

Pictures are usually taken of individuals who become implicated in that sort of thing, so the individual is really desperate. Such blackmail has occurred year after year for some time.

In Oswald's case we had no suspicion that any pressure like that had been brought to bear on him because he had gone voluntarily and had obviously wanted to live in Russia and had married a Russian woman.

After those interviews had been completed, the next incident was the difficulty he had at New Orleans. We were concerned there as to whether he was functioning officially for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which was financed and supported by Castro and Castro's government, and if he was, where he obtained money and with whom he had dealt.

He apparently had the leaflets printed himself on plain ordinary paper. There was no reason for us, then, to have any suspicion that he had any element of danger in him.

However, we did not ignore or forget the fact that he was still in the country. We kept track of him when he went from New Orleans to Dallas, and that was one of the reasons why Hosty went to the home of Mrs. Paine. She told us where Oswald was working, at the Texas book house. Hosty gave her his telephone number and his name so that if there was any information or any contact she wanted to make she could phone him at the Dallas office.

Mrs. Oswald, the wife, took down the license number of Hosty's car which was incorrect only in one digit. The name, the telephone number, and the automobile license were later found in Oswald's memorandum book.

However, that in itself was not significant because many times we will go to see a person and tell him now, "If you think of anything you want to tell us or you have any information you want to give us, here are my name and address, telephone number, and call me," and that is what was done with Mrs. Paine because Hosty wasn't there at the time. He was at work.

Incidentally, those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative attention were first set out in an investigative report of our Dallas Office dated December 23, 1963. This report was not prepared for this Commission but rather for investigative purposes of the FBI and, therefore, the information concerning Hosty's name, telephone number and license number was not included in the report as the circumstances under which Hosty's name, et cetera, appeared in Oswald's notebook were fully known to the FBI.

After our investigative report of December 23, 1963, was furnished to the Commission, we noted that Agent Hosty's name did not appear in the report. In order that there would be a complete reporting of all items in Oswald's notebook, this information was incorporated in another investigative report of our Dallas Office, dated February 11, 1964. Both of the above-mentioned reports were furnished to the Commission prior to any inquiry concerning this matter by the President's Commission.

There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President or to the Vice President. Up to that time, as has been indicated.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, may I interrupt, you said Hosty was not there at the time, he was at work—did you mean Mr. Oswald?

Mr. Hoover. That was my mistake. I meant Mr. Oswald. Hosty talked with Mrs. Paine and Mrs. Oswald. Mrs. Paine speaks Russian and she could interpret for her.

Oswald was at the Texas Book Co., and then, as I say, Hosty left his telephone number and name, and Mrs. Oswald for some reason took down the license number. I don't know whether she was convinced this was an agent of the FBI, or why she did it.

113 But, anyway, that was in the book that was later found, and which contained many other things that Oswald had entered in the book.

Now, as I say, up to that time, there had been no information that would have warranted our reporting him as a potential danger or hazard to the security or the safety of the President or the Vice President, so his name was not furnished at the time to Secret Service.

Under the new criteria which we have now put into force and effect, it would have been furnished because we now include all defectors. As to the original criteria, which we felt were sound and sufficient and which we felt no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent could take exception to, we limited the furnishing of names to S.S. to persons potentially dangerous to the physical well being of the President. We included emotionally unstable people who had threatened the President or Vice President.

At my office during the course of a week there are sometimes three or four callers who have to be taken to a Hospital because of their mental condition. They claim they are being persecuted by radio beams and they want to see me or the President to have those beams stopped. Now you never know what tangent they are going to take. If such a person is living in some part of the country where the President may be going his name would be furnished to the Secret Service.

One car last year, I think, crashed through the gates of the White House; the person driving wanted to see the President. The guard wouldn't let him in and so the car crashed through and got within 20 feet of the first door. The guards, by that time, had their revolvers out and took him into custody.

Last year a gentleman drove all the way from Arizona to see me. He drove up the marble steps of the Department of Justice, and by that time the guards had come out and took him into custody. I think he was incarcerated in Arizona.

People of this type are among those we would have furnished to the Secret Service. They have the potential to harm somebody.

We get names from members of Congress, of people who come to the Capitol and try to threaten them or harass them. They let us know about it, and we make the investigation or advise the police. If we can get the family to have the person put into an institution, we try to do so. If they don't, we may take steps to have him incarcerated through other legal means.

Mr. Dulles. How many names, Mr. Director, in general, could the Secret Service process? Aren't their facilities limited as to dealing with vast numbers of names because of their limited personnel?

Mr. Hoover. I think they are extremely limited. The Secret Service is a very small organization and that is why we are fortifying them, so to speak, or supplementing them by assigning agents of our Bureau which is, of course, quite a burden on us. Our agents are assigned about 24 to 25 cases per agent and cover such involved matters as bankruptcy and antitrust cases.

Now, the Secret Service has a very small group and I would estimate that the names we have sent over number some 5,000. I would guess there are about another 4,000 that will go over in the next month to them. Frankly, I don't see how they can go out and recheck those names. We keep the records up to date; if additional information comes in on these names we furnish it to the Secret Service. They will have to call upon the local authorities, unless the Secret Service force is enlarged considerably so that they can handle it entirely on their own. I think the Secret Service is entirely too small a force today to handle the duties that they are handling. The great crowds that are at the White House all the time, around the gates, that go to church where the President goes, all of those things, of course, have to be checked over by them. They always check in advance and just recently, a few Sundays ago, they found some individuals in the basement of St. Mark's church in Washington, where he was going to attend on Sunday morning. His arrival was held up until they could ascertain who they were. They were deaf mutes whose identity had not been cleared with the Secret Service.

Now, the Presidential party was delayed about 5 or 10 minutes in reaching the church by reason of the radio call to the White House to hold it up.

We are giving to Secret Service more and more names. The total, in addition to the names they already had, will reach 10,000. I don't see how they are114 going to be able to handle the situation as they would want to handle it. They have to depend upon local police organizations. Many local police departments are capable and efficient; some are not. Many have good judgment and some have not. Wherever you have a police department of 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 men you are bound to find a few who will just barge in and do something which better judgment would dictate should not be done, as in the incident which occurred in the Midwest where they placed people practically under house arrest. I think it was very bad judgment and should not have been done but the Secret Service, of course, turned the names over to the local authorities, and the local authorities do what they think is right.

Now, I guess their attitude with all justice to them is. "Well, we will resolve the risk in our favor. If we keep these people under surveillance and keep them in the house until the President gets out of town nothing can happen from them." That is what you would call totalitarian security. I don't think you can have that kind of security in this country without having a great wave of criticism against it. There is a great tendency for people to expect the intelligence forces and the law enforcement agencies to be able to go out and arrest people and bring them in and hold them endlessly and talk to them. We can't arrest a person, without probable cause, or unless he commits a crime in our presence. We have to arraign him promptly and if not done promptly, the confession that he may have made generally cannot be used against him.

Just as a collateral matter we faced that problem in California in the case of the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr. One of the kidnappers we arrested near San Diego confessed but we didn't arraign him because the other kidnappers would have left California and it would have been difficult to find them. However, the next day after arraignment he made changes in the confession and signed it so the court held that it was admissible.

The Secret Service, of course, is faced with the same problem. They just can't arrest people because they may not like their looks. They have to have facts justifying detention but the public conception is that you have a full right to go out and do these things. We have stressed in the FBI that there must be full compliance with the laws of this country and with the decisions of the Supreme Court. That is the law of the country. Now, whether a person likes it or not and there are some groups that are very violent against the decisions of the court while others are very much in favor of them, it is not for the FBI to take sides. We have a job to do and we do it under the rulings of the courts and we have been able to do it effectively.

I know when the ruling came down on the prompt arraignment, there was great shouting and some strong editorials claiming that it was going to wreck law enforcement. It hasn't wrecked us. It has made it more difficult but I think we have to face up to the fact that law enforcement in a free country must abide by the laws of that country irrespective of how difficult it is. Some persons talk about putting handcuffs on the law enforcement officers and taking them off the criminals. That is a nice catch phrase to use in a speech or article but operating within the law has not interfered with our work.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, I ask you about Exhibit 825 which is first a letter and then encloses certain affidavits of your agents.

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You are familiar with that?

Mr. Hoover. I am familiar with that. I read all of that and signed it.

Mr. Rankin. You know those are the affidavits in regard to whether Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent or connected in anyway with the Bureau that you have just testified to?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct; and the affidavits of all agents, who had any contact with him.

Mr. Rankin. I call your attention to Exhibits 864 and 865, and ask you if you have seen those before or, you have seen the original of 864 and 865 is a photostatic copy of your letter to us in answer to 864, is that correct?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct; yes. I recall very distinctly.

Mr. Rankin. Do you recall those letters involved an inquiry as to any connections of Lee Harvey Oswald with Communists or any criminal groups or others that might be conspiratorial?

115 Mr. Hoover. That is correct; and my letter of April 30 states the facts as they are in our files.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, we offer in evidence Exhibits 864 and 865.

The Chairman. They may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit Nos. 864 and 865 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, do you have any suggestions that you would like to tell the Commission about of your ideas that might improve the security of the President, and you might comment upon information the Commission has received. You have a special appropriation that is related to that area.

Mr. Hoover. Well, I, at the request of——

The Chairman. Director, before you get into that question, and may I ask something that I would like to hear you discuss in this same connection?

Mr. Hoover. Yes.

The Chairman. You have told us that you had no jurisdiction down there in Dallas over this crime.

Mr. Hoover. That is correct.

The Chairman. Because there is no Federal crime committed. And I assume that that caused you some embarrassment and some confusion in doing your work?

Mr. Hoover. It most certainly did.

The Chairman. Because of the likelihood of your being in conflict with other authorities. Do you believe there should be a Federal law?

Mr. Hoover. I am very strongly in favor of that.

The Chairman. Against an attempt to assassinate the President?

Mr. Hoover. I am very strongly in favor of legislation being enacted and enacted promptly that will make a Federal crime of attempts upon the life of the President and the Vice President, and possibly the next two persons in succession, the Speaker and the President pro tempore of the Senate. In the Oswald case, we could not take custody of him. If we had had jurisdiction we would have taken custody of him and I do not believe he would have been killed by Rubenstein. The failure to have jurisdiction was extremely embarrassing. I think the killing of Oswald has created a great fog of speculation that will go on for years, because of the things that Oswald might have been able to tell which would have been of assistance in pinning down various phases of this matter. This must be done now by collecting evidence from third parties, and not from Oswald himself.

Now, as to the publicity that took place in Dallas, I was very much concerned with that. We have in the FBI a crime laboratory that furnishes free service to all law enforcement agencies of the country. Any law enforcement agency can send to our laboratory here in Washington any evidence—blood, dirt, dust, guns, anything of that kind—and our laboratory examines it and then reports back to the contributing police department. This was being done in the early stages of the Oswald case, and almost as soon as the report would reach the Dallas Police Department, the chief of police or one of the representatives of the department would go on TV or radio and relate findings of the FBI, giving information such as the identification of the gun and other items of physical evidence.

Now, that concerned me for several reasons. In the first place, I don't think cases should be tried in the newspapers. I think a short and simple statement can be made when a person is arrested, but the details of the evidence should be retained until you go into court to try the case. Secondly, it creates a great deal of speculation on the part of the press. There was very aggressive press coverage at Dallas. I was so concerned that I asked my agent in charge at Dallas, Mr. Shanklin, to personally go to Chief Curry and tell him that I insisted that he not go on the air any more until this case was resolved. Until all the evidence had been examined, I did not want any statements made concerning the progress of the investigation. Because of the fact the President had asked me to take charge of the case I insisted that he and all members of his department refrain from public statements.

There was an officer in his department who was constantly on the radio or giving out interviews. The chief concurred in my request and thereafter116 refrained from further comment but of course by that time the identification of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where it had come from, where it had been bought and the information we had run down in Chicago and had furnished to the Dallas Police Department.

If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information would have been given out. Because of the publicity you had to face the charge that the prejudice of the community would require a change of venue. With the publicity, I don't know where you could have changed the venue to, since newspapers all over the State covered it. I think a Houston reporter was the first one who wrote that Oswald was an informant of the FBI. We went to the newspaper reporter. He refused to tell us his source. He said he had also heard it from other persons. We asked him the names of these persons and we interviewed them but none of them would provide the source. In other words, I was trying to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always the result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the press wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in the Bureau of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest. Then a release is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what the written complaint says, the fact. The complaint was filed with the Commissioner, and that ends it. We don't try to run it out for a week or 10 days. It is up to the U.S. attorney thereafter and the court to try the case.

I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the evidence was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn't know that Oswald was going to be killed, and there was a possibility that he might be confronted with some of this evidence. If it had been kept secret and used in the interrogation of him, just confronting him with what was found, such as his picture with the gun might have been helpful.

A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he will be on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always advised of his rights and that he can have an attorney. We always make a point of this. We generally have a reputable physician of the community present in our office while the prisoner is there, to administer to him and be able to testify that he has not been subjected to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes in and he is examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him before the commissioner in a case like Oswald's would probably have been done within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an hour.

That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say I am in favor of having the procedures of law enforcement officers as tightly bound down as we can, with due respect for the interests of society.

Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments used the third degree. I think very few of them use it now because if they use it they violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate them for having brutally handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made unfairly against police officers that they have used third degree methods and we are able to prove they haven't in our investigations. That is particularly true where civil rights matters are involved. We have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is going on.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions that you may have concerning the protection of the President, and the information that the Commission has that you have a special appropriation in that connection for the Bureau?

Mr. Hoover. We do not have a special appropriation for the protection of the President. The Secret Service, of course, has that responsibility. On December 2, I prepared this memorandum for the President, and for the chief of the Secret Service at the request of the President, outlining suggestions that I felt should be considered to tighten up on the security of the President. If the Commission desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to the Commission.

Representative Boggs. Why don't you ask the Director just to summarize it.

Mr. Rankin. Will you summarize it?

117 Mr. Dulles. Can we have a copy of it?

Mr. Hoover. Oh, yes.

Representative Ford. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. I have no objection to it.

Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as possible of the President's travel plans and proposed itinerary. The reason for that is there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they are going somewhere and the Secret Service does not have the chance always to cover the area and check the neighborhood and check the hotel or place where it may be.

Representative Boggs. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.

Mr. Hoover. I know from experience.

Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible. Again, it has been the practice in the past to announce the President is going along a certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather along that route. And, therefore, I thought that was something that should not be given out and the President should be taken along some routes which are not announced. At the present time, he goes to cities and he wants to see people and the crowd wants to see him. In Dallas, the route was publicized at least 24 hours before so everybody knew where he would be driving.

Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such cars readily available in locations frequently visited. The President, as I observed earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one now which I supplied to Secret Service and they will have one made no doubt in due time for the President's use. But if it had been armored, I believe President Kennedy would be alive today.

Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity such as visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.

Regarding public appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to the amount of metal required in a firearm or grenade.

Second, use a bulletproof shield in front of the entire rostrum in public appearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on inauguration day, the presidential reviewing stand in front of the White House on the same day and on the rear of trains.

Third, keep to a minimum the President's movements within crowds, remain on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling with the audience. Again, there is great difficulty in that field.

Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football games, remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time ceremonies.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Dulles. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored car that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have some protection to protect his head?

Mr. Hoover. Oh, yes.

Mr. Dulles. Because if the armored car had been open——

Mr. Hoover. He must never ride in an open car; that has been my recommendation.

Mr. Dulles. The back never comes down?

Mr. Hoover. The back never comes down, and it is bulletproof. The top, sides, and underpart are all of bulletproof construction. So that except by opening a window and waving through the window the occupant is safe. A person can shoot through the window if the glass window is lowered.

Fifth, limit public appearances by use of television whenever possible.

Sixth, avoid walking in public except when absolutely necessary.

Now, on legislation. First, I recommended that the President and the Vice President be added to the list of Federal officers set out in section 1114, title 18 of the U.S. Code which deals with assaults which are punishable under Federal law.

Mr. Rankin. You would add to that I understood from your prior remarks, the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore?

Mr. Hoover. In view of the situation which prevails at the present time the118 Speaker and President pro tempore, in other words, the line of succession under the Constitution but not below that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Hoover. Second, furnish the Secret Service authority to request assistance and cooperation from other U.S. agencies including the military, particularly in connection with foreign travel.

Now, my reason for that is that sometimes requests for assistance have to clear through red-tape channels here at Washington through some high official of Government. If an emergency arises abroad, or even in this country, it may be of such character that you do not have time to telephone back to Washington or to telephone back to the Pentagon. Aid ought to be immediately available by calling on the local authorities and the nearest military authority.

Third, improve control of the sale of firearms requiring as a minimum registration of every firearm sold together with adequate identification of the purchaser. The problem of firearms control is under extensive debate, in both the House and Senate at the present time.

The gun that Oswald used was bought by mail order from a mail-order house in Chicago, no license for it, no permit for it, no checkup on it. The only way we were able to trace it was to find out where in this country that Italian-made gun was sold. We found the company in Chicago and later the mail-order slip that had been sent by Oswald to Chicago to get the gun. Now, there are arguments, of course——

Mr. Dulles. In a false name.

Mr. Hoover. In a false name.

There is argument, of course, that by passing firearms legislation you are going to take the privilege of hunting away from the sportsmen of the country. I don't share that view with any great degree of sympathy because you have to get a license to drive an automobile and you have to get a license to have a dog, and I see no reason why a man shouldn't be willing, if he is a law-abiding citizen, to have a license to get a firearm whether it be a rifle or revolver or other firearm.

It is not going to curtail his exercise of shooting for sport because the police make a check of his background. If he is a man who is entitled to a gun, a law-abiding citizen, a permit will be granted.

Of course, today firearms control is practically negligible, and I think some steps should be taken along that line.

Fourth, a ban on picketing within the vicinity of the White House as is now done at the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Some of these pickets are well-meaning and law-abiding individuals, some are for peace and some are more or less dedicated Communists.

Representative Boggs. It is illegal to picket a Federal court now, Mr. Director, I happen to be the author of that law.

Mr. Hoover. Yes; I am glad you had that law passed. Of course, they picket public buildings, they march around the Department of Justice Building, now and then, but the principal places they prefer to go are the Supreme Court Building, the Capitol and its grounds and the White House.

I think such picketing at the White House, of large or small groups, should be forbidden. I think at the White House they tried to get the pickets to walk across the street along Lafayette Park. That at least takes them away from being close to the gates at the White House. I think there ought to be some control. Picketing, of course, is legitimate if it is orderly. Many times it doesn't continue to be orderly, and sometimes pickets, as in this city, have thrown themselves on the pavement and the police have to come and pick them up or drag them away. Then, of course, the charge is made of brutality right away.

Delegations of colored groups have visited me and asked why I don't arrest a police officer for hitting some Negro whom he is arresting in a sit-in strike, lay-in strike or demonstration in some southern cities.

We have no authority to make an arrest of that kind. Under the authority the Bureau has we have to submit those complaints to the Department of Justice and if they authorize us to make an arrest we will do it.

119 Those in general are the recommendations I made and I will furnish the committee with a copy of this memorandum.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, I would like to ask you in regard to your recommendations, do you think you have adequately taken into account that the President is not only the Chief Executive but also necessarily a politician under our system?

Mr. Hoover. I have taken that into account, and I would like to say this off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Rankin. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Any other questions, gentlemen?

Representative Boggs. I would just like to thank the Director again for all the help he has given us.

Mr. Hoover. I am happy to.

The Chairman. I would, too, on behalf of the Commission, Mr. Director, I would not only like to thank you for your testimony but for your cooperation that your people have given us throughout this entire investigation.

Mr. Hoover. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. I also want to add one other thing, having in mind the testimony you gave that this is still an open investigation, that should anything come to your attention that you believe this Commission has either overlooked or should look into you feel free to ask us to do it.

Mr. Hoover. I would most certainly do that.

The Chairman. You do it.

Mr. Hoover. I want to give all the cooperation I can to this most difficult task you have.

Representative Ford. One question. The other day when we had the State, Justice, Judiciary Appropriation bill before the full Committee on Appropriations——

Mr. Hoover. Yes.

Representative Ford. And I am not a member of that subcommittee, I noticed a provision in the bill, as I recall, to the effect funds for or something of that content, of FBI responsibilities for the protection of the President.

Mr. Hoover. There is a provision for funds that we can use for the apprehension of a man who has been declared a fugitive from justice, that is where a man has committed a crime, a warrant is out for him and he has fled or where he has escaped from a penitentiary. I don't recall offhand any specific appropriation for the protection of the President. I will look at the appropriation bill. I may be wrong there but I am quite certain that is so.

Representative Ford. It was my recollection as I was looking at the bill in committee there was a phrase to this effect in the language of the bill. I think it might be helpful for the record to get whatever the history is of that if it is still a matter of the bill or the law.

Mr. Hoover. I remember that at the time Mr. Curtis was Vice President, he was Senator and then Vice President, at that time he insisted that he wanted FBI agents with him and nobody else. When Mr. Nixon took office as Vice President he was protected by the Secret Service and with Mr. Johnson, it was the same thing.

Secret Service asked us to let them have additional manpower, as a matter of assistance, and we have done so.

Representative Ford. I think it would be helpful if you would have a memorandum prepared.

Mr. Hoover. I will be glad to.

Representative Ford. Showing the history of this provision from its inception and whether or not it is in the bill or the proposed law for fiscal 1965.

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Representative Ford. And the justification you have indicated.

Mr. Hoover. That was not taken up, I know, in the testimony before the Appropriations Committee. I gave the testimony before the committee in January, and the testimony wasn't released until 2 weeks ago when the bill was reported out. It was not discussed in the hearings.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, in order to complete the record, may I ask to120 have the number 866 assigned to the memo that Mr. Hoover is going to send about protection of the President, and have it admitted to this record under that number.

The Chairman. Yes; it may be.

Representative Ford. Also a number for this letter Mr. Hoover is going to submit.

Mr. Rankin. May I assign 867?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Commission Exhibit Nos. 866 and 867 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. McCONE AND RICHARD M. HELMS

The Chairman. The Commission will be in order.

Director McCone, it is customary for the Chairman to make a short statement to the witness as to the testimony that is expected to be given. I will read it at this time.

Mr. McCone will be asked to testify on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence or of any conspiracy either domestic or foreign involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, also with regard to any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States.

Would you please rise and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McCone. I do.

The Chairman. Will you be seated, please? Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, will you state your name?

Mr. McCone. My name is John Alex McCone.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have an official position with the U.S. Government?

Mr. McCone. Yes, sir; I am Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Rankin. Have you been Director for some time?

Mr. McCone. Yes; a little over 2½ years.

Mr. Rankin. Where do you live, Mr. McCone?

Mr. McCone. I live at 3025 Whitehaven Street in Washington.

Mr. Rankin. Are you familiar with the records and how they are kept by the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether a man is acting as an informer, agent, employee, or in any other capacity for that Agency?

Mr. McCone. Yes; I am generally familiar with the procedures and the records that are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Quite naturally, I am not familiar with all of the records because they are very extensive.

Mr. Rankin. Have you determined whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald, the suspect in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, had any connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, informer or indirectly as an employee, or any other capacity?

Mr. McCone. Yes; I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such connection, and I would like to read for the record——

Mr. Rankin. Will you tell us briefly the extent of your inquiry?

Mr. McCone. In a form of affidavit, I have gone into the matter in considerable detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate people within the Agency, examined all records in our files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald. We had knowledge of him, of course, because of his having gone to the Soviet Union, as he did, putting him in a situation where his name would appear in our name file. However, my examination has resulted in the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him directly or in any other manner. The Agency never furnished121 him with any funds or money or compensated him directly or indirectly in any fashion, and Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency. When I use the term "Agency," I mean the Central Intelligence Agency, of course.

Representative Ford. Does that include whether or not he was in the United States, in the Soviet Union, or anyplace?

Mr. McCone. Anyplace; the United States, Soviet Union, or anyplace.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, is that the affidavit you are going to supply the Commission in connection with our request for it?

Mr. McCone. Yes; this is the substance of the affidavit which I will supply to you.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to mark that Exhibit 870 and have it introduced in evidence as soon as we receive it from Mr. McCone as a part of this record.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 870 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Would you tell us about your procedures in regard to having an agent or informer or any person acting in that type of capacity? Does that have to pass through your hands or come to your attention in the Agency?

Mr. McCone. No; it does not have to come through my personal hands.

Mr. Rankin. Without disclosing something that might be a security matter, could you tell us how that is handled in a general way in the Agency?

Mr. McCone. Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that division of the Agency's activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be permissible?

Mr. Rankin. Could we have him sworn then?

The Chairman. Yes.

The Chairman. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Helms. I do.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Helms, you heard the inquiry just directed to Mr. McCone. Could you answer the question directly?

Mr. Helms. Yes; we have a specific procedure which we follow in all cases where the Agency is in contact, for the purposes of acquiring intelligence or whatever the case may be, with an individual. We not only have a record of the individual's name, but we also usually get information of a biographical nature. We then check this individual's name against our record. At that point we make a determination as to whether we desire to use this man or not to use him. It varies from case to case as to how many officers may be involved in approving a specific recruitment. May I go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Helms, did you have anything to do on behalf of your Agency with determining whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was acting in any of the capacities I have described in my questions to Mr. McCone?

Mr. Helms. Yes; I did.

Mr. Rankin. Will you tell us what you did in that regard?

Mr. Helms. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.

Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

122 Mr. Rankin. Mr. Helms——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question there? Do you recall or do you know at what time the name of Lee Harvey Oswald was carded, first came to your attention so it became a matter of record, in the Agency?

Mr. Helms. Sir, I would want to consult the record to be absolutely accurate, but it is my impression that the first time that his name showed up on any Agency records was when he went to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Helms, in connection with your work you have supplied information to the Commission and we have requested many things from your Agency. Can you tell the Commission as to whether or not you have supplied us all the information the Agency has, at least in substance, in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Helms. We have; all.

Representative Ford. Has a member of the Commission staff had full access to your files on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Helms. He has, sir.

Representative Ford. They have had the opportunity to personally look at the entire file?

Mr. Helms. We invited them to come out to our building in Langley and actually put the file on the table so that they could examine it.

The Chairman. I was personally out there, too, and was offered the same opportunity. I did not avail myself of it because of the time element, but I was offered the same opportunity.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Helms, can you explain, according to the limitations of security, the reasons why we examined materials but did not always take them, in a general way?

Mr. Helms. Yes; I can.

In our communications between individuals working overseas and in Washington, we for security reasons have a method of hiding the identities of individuals in telegrams and dispatches by the use of pseudonyms and cryptonyms. For this reason, we never allow the original documents to leave our premises. However, on the occasion when the representatives of the Commission staff looked at these files, we sat there and identified these pseudonyms and cryptonyms and related them to the proper names of the individuals concerned, so that they would know exactly what the correspondence said.

Mr. Rankin. By that you mean the representatives of the Commission were able to satisfy themselves that they had all of the information for the benefit of the Commission without disclosing matters that would be a threat to security; is that right?

Mr. Helms. It is my understanding that they were satisfied.

Representative Ford. Mr. McCone, do you have full authority from higher authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCone. That is right. It is my understanding that it is the desire of higher authority that this Commission shall have access to all information of every nature in our files or in the minds of employees of Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative Ford. On the basis of that authority, you or the Agency have made a full disclosure?

Mr. McCone. That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Helms, I have handed you Exhibits 868 and 869 directed to you acting for the Agency, the first one being from the Commission to you and the second one, 869, being your answer in regard to your full and complete disclosure in regard to your records; isn't that correct?

Mr. Helms. That is correct. May I say, Mr. Rankin, that any information, though, subsequent to this correspondence which we may obtain we will certainly continue to forward to the Commission.

Mr. Rankin. Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask leave to have those two exhibits, 868 and 869, received in evidence at this time.

The Chairman. They may be admitted under those numbers.

123 (Commission Exhibits Nos. 868 and 869 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, if I may return to you, I will now ask you if you have any credible information that you know of or evidence causing you to believe that there is any or was any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. McCone. No; I have no information, Mr. Rankin, that would lead me to believe or conclude that a conspiracy existed.

Representative Ford. Did the CIA make an investigation of this aspect of the assassination?

Mr. McCone. We made an investigation of all developments after the assassination which came to our attention which might possibly have indicated a conspiracy, and we determined after these investigations, which were made promptly and immediately, that we had no evidence to support such an assumption.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any contact with Oswald during the period of his life in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCone. No; not to my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according to any record we have.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any personal contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United States?

Mr. McCone. No.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, your Agency made a particular investigation in connection with any allegations about a conspiracy involving the Soviet Union or people connected with Cuba, did you not?

Mr. McCone. Yes, we did. We made a thorough, a very thorough, investigation of information that came to us concerning an alleged trip that Oswald made to Mexico City during which time he made contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to gain transit privileges from Mexico City to the Soviet Union via Havana. We investigated that thoroughly.

Mr. Rankin. Do you also include in your statement that you found no evidence of conspiracy in all of that investigation?

Mr. McCone. That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. And also the investigation you made of the period that Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCone. That is right.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question there? Does your answer, Mr. McCone, include a negation of any belief that Oswald was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time when you were in contact with him or knew about his activities?

Mr. McCone. As I have already stated, we were never in contact with Oswald. We have no evidence that he was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time. According to his diary, Oswald did receive a subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross which we assume had the approval of the authorities. Such a payment does not indicate to us that he even worked for the Soviet intelligence services. Furthermore, we have no other evidence that he ever worked for Soviet intelligence.

Representative Ford. Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any investigation into this area?

Mr. McCone. No, because, at the present time, we have no information in our files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satisfaction. Naturally, any new information that might come into our hands would be investigated promptly.

Mr. Helms. I simply wanted to add that we obviously are interested in anything we can pick up applying to this case, and anything we get will be immediately sent to the Commission, so that we haven't stopped our inquiries or the picking up of any information we can from people who might have it. This is on a continuing basis.

Representative Ford. In other words, the case isn't closed.

Mr. Helms. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.

124 Mr. Rankin. Would that be true, Mr. Helms, even after the Commission completed its report, you would keep the matter open if there was anything new that developed in the future that could be properly presented to the authorities?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I would assume the case will never be closed.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, do you have any ideas about improving the security provisions for the President that you would like to relate to the Commission?

Mr. McCone. Well, this is, in my opinion, a very important question which I am sure this Commission will—has and will—devote a considerable amount of thought to, and undoubtedly have some recommendations as part of its report.

Mr. Rankin. Your Agency does have an important function in some aspects.

Mr. McCone. We have a very important function in connection with the foreign travels of the President, and I would like to inform the Commission as to how we discharge that responsibility by quickly reviewing the chronology of the Central Intelligence Agency's support of President Kennedy's visit to Mexico City from the 29th of June to the 2d of July 1962.

Mr. Rankin. Will you please do that.

The Chairman. Director, is that a security matter?

Mr. McCone. No. I think I can handle this for the record.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. McCone. If I have to make a remark or two off the record I will ask that privilege.

That visit, as I said, started on the 29th of June. On the 28th of April, in anticipation of the visit, instructions were transmitted to Mexico for the Ambassador to coordinate planning and informational guidance for the advance party of the Secret Service.

We asked that the Secret Service be given information on local groups and persons who would cause disturbances, embarrassments or physical harm, an estimate of the determination and ability of the Mexican government to prevent incidents, and preparation for special briefings to the Embassy officials and the Secret Service, and such additional support and communications personnel that might be required.

These instructions were given two months before the trip.

On the 15th of May, we received confirmed information that the President would visit Mexico on the specific dates. On the 1st of June the Secret Service was supplied by the Agency with the detailed survey of Mexican security forces that would be called upon to protect the President.

Friendly and allied governments were informed of the visit and their cooperation and pertinent informational support was solicited. From this date through the 2d of July daily information reports were furnished to the State Department, the Secret Service, the FBI and the military services.

That is from the 1st of June to the 2d of July, a period of 31, 32 days. On the 8th of June the Secret Service advance party was briefed in detail by a group of officers of the Agency on the Mexican government's plans for the protection of the President, including current information on the size, strength and capabilities of potential troublemakers.

Hazardous locations and times in the planned itinerary were identified, political and economic issues that might be invoked by hostile elements for demonstrations were specified.

On the 11th of June, the Secret Service advance party left for Mexico supported by additional security personnel to assist in coordinating an informational report and the followup activity required.

Especially prepared national intelligence estimates on the current security conditions in Mexico was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on the 13th of June.

On the 15th of June arrangements were completed to reenforce communications facilities. On the 24th of June a conference at the State Department was held at the request of the President for reviewing security measures, and this meeting I attended personally, and reported to the State Department on the essence of all that had gone before.

Emergency contingency plans were discussed and a consensus was reached that the President should make the visit as scheduled.

125 On the 27th of June, a final updated special national intelligence estimate was prepared, and this indicated no basic changes in the security assessment that Mexican government was prepared to cope with foreseeable security contingencies.

On the 28th of June, a final briefing report was prepared for the Director's use which indicated the security precautions of the Mexican government had effectively forestalled major organized incidents, and our informed estimate was that the President would receive a great welcome.

The report was presented to the President personally by the Director at noon in a final meeting prior to departure on this trip.

From the 29th of June to the 2d of July in Washington headquarters, headquarters components remained on a 24-hour alert for close support of the embassy and the Secret Service.

So, not only was the Central Intelligence Agency and its various components involved in this for a period of 2 months in close collaboration with the Secret Service, but by bringing in the United States Intelligence Board we brought in all of the intelligence assets of the United States Government in connection with this particular trip. I thought this procedure which is followed regularly on all trips that the President makes out of the country would be of interest to the Commission.

The Chairman. That is the normal format of your procedures?

Mr. McCone. Yes.

The Chairman. When the President goes abroad?

Mr. McCone. Yes, I selected this one. The same was true of his trip to Caracas or Paris or elsewhere.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, in your investigation of the Oswald matter did you use the same approach or a comparable approach to a liaison with the other intelligence agencies of government to try to discover anything that might involve your jurisdiction.

Mr. McCone. Yes. We were in very close touch with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with the Secret Service on a 24-hour basis at all points, both domestic and foreign, where information had been received which might have a bearing on this problem.

Mr. Rankin. Assassination?

Mr. McCone. Assassination.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have an opinion, Mr. McCone, as to whether or not the liaison between the intelligence agencies of the United States Government might be improved if they had better mechanical, computer or other facilities of that type, and also some other ideas or methods of dealing with each other?

Mr. McCone. There is a great deal of improvement of information that might be of importance in a matter of this kind through the use of computers and mechanical means of handling files, and you, Mr. Chief Justice, saw some of our installations and that was only a beginning of what really can be done.

The Chairman. Yes; I did.

Mr. McCone. I would certainly urge that all departments of government that are involved in this area adopt the most modern methods of automatic data processing with respect to the personnel files and other files relating to individuals. This would be helpful.

But I emphasize that a computer will not replace the man, and therefore, we must have at all levels a complete exchange of information and cooperation between agencies where they share this responsibility, and in going through this chronology, it points out the type of exchange and cooperation that the Central Intelligence Agency tries to afford both the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in matters where we have a common responsibility.

I would like to emphasize the very great importance of this exchange, which is not always easily accomplished because it is cumbersome.

Sometimes it becomes involved in distracting people from other duties, and so on and so forth.

I have given a good deal of thought to the matter of some incentives to bring out informers, thinking about the old informer statutes in which some of them are still on the books, in which people were rewarded for informing when others conducted themselves in a damaging way.

126 Mr. Dulles. Smuggling cases?

Mr. McCone. Smuggling cases. But I believe that something could be done. I call to the attention of this Commission one of the laws relating to atomic energy, namely the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 wherein a substantial reward is offered for the apprehension of persons responsible for the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the United States of such nuclear material or atomic weapons. It is suggested that the Commission may wish to recommend that original but similar legislation be enacted which would induce individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a substantial reward and preferential treatment. Substantial reward could represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret associations and state security organs abroad who are charged with assassination and sabotage. We have information that such personnel and police state apparatuses have expressed and, in certain cases, acted upon their repugnance for such work and for the political system which requires such duties to be performed.

Mr Rankin. Is it your belief, Mr. McCone, that the methods for exchange of information between intelligence agencies of the Government could be materially improved.

Mr. McCone. I think the exchange between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Secret Service is quite adequate. I am not informed as to whether the exchanges between the Secret Service and the FBI are equally adequate. I have not gone into that. I would have no means to know. Certainly it is most important that it be done.

Mr. Dulles. Looking back now that you have the full record, do you feel that you received from the State Department adequate information at the time that they were aware of Oswald's defection and later activities in the Soviet Union, did you get at the time full information from the State Department on those particular subjects?

Mr. McCone. Well, I am not sure that we got full information, Mr. Dulles. The fact is we had very little information in our files.

Mr. Helms. It was probably minimal.

Representative Ford. Why did that happen?

Mr. Helms. I am not sure, Mr. Ford. I can only assume that the State Department had a limited amount. Interestingly enough, it is far enough back now so that it's very hard to find people who were in the Moscow Embassy at the time familiar with the case, so in trying to run this down one comes to a lot of dead ends and I, therefore, would not like to hazard any guess.

Representative Ford. Whose responsibility is it; is it CIA's responsibility to obtain the information or State Department's responsibility to supply it to Central Intelligence and to others.

Mr. McCone. With respect to a U.S. citizen who goes abroad, it is the responsibility of the State Department through its various echelons, consular service and embassies and so forth.

For a foreigner coming into the United States, who might be of suspicious character, coming here for espionage, subversion, assassination and other acts of violence, we would, and we do exchange this information immediately with the FBI.

Representative Ford. But in this particular case, Oswald in the Soviet Union, whose responsibility was it to transmit the information, whatever it was, to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCone. Well, it would be the State Department's responsibility to do that. Whether there really exists an order or orders that information on an American citizen returning from a foreign country be transmitted to CIA, I don't believe there are such regulations which exist.

Mr. Helms. I don't believe they do, either.

Mr. McCone. I am not sure they should.

Representative Ford. It wouldn't be your recommendation that you, the head of Central Intelligence Agency, should have that information?

Mr. Dulles. In a case of an American defecting to a Communist country, shouldn't you have it?

Mr. McCone. Certainly certain types of information. What we ought to be127 careful of here, would be to rather clearly define the type of information which should be transmitted, because after all, there are hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans going back and forth every year, and those records are the records of the Immigration Service, the Passport Division.

Mr. Dulles. I was thinking of a person who having defected might, of course, have become an agent and then reinserted into the United States and if you were informed of the first steps to that you might help to prevent the second step.

Mr. McCone. Well, certainly information on defectors or possible recruitments should be, and I have no question is being, transmitted.

Representative Ford. What I was getting at was whether the procedures were adequate or inadequate, whether the administration was proper or improper in this particular case, and if some files you have that started when he attempted to defect are inadequate why we ought to know, and we ought to know whether the basic regulations were right or wrong, whether the administration was proper or improper, that is what I am trying to find out.

I would like your comment on it.

Mr. McCone. Well, I think the basic regulations should be examined very carefully to be sure that they are copper-riveted down and absolutely tight. What I am saying, however, is because of the vast number of Americans who go abroad and stay in foreign countries for indefinite periods of time, it would be an impossible task to transmit all information available in the State Department and Immigration Service as files to the Central Intelligence Agency. It would not be a productive exercise. What must be transmitted and is being transmitted, while I cannot recite the exact regulations is information that is, becomes, known to the various embassies of suspicious Americans that might have been recruited and defected, and then returned so that they would be agents in place.

Representative Ford. In this case, Oswald attempted to defect, he did not, he subsequently sought the right to return to the United States, he had contact with the Embassy. Was the Central Intelligence Agency informed of these steps, step by step, by the Department of State?

Mr. McCone. You might answer that.

Mr. Helms. Mr. Ford, in order to answer this question precisely I would have to have the file in front of me. I have not looked at it in some time so I don't have it all that clearly in mind. But it is my impression that we were not informed step by step. When I say that there is no requirement that I am aware of that the State Department should inform us and when I said a moment ago that we had minimal information from them, this was not in any sense a critical comment but a statement of fact.

But an American going to the American Embassy would be handled by the Embassy officials, either consular or otherwise. This would be a matter well within the purview of the State Department to keep all the way through, because we do not have responsibility in the Central Intelligence Agency for the conduct or behavior or anything else of American citizens when they are abroad unless there is some special consideration applying to an individual, or someone in higher authority requests assistance from us. So that the State Department, I think, quite properly would regard this matter as well within their purview to handle themselves within the Embassy or from the Embassy back to the Department of State without involving the Agency in it while these events were occurring.

Representative Ford. I think it could be argued, however, that the uniqueness of this individual case was such that the Department of State might well have contacted the Central Intelligence Agency to keep them abreast of the developments as they transpired. This is not—and when I say this, I mean the Oswald case—is not an ordinary run-of-the-mill-type of case. It is far from it. Even back in the time, well, from the time he went, and particularly as time progressed, and he made application to return, there is nothing ordinary about the whole situation.

Mr. McCone. That is quite correct; there is no question about that.

Representative Ford. And I am only suggesting that if the regulations were not adequate at the time and are not now, maybe something ought to be done about it.

128 Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, when you said that supplying all of the information about U.S. citizens who went abroad and came back to the country would not be a profitable exercise, did that comment include the thought that such an intrusion upon all citizens would be questionable?

Mr. McCone. Such an intrusion?

Mr. Rankin. Upon their right to travel.

Mr. McCone. Well, I think this would have a bearing on it. I did not have that particular matter in mind when I made that statement, however. I was just thinking of the——

Mr. Rankin. Burden?

Mr. McCone. Of the burden of vast numbers involved.

Mr. Rankin. Do you you have any thought in regard to whether it would be an intrusion upon their rights?

Mr. McCone. Well, that would be a matter of how it was handled. Certainly, if it was handled in a way that the counterpart of providing the information was to impose restrictions on them, then it would be an intrusion on their rights.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Senator Cooper. May I inquire?

The Chairman. Senator Cooper.

Senator Cooper. I missed the first part of Mr. McCone's testimony; I went to answer a quorum call. Perhaps the question has been asked.

It has been brought into evidence that a number of people in the Embassy talked to Oswald when he first defected, and the various communications with the Embassy and, of course, when he left to come back to the United States. Have we been able to ascertain the names of officials in the Embassy or employees with whom Oswald talked on these various occasions?

Mr. McCone. I am not familiar with them; no.

Mr. Helms. Neither am I, sir.

Mr. McCone. I presume that the Department's inquiries have covered it.

Senator Cooper. Is it possible to ascertain the names of those employees?

Mr. Rankin. Senator Cooper, I can answer that. We have inquired of the State Department for that information, and are in the process of obtaining it all.

Senator Cooper. Taking into consideration your answers to the previous question, would it have been possible in your judgment to have secured more comprehensive information about the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. McCone. It would not have been possible for the Central Intelligence Agency to have secured such information because we do not have the resources to gain such information.

The Chairman. Anything more? Congressman Ford?

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency investigate any aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we did.

Representative Ford. Can you give us any information on that?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we were aware that Oswald did make a trip to Mexico City and it was our judgment that he was there in the interest of insuring transit privileges and that he made contact with the Cuban Embassy while he was there.

We do not know the precise results of his effort, but we assumed, because he returned to the United States, he was unsuccessful. We have examined to every extent we can, and using all resources available to us every aspect of his activity and we could not verify that he was there for any other purpose or that his trip to Mexico was in any way related to his later action in assassinating President Kennedy.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency make any investigation of any alleged connection between Oswald and the Castro government?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we investigated that in considerable detail, because information came to us through a third party that he had carried on a rather odd discussion with Cuban officials in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The allegation was that he had received under rather odd circumstances a substantial amount of money in the Cuban Embassy, and the statement was made by one who claimed to have seen this transaction take place. After a very thorough129 and detailed examination of the informer, it finally turned out by the informer's own admission that the information was entirely erroneous, and was made for the purpose of advancing the informer's own standing with the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Government and it was subsequently retracted by the informer in its entirety.

Representative Ford. Was there any other evidence or alleged evidence——

Mr. McCone. Parenthetically, I might add a word for the record that the date that the informer gave as to the date in time of this alleged transaction was impossible because through other, from other, information we determined that Oswald was in the United States at that particular time.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency ever make an investigation or did it ever check on Mr. Ruby's trip to Cuba or any connections he might have had with the Castro government?

Mr. McCone. Not to my knowledge.